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It gives me great pleasure to introduce this volume as the eleventh in the series  
entitled Papers in English and American Studies (PEAS) published by our Institute  
of English and American Studies. The Institute prides itself on being the first ever  
in Hungary to have launched an American Studies program. Under the leadership  
of Dr. Bálint Rozsnyai, the program was founded in1985 and matured into a major  
degree program by 1994. It has exhibited great development in terms of the number  
of staff, infrastructure, student body, teaching potential as well as research output  
of which this volume is the first representative in the PEAS series.  
As Shelley Fisher Fishkin, current president of the American Studies Association,  
claimed in her presidential address in Atlanta in November 2004, American Studies  
has been open to a wide range of methodologies and approaches, and connected to  
this is the assumption that its definition may well vary from place to place and even  
from scholar to scholar. Reassuring as this view may look at first sight, she also 
pointed at the existence of major tendencies that have influenced the development  
of the field in one way or another ever since the 1960s, with the emergence of 
women's and the civil rights movement, various sorts of minority consciousness,  
and, in our times, transnationalism (American Quarterly March 2005, 19) . In other  
words, history seems to have molded the contours of American Studies world wide,  
to a great extent offering concerns and emphases, raising certain issues for scholarly  
attention. Thus, however much these may vary, no institution of American Studies  
can have the power to remain unaffected by these processes. Consequently, the  
American Studies program has as its major components the more recently devel-
oped fields of cultural studies, ethnic and minority studies, women's studies or pop-
ular culture alongside the more traditional fields having a longer record such as his-
tory, intellectual history, literary history or the history of American religions. Both  
research and teaching have focuses in these fields. 
This work by Irén Annus addresses the issue of identity, a theme that has been  
a major concern in American Studies since its founding in the 1950s and a problem  
that cuts across quite a number of the sub-fields of American Studies. Identity is  
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probably best placed at the intersection of several disciplines, such as history, soci-
ology, literature, minority and migration studies, or transnational studies — in short, 
it is a ubiquitous organizing principle for theorizing various problems in American 
Studies. 
Dr. Annus undertakes to survey theories of identity conceived and blossoming 
in the American (i.e. US) soil, following chronological order, in order to show how 
they were, to a considerable degree, responses to changing historical circumstances. 
She also provides an analysis of these models by, at the same time, constructing a 
narrative about the development of American identity as she conceives it, from 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestant fathers through melting pot believers and all the way 
down to contemporary multiculturalism and identity politics. She does this within 
a conceptual framework centered around nation, ethnicity and identity, offering a 
usable map for readers to find their way in the labyrinth of proliferating theories of 
American identity in the last century. She also does this with grace and ease in a 
delectable style, making professional jargon accessible even to the lay reader. 
Interestingly, but hardly surprisingly, the book also highlights the great irony 
that needs constant reflecting upon: when doing American Studies as national stud-
ies (i.e. studying the USA), what does one do in the face of contemporary theories 
of identities that actually question the existence of stable, essentialist conceptions of 
identities, including national identity? Does the national focus then seem to have 
melted into thin air? One may argue, as Fisher Fishkin did in Atlanta, that the trans-
national perspective can show a way out of the collapsing structures represented by 
the nation as a conceptual category; furthermore, now, at the dawning of the age 
of deterritorialization (a possible consequence of globalization) we may look into 
a brighter future. Tough problems that will keep us busy for a long while, this work 
offers a useful perspective on them. 
All that remains to be said is that one wishes that her work, ambitious in scope 
and persistent in its aim to make sense even to a non-expert English "reading" au-
dience, reach an ever expanding readership of students, colleagues, lovers and haters 
of the USA alike, and, last but not least, students of American identities. 
ZOLTÁN VAJDA 
Associate Director of IEAS 
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This volume offers two studies to readers interested in social sciences in general 
and in American studies in particular. One presents the theory of structuration, one 
of the most recent metatheories on social existence and realities. It was developed 
in 1984 by Anthony Giddens, one of the most prominent social thinkers of our 
times. The other piece traces the various ways and contexts within which under-
standings ofAmerican identity have changed within social sciences, especially within 
sociology. Both of these studies grew out of a need to fill two gaps in Hungarian 
academic writing: one, the need to provide the Hungarian audience with an intro-
duction to the theory of structuration—a theory unfairly neglected in Hungary—
through a publication readily available; and two, to provide an understanding of 
how social realities have been captured through theorizations on identity in the US. 
Part I is devoted to Giddens' grand theory, which is greatly praised for having 
attempted to overcome the dichotomy between giving primacy to a micro- or to a 
macro-level analysis in the social sciences. The first chapter outlines the way in 
which this theory emerged and covers the most prominent scholars and notions to 
influence Giddens in the process. This is followed in the second chapter by a de-
tailed discussion of the theory of structuration, its internal logic, and its key terms 
and concepts. The third chapter opens with a review of the reception of this theory 
in the social sciences, outlining the main points of praise and criticism. Finally, a 
discussion of the various areas in which this theory has proven significant in social 
theories—such as identity studies—and in social research closes Part I. 
Part II surveys the more influential social theories in the US regarding American 
identity. A study of this kind may be valuable in showing how modern identities are 
constructions, always in the process of changing, and thus of making, as well as the 
ways in which the borders dividing groups are flexible and depend on various un-
derstandings of realities and ways of theorizing about them. A discussion of these 
identity models in a historical sequence also reveals how circumstances and contexts 
contribute to the semantic field of identities along with the social and cultural prac-
tices that the given group embraces. 
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I would also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all those 
who were of particular help to me in this project. These include the Council for 
Academic Affairs at the University of Szeged for financing the publication of this 
book; Erzsébet Barát for her precise, insightful comments, but even more so for her 
never failing, long-term academic support; Zoltán Vajda for his well-placed com-
ments; Etelka Szőnyi, my editor, for her consistent attention to my publications; 
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AVNAM.4 1465V.,  
INTRODUCTION 
The theory of structuration set forth by the British sociologist Anthony Giddens 
is probably the most influential grand social theory to have appeared in the last 20 
years. Its significance stems from the fact that it claims to be a social theory, em-
bracing a number of issues late twentieth-century social scientists have included in 
their research. To that end, it also integrates a number of concepts and theories which 
have marked the various fields of social sciences throughout the century, thus offering 
a critical reassessment of the theories to have emerged during this period. Giddens' 
theory has been much debated, praised and criticized, but has definitely become an 
exceptional contribution to social sciences and research which cannot go unnoticed. 
Having developed out of a thorough critical study of the classics, this compre-
hensive theory on the constitution of societies was the fruit of a long journey. An out-
line of this venture and the ideas which have shaped Giddens' thinking may assist one 
in seeing the process in which this theory has taken shape. Thus, Chapter 1 is devoted 
to the discussion of Giddens' early work and the roots of structuration theory. Chap-
ter 2 follows this with a discussion of the theory of structuration, organized around 
three areas: (1) the micro-level analysis of actors and action; (2) the macro-level anal-
ysis of structure(s) and institutions; and (3) the introduction of the duality of struc-
ture which, in Giddens' understanding, binds these two realms together in a dialectical 
relationship. Chapter 3 outlines the critical reception of the theory of structuration 
and the areas which have drawn on it, either in theorizations or actual research, in the 
years following its publication in its most comprehensive form in 1984. 2 
1 	Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 




GIDDENIS AND THE ROOTS OF 
HIS THEORY OF STRUC'I` UIiATION 
This chapter outlines the background of the theory of structuration, thus con-
tributing to a more thorough understanding of Giddens' theory as well as to the 
location of this theory on the map of social sciences. Giddens proposes a grand 
theory which, he claims, must be interdisciplinary in nature 3 and should regard 
areas, which are larger in scope than the traditional ones we have become familiar 
with, such as sociology, anthropology, or ethnography, to mention but a few.' He 
presents his social theory which borrows from findings and considerations of 
various disciplines, and is also able to encompass issues which he holds "to be the 
concern of all the social sciences." 5 He proposes that these issues regard the nature 
of human action and self, of social interaction and institutions, as well as of social 
analysis. He maintains that his theory aids one in understanding how social realities 
are constituted in contemporary societies, which he defines as the period of late 
modernity.' The sections to follow outline the intellectual passage through which 
he arrived at the theory of structuration: his early works and assessment of pre-
viously constructed theories and concepts. 
3 	Interest in various disciplines has characterized Giddens from the beginning. Already as a student, 
he wanted to major in philosophy, but once he found that it was not possible, he majored in psychology 
and sociology. 
4 	He claims that sociology, for example, is "not a generic discipline to do with the study of human 
societies as a whole, but that branch of social science which focuses particularly upon the `advanced' or 
modern societies." Giddens 1984, xvii. 
5 	Giddens 1984, xvi. 
6 	This periodization already locates him with regard to his understanding of the self and societies. 
He explains his position in an interview with Lars Kaspersen in 1993 with the following reasoning: "I 
attempt to distance myself from concepts such as postmodernity and the postmodern. The postmodernists 
view our world as fragmented, which in my opinion is not the case. The development of society is to a 
great degree characterized by a duality between fragmentation and unification, between disintegration and 
integration. Today we can observe the dissolution of states, families, and friendships, but at the same time 
we see being recreated new units and relations which cut across the former bonds." Lars Bo Kaspersen, 
Anthony Giddens. An Introduction to a Social Theorist (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 143. 
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1. The Early Giddens 
Giddens' first major book entitled Capitalism and Modern Social Theory ex-
presses his interest in social theories in general. His analysis and criticism of such 
classics of sociology as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim demonstrate 
not only his extensive knowledge of the field but his dissatisfaction with the ex-
planatory force of these earlier theorists. He argues that contemporary capitalist 
societies have broken away from the old formulas captured by these scholars and 
their systems can, therefore, no longer be used to describe late modernity. Ulti-
mately, this hints at the possibility of his moving on later in his career to construct 
a theory which can capture contemporary societies with more success, provided that 
generally applicable theories describing modern Western societies can exist at all. 
Relying on Marx and conflict theory, in his next study, The Class Structure of the 
Advanced Societies, 8 Giddens analyzes modern social change and the role of vio-
lence—a recurring theme for him as, for example, in The Nation-State and Violence. 9 
These works are concerned with more general societal changes, structures, and func-
tions. Giddens seems to turn away from empirical macro-level analysis in society—a 
quintessential feature of British sociology—to the realm of theoretical modeling, 1°  
that is, the development of the theory of structuration, so that in his later works in 
the early 1990s he can focus on a microanalysis of the individual, the self, the most 
prominent works on which are Modernity and Self-Identity ll and The Transformation 
oflntimacy12 . This continuum seems to indicate his fascination with both of the clas-
sical trends: the dualities between agency and determinism, action and structure, as 
well as individual and system, having been expressed through structuralism, func-
tionalism, and conflict theory, on the one hand, and phenomenology and symbolic 
interactionism, on the other. His attraction to, as well as his partial rejection of, 
both of these major trends indicate that in some way they will both be reworked in 
his structuration theory. 
Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
9 Anthony Giddens,A Contemporary Critique ofHistoricalMaterialism, Vol. 2, The Nation-State and 
Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 
10 	The British empiricist tradition in sociology preferred to execute social analysis by looking at var- 
ious phenomena in the first phase, using various methods, such as surveys or statistical analysis in the 
assessment, and then conceptualize about the findings in the second, descriptive phase, which allows for 
empirical generalizations based on which theory-building may begin. This method of social analysis often 
described as inductive is challenged by Giddens, who prefers the deductive model, as implied by the fact 
that he proposes a social metatheory for consideration as the starting point for social analysis. 
11 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity. Selfand Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991). 
12 Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
1971). 
8 Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London: Hutchinson, 1973). 
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This theory is based on Giddens' firm assumption that "[S]ocial theory does not 
`begin' either with the individual or with society, both of which are notions that 
need to be reconstructed through other concepts. In structuration theory, the core 
concern of the social sciences is with recurrent social practices and their transfor-
mations.i 13 This reconstruction takes place through his evaluation of the schools of 
classical social thought which he considers insufficient to capture social realities in 
a complex and exhaustive manner. 
He has undertaken this complicated task, resulting in the gradual emergence of 
the theory of structuration during the second half of the 1970s, and the first part of 
the 1980s. The first time Giddens refers to it is in his New Rules of Sociological 
Method" in which he concentrates on interpretative sociology and searches for a 
satisfactory position to recognize the "centrality of the interpretation of meaning" 
in sociology. The next study to contribute further to the development of his theory 
is Central Problems in Social Theory, 15 which provides a criticism of structuralist and 
post-structuralist thought. A brief synopsis of his conception serving as the basis of 
the new theory is introduced in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: 
Vol. 1 16 while a complete exposition of his system of thoughts is provided in The 
Constitution of Society, the book fully devoted to this theory. 
2. The Roots of the Theory of Strue oration 
In the "Introduction" to The Constitution of Society, Giddens proposes to reach 
beyond a theory with a sociological bias, meaning that his is a social theory addres-
sing issues which are of concern to all the social sciences; however, he maintains a 
sociological bias in that his theory is with a concentration upon modern Western 
states and societies. ' He claims to break with the traditional orthodoxies of as-
signing superiority either to actors or structures and to offer a comprehensive frame-
work applicable to "the illumination of concrete processes of social life." 18 He 
introduces the concept of the duality of structure as the way to destabilize the di-
chotomy between subjects and objects, that is, actors and structures, by arguing for 
a relationship between them which is dialectical in manner. 
13 	Giddens 1991, 203. 
14 Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (London: Hutchinson, 1976). 
15 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
16 Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism,  Vol.], Power, Property and 
State (London: Macmillan, 1981). 
17 	He also calls for a shift in the focus of social research from epistemology to ontology, placing 
issues regarding existence in the center of investigation. 
18 	Giddens 1984, xvii. 
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The two classical trends, however, have also supplied him with some of the basic 
elements of his theory insofar as he has had to consider the role of the acting agent 
in the light of its relations to the structure(s) and institutions of modern societies. 
The classics have also convinced Giddens that a social theory has to address the 
realm of social praxis, reproduction, and transformation with reference to the role 
of time and space, which have also become key notions in post-structuralist think-
ing. Giddens, therefore, also regards the positioning of the actors or the various 
time constraints involved, that is, the problem of enclosure and disclosure in social 
action. However, it is also necessary to pair these various ontological issues with 
some epistemological ones, such as the ability of the actors to initiate, control, and 
monitor their actions as well as the development of their knowledgeability. 
Besides the classics, Giddens also considers carefully the propositions set forth 
by his contemporaries. He finds that his model that addresses these latter issues 
regarding actors can revolve around (1) the results of recent psychological investi-
gations, especially findings regarding cognitive processes, that is, how the mind, the 
conscious, and the unconscious work; as well as (2) what is commonly referred to 
in the literature as the linguistic turn in the social sciences which evokes the issues 
of the construction of meaning, verification, and falsification as well as the inter-
section of acting and speaking. Other contemporary post-structuralist scholars also 
raise the issue of the role and function of ideology, power, knowledge, structure, 
and institutions in the reproduction of society, questioning the agency position of 
the individual and redefining it as an ideologically interpellated subject, a position 
Giddens rejects. However, other post-structuralist views do leave their mark on his 
methodology and conceptual development. 
What follows is an attempt to elucidate Giddens' conviction that a crisis exists in 
the social sciences since, he claims, social scientists have been unable to overcome 
the classical dichotomy between micro- and macro-level analyses. This crisis thwart-
ed the emergence of a holistic, integrative theory that would successfully combine 
both of these trends. The present chapter outlines his criticism of the various schools 
of thought 19 and explores which notions put forth by these trends he has found 
applicable and valid in constituting his own conception. 20 
19 The following discussion does not offer a comprehensive introduction to the various schools but 
focuses only on those more important notions which Giddens draws on significantly in his theory. 
20 The main sources used in this text, although not indicated regularly, are Giddens 1981, 1984 and 
1991, as well as Kaspersen. Other sources include Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1987), Anthony Giddens, Politics, Sociology and Social Theory. Encounters with Clas-
sical and Contemporary Social Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), Ian Craib, Anthony 
Giddens (London: Routledge, 1992 ), and Ruth Wallace and Alison Wolf, Contemporary Sociological Theory. 
Continuing the Classical Tradition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995). In the discussion of the var-
ious trends and scholars, the classification offered by Wallace and Wolf is followed. 
17 
2.1 Positivism '~  
Positivism is often referred to as "the positive philosophy of science" which  
expresses that it is a stand or philosophy which favors "positive" knowledge, mean-
ing knowledge based on experiment and/or systematic observations of the primary  
source of knowledge as opposed to metaphysical "speculation". As a result, it prefers  
empiricism and so-called inductive methods, which place verifiable facts in the  
center of research, from which theoretical conclusions derive through generaliza-
tions. The phrase also indicates the way in which positivism regards sciences, ac-
tually favoring natural sciences over social sciences. As a result, it prefers the appli-
cation of natural-scientific models in the study of social life, not only indicating  
empiricism, but also the conceptualization of societies as organisms, thus social laws  
as analogous to laws which describe regularities in the natural sciences. It also views  
humans as objects in the larger organism of society and argues for the study of facts  
which, thus, must be separated from values. The acknowledged founder of posi-
tivism is Auguste Comte, who is also claimed to have invented the term sociology  
to signify the science of society as he envisioned it.  
Giddens rejects positivism outright stating that its basic assumption of humans  
as mere objects and its structuring a scholarly field on the basis of natural-scientific  
thinking and methodology are unacceptable and long outdated. He believes that the  
social sciences are about human beings who are knowledgeable acting agents and  
have the will power to act knowingly on decisions they have consciously made.  
Thus, they must not be treated and analyzed as objects. People also vary: they have  
their own internal as well as external features, so other disciplines, such as psychol-
ogy, must also be incorporated into social research in order to be able to gain a  
fuller understanding of human action. Since individuals are not mechanically created  
either and are aware of a great deal regarding what is happening, as well as how and  
why it is happening, they cannot be treated as if totally identical nor be categorized  
as simply as inert objects can be.  
Giddens also feels the need to expand the issues involved in social examination  
which Comte21 reduces to two major areas: an analysis of (1) social statistics dealing  
with the mechanisms of stability, order, and reproduction in society; and that of (2)  
social dynamics, which examines the background, nature, and direction of social  
change. Though Comte also states that investigation begins with facts and is aimed  
at facts, that is, he embraces a theory relying on objectivity and empirical research,  
he gives priority to theoretical laws and describes various phenomena in relation to  
previously set theoretical frameworks. 22 Giddens, however, prefers the deductive  
22 	These are seemingly contradictory dispositions because, on the one hand, Comte claims that the  
examination of facts must serve as the basis of social analysis, but, at the same time, he also seems to be- 
lieve in the primacy of a theoretical framework which precedes social investigation. However, what Comte  
21 	Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy (1842) (New York: C. Blanchard, 1958). 
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method in social sciences, affirming that testing clearly defined theorems in research 
is a more fruitful method in social analysis. 
Giddens also rejects Herbert Spencer's 23 ideas which serve as the basis for func-
tionalism: the view of society as a living organism in which the seemingly different, 
independent parts are actually interdependent—they work together, each fulfilling a 
specific function, in order to maintain an equilibrium in society, thus granting social 
stability, order and survival. It is is rather interesting to observe that, at the same 
time, Spencer also implies the idea of social evolution by concluding that society 
changes from elementary or primitive forms of social order to more complex struc-
tures, such as the industrialized Western societies. Thus, he also establishes the basic 
principles of the evolutionary theories, which also identify change with linear 
progress, thus evaluating and classifying societies, also implying a sense of predeter-
minism and the view of history as a form of development. In this manner, Spencer's 
theory unites the basic ideas of the two most influential social trends of the early 
20th century, functionalist and evolutionary theories, both of which Giddens is 
rather critical of. 
2.2 Evolutionary Theory 
Evolutionary theory unites the works of two major German classics, Karl Marx24 
and Max Weber 25 . Although both scholars are considered to be representatives of 
the same major school, evolutionary theory, their work resulted in the development 
of two separate trends: (1) conflict theory which relies heavily on the writings of 
Marx; and (2) analytical critical theory which embraces the ideas of Weber. An 
excellent comparison of these two trends is provided by Wallace and Wolf, who 
claim that the most apparent difference between them lies in the fact that in conflict 
theory the task of the scial scientist is expected to be not only to describe processes 
as an outsider but also to offer an evaluation of the phenomena in question based 
on his own personal values and beliefs, while analytical theorists require that the 
scholar be an objective eye, therefore, the author's personal values and convictions 
be excluded from the analysis. 
expresses by theory may be best understood as his philosophical conviction and supposition that natural 
sciences must be taken as the model for social scientific investigation, with all their conceptualizations, 
methodological considerations, and manners of investigation as well as the idea that, as in natural sci-
ences, all phenomena are interrelated and, thus, the outcome, i.e., the theoretical conclusion emerging as 
the result of the analysis of a given phenomenon, can be connected to an already revealed law or regular-
ity, in line with the overall model regarding the operation of society. 
23 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (New York: Appleton, 1896). 
24 See, for example, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Writings (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1968). 
25 See, for example, Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1922) (New York: 
The Free Press, 1964). 
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They consider the second difference between the two schools to be the fact that 
conflict theorists view society as being shaped by a single decisive factor: the eco-
nomy, which establishes a ruling class opposed by the oppressed masses on the basis 
of their differential relationship to the means of production, while analytical theo-
rists claim that complex structures and various sources of power divide society along 
several lines. Therefore, it is not necessarily the private property of the means of 
production that defines the power potential of a given social group, but also reli-
gion, education or politics. 
As the third difference, the authors mention that conflict theorists believe in the 
possibility of the existence of a conflict-free state, namely communism, and make 
the assumption that history moves in the direction of this conflict-free ideal state 
form, while analytical theorists do not rationalize about an ideal state because they 
recognize that conflicts will continue to exist as long as societies do. As a result, they 
claim, societies do not move toward a utopian state but toward a more complex so-
cial structure. Weber, for example, predicts that the next level of development in the 
Western hemisphere will be a society taken over by bureaucracy. 
However, as Wolf and Wallace point out, these two trends share a number of 
similarities. They both imply determinism and uniformity in human history as well 
as in the direction of social change, both viewing societies and change in terms of 
social conflict. Just like functionalism, they also favor macro-level analysis and a de-
ductive approach and are convinced that predetermined mechanisms play a crucial 
role in social life. 
Giddens strongly criticizes these schools for their developmental view of history 
and their belief in the notion of universal determinism, in a normative illusion, on 
the basis of which societies can be evaluated and branded, as well as their reduction 
of the individual either to a powerless subject, completely unaware and manipulated 
by the power structure, or to a power-hungry individual in a particular power po-
sition, who deprives, alienates, and subjugates the overpowered, oppressed majority 
in order to maintain its power and the existing social structure which allows for this. 
Giddens also contends that neither individual actions nor social changes can be 
defined in a uniform and deterministic manner and he rejects the implied parallel 
between classes, 26 on the one hand, and social change and development, on the 
other. Last, the temporal framework inherent in both trends, namely, the notion 
that time always involves change which is progress, is also challenged by Giddens. 
26 Both Marx and Weber use the term class, but with a different understanding and implications. 
Marx views class as the basic unit of structural division in modern capitalist societies, while Weber regards 
it as one type of group in his typology of organizations, in which (1) class is a group of people with the 
same position in economic life with regard to property, potential purchasing power, and marketable skills; 
(2) status group is a group united by a shared mode of life, often the result of common education and/or 
social prestige; while (3) party is an association aimed at securing power and advantages for its members 
and leaders. Thus, Marx's concept of class is defined in terms of the relationship to the means of produc-
tion; Weber's in terms of shared market position, leading to shared life chances. 
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Nevertheless, these notions and their criticism are incorporated into his discussion 
of evolution, history and change, and capitalist societies in The Constitution of Society. 
2.3 Functionalism 
Functionalism, along with structuralism, was the most highly praised sociological 
trend during Giddens' university years. The most prominent representative of this 
trend, the American Talcott Parsons along with his outstanding student, Robert 
Merton, made an attempt to mould functionalism together with structuralism, thus 
proposing a social theory which could capture the essence of contemporary modern 
societies. However, Giddens believes that they were not entirely successful in this 
endeavor. 
This school, having been established in sociology by Emile Durkheim, 27 focuses 
on macro-level analysis: it examines the whole of society as a complex organic unit, 
which is composed of largely autonomous parts or sub-organisms—a conceptual 
framework proposed by Spencer. Just like in the human body, where organs func-
tion with the primary goal of maintaining the body, social organisms also operate 
with the underlying ultimate purpose of maintaining the whole organism, which is 
society. Functionalism, similarly to positivism, gives priority to this basic theoretical 
assumption, attributing to it some sort of an a priori position. Its basic supposi-
tions—that social cohesion exists and that institutions serve certain given functions 
necessary for the maintenance of this cohesion and social equilibrium—indicate that 
institutions and functions in societies have priority over individuals, who are es-
sentially subjected to and often unaware of these functions. All events and actions 
are intertwined and serve the sole purpose of providing social permanence and ba-
lance; thus, events and actions may be viewed with a sense of determinism. It is this 
determinism, implying the consideration of functions as the primary motive for 
actions as well as the reduction of human beings to subject positions, that Giddens 
refuses to accept. 
If the basic function of the establishment is to provide social balance and per-
manence, how should social change be conceptualized? Functionalism, relying on 
Spencer's essentially evolutionary view of history, compares the development of 
societies to that of biological organisms: the way a cell divides and each time forms 
a more complex structure, societies also break with their previous patterns at certain 
points 28 and develop a more complex system which reflects the more recent func-
tions society needs to fulfill in order to be able to maintain its existence. Change can 
be understood through an analysis of the systems and these new functions, in the 
27 See, for example, Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) (New York: The Free 
Press, 1982). 
28 	Durkheim explains these points by introducing the notion of anomie, meaning "normlessness": 
whenever anomie occurs on the social level, certain changes are bound to occur in the system. 
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course of which they must be regarded as social facts, i.e., objective realities, as 
Durkheim suggests. This evolutionalism also indicates that social change should be 
conceptualized as a form of progress, which follows the same course everywhere, 
and is thus both universally applicable and determined. 
Giddens rejects the functionalist notion that each society develops in an organic 
way from simple to more complex structures. He believes that just because systems 
have certain needs, i.e., certain new functions necessary for the maintenance of social 
equilibrium, this does not mean that they will be automatically met. This mechanical 
way of approaching social reality and history as a form of predetermined progress, 
therefore disregarding the mental capacity and ability of the individual to act on his 
own, provides another point of departure for Giddens from this trend. Moreover, 
if it is accepted that it is only societies that are in the position of being able to act 
and have their needs met, then societies must also be provided with their own con-
sciousness, needs, drives, and the power as well as the means to have these needs ful-
filled. But what is the origin of this consciousness? And what about people? Should 
they not be considered? After all, they provide the body of societies, the various 
institutions and functions. Can they not also shape societies? These are further 
points Giddens raises in his criticism of functionalism. 
Of the various functionalist thinkers, Talcott Parsons' concepts have had a lasting 
impact on the development of Giddens' theory in two areas. One is Parsons' theory 
of action, 29 in which he considers how motivated actors perform actions. Parsons 
proposes that in the course of actions, people set their goals first and act in order to 
achieve them. While acting, they must consider two social components: (1) the sit-
uation in which the action takes place, which includes the available means and con-
ditions; and (2) the social standards as well as regulations which provide the frame-
work for human action. With this reasoning, Parsons is able to expand the con-
straining limits of functionalism and to assert the possibility of motivated human 
actions—even if he conceptualizes it strictly within the framework of the social struc-
ture and the limitations it places on action. The idea of motivated actors and the 
need to examine the context of action, including norms and regulations, have found 
their way into the theory of structuration. 
The other area which has had a lasting impact on the theory of structuration is 
Parsons' description of the systems of action. 30 Parsons claims that there are four 
systems which regard the life and action of individuals. The first one is actualized 
with the birth of the individual and provides the behavioral organism. The second 
one is the personality system which is the result of identity formation. Both of these 
systems are primarily tied to the individual, a theoretical stand which represents 
another possible point of departure from the original ideas of functionalism. The 
other two systems are tied to the whole of society: the social system, with its def- 
29 Talcott Parsons, Action Theory and the Human Condition (New York: The Free Press, 1978). 
30 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951). 
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inition of roles' and interaction, and the cultural system, which includes platforms 
connected to value transmission and maintenance, such as religion and education. 
This division of systems which binds them both to the individuals and systems fore-
shadows some aspects of Giddens' notion of the duality of structure. 
Two areas in the work of Robert Merton 32 have also contributed to Giddens' 
theory. One is related to Merton's understanding of functions: his definition of dys-
functions, as opposed to functions, associated with human action, as well as his dis-
tinction between manifest and latent functions. Merton seems to treat these notions 
as dualisms and not as dualities, that is, not as two intertwined notions originating 
in and representing the essence of the same thing, as if two sides of the same coin, 
only seemingly in opposition. While Giddens draws on the differentiation between 
the two types of functions, he refuses to accept the dualistic nature between them. 
He proposes a model duality capturing the dynamisms of action, generally over-
coming the differences between the two major sociological trends with regard to 
their focus on the role of the individual versus the structure when examining society. 
Merton's role-set is the second area which can also be detected in the theory of 
structuration. Merton departs from the basic assumption that each individual oc-
cupies a status in a given society. Status is connected to social structure and is ac-
companied by a set of roles which describe and prescribe the behavior of the indi-
vidual in the given status under various circumstances. This is a conceptualization 
primarily about the prescribed nature of face-to-face public action as determined by 
social standings, a notion also featuring symbolic interactionism. 
2A Phenomenology 
Phenomenological sociology, which is rooted in the Kantian concept of the 
centrality of the individual, was developed as a distinct philosophical school by Ed-
mund Husserl. 33 He believes that all experience is channeled to the individual 
through the senses; thus, knowledge is of sensory origin. The various sensations are 
transmitted to the individual consciousness, where they serve as the basis for the 
construction of knowledge of them. In describing what reality is, therefore, in-
dividuals must describe the way they perceive, see and evaluate the world, that is, 
describe the process through which the constitution of knowledge takes place. As 
it happens in the individual consciousness, this theory considers individuals to be 
free and rational actors, thus, their actions are conceptualized as unbound, not me-
chanically determined by their social or cultural milieu. Therefore, actions and social 
31 	The concept of role highlights the social expectations attached to given statuses, social positions, 
and situations. 
32 Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968). 
33 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology (1929) (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1960). 
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reality must be understood on the basis of individual interactions; as a result, the 
central role in action is assigned to individuals. The belief that human activity must 
be interpreted as meaningful for the actors expresses a concern for subjective mean-
ing and gives way to the development of phenomenological or interpretative soci-
ology, the founder of which is the Austrian, Alfred Schutz. 
Giddens defines this school as existentialist and connects it to another trend, her-
meneutic phenomenology. 34 He states that the major difference between existential 
and hermeneutic phenomenologies lies in their focus in social analysis: existential 
phenomenology is concerned with the analysis of culture and society on the level of 
the individual, i.e., the way and mechanisms through which culture is internalized 
in the individual, while hermeneutical phenomenology is a field primarily oriented 
towards the collective aspects of culture. This difference alone implies that the object 
of the analysis must also differ: existential phenomenology focuses on the self and 
the processes of internalization, while the concern for hermeneutical phenome-
nology is with texts, and, thus, language, resulting in the attempt at defining the 
nature and structure of communication, i.e., the communal nature of culture. 
24.1 Existential Phenomenology 
Alfred Schutz, a student of Husserl's, has developed this thought 35 on the pre-
mise that understanding is subjective, and that it emerges out of the individual's 
evaluation of particular situations, in the course of which the actor draws on a com-
mon stock of knowledge, thus using typifications or recipes when acting and think-
ing. This assumes that the world is constructed of certain types of things and acts, 
from among which the individual chooses when acting and elaborating discursively 
on actions. This presupposes that the actors regularly find themselves in certain 
taken-for-granted situations in which they expect their partners to act according to 
certain prescribed scripts; the participants in the interaction, thus, can draw con-
clusions and define their own roles and conduct their own actions. This common 
sense knowledge, therefore, which is developed through experience and socializa-
tion, serves as the basis for everyday interaction. 3ó Schütz contends that the purpose 
of sociology is to examine the process of understanding through a set theory which 
enables one to view individual actions as free of preconceptions and to discover how 
the actor recognizes situations and assigns meaning to them. 
35 Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology ofthe Social World (1932) (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1967). 
6 Erzsébet Barát, in a comment, argues for the lack of actual agency position and autonomy of the 
actors in Schütz's theory since his process of socialization merely implies one's capacity to recognize the 
appropriateness of a pre-given role and to assess a given situation and thus, the agency of the actor con-
sists in the assessments and assumptions of a self-penetrating system only. As a result, no action otherwise, 
that is, no change originates in the actor. 
34 Anthony Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1977). 
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Giddens relies on Schutz in his application of a number of notions. One is the 
idea of the common stock knowledge which reappears in Giddens' idea of the struc-
ture and of the mutual knowledge. The ability of actors to act in accordance to their 
own free will and to determine the course of their action is also a key aspect of the 
theory of structuration, as is the understanding that actors monitor action and are 
able to reflect on them discoursively. That is, the constitution of meaning as per-
formed by the actor is also a notion Giddens himself applies in his theory of struc-
turation. 
One major trend generated by these ideas is ethnomethodology 37 with Harold 
Garfinkel as its key representative. Ethnomethodology relies on the basic assump-
tion that cultural typifications identified as institutionalized knowledge of the real 
world exist and are the basis for everyday interactions. In order to understand the 
way meaning is constructed, these typifications must be disregarded in the course 
of the interaction. The tool for this analysis is language, as it is the most complex 
indexical system in a society, one, which is generally used in interaction, acquired 
through interaction and routine, and applied on the basis of social consensus. Lan-
guage is also a field around which a great deal of presupposed knowledge may be 
organized. 38 Therefore, through breaking away from the traditional usage of the 
language in given situations, all these presuppositions can also be disregarded, and 
the analysis of the actual process of meaning construction may begin. 39 In his work, 
Garfinkel examines how social order is created through our activities, primarily 
through talk and conversation. He points out that when the consensus underlying 
verbal communication is broken, interaction and, thus, social integration is threat-
ened, leading not only to cognitive but also emotional misreadings between in-
dividuals. 
Giddens draws on Garfinkel's findings at two points. One is Garfinkel's entrust 
of the individual with the ability of giving a rational account of his actions. Giddens 
proposes that through these evaluated actions one assigns meaning to the social 
world. The individual is able to reflect on actions, to evaluate them, therefore, to de- 
37 	"Ethnomethodology is the investigation of the rational properties of indexical expressions and 
other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday 
life." Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967), 11. 
38 Following is an example of underlying presuppositions in language. The question "Did you like 
your soup?" involves the following information: I know you, I know that you had soup and that you have 
finished eating it; I know that you do not always like soup and I express my curiosity as to whether this 
time you liked it or not. As this example indicates, there is usually more meaning and knowledge behind 
each statement than the actual words uttered allow one to predict, and the statement cannot be fully 
understood unless we know the consensus behind it. 
39 He asked his students to pretend that they were unaware of the consensus around which language 
is structured and to act upon the word-by-word meaning of utterances, thus breaking the set of institu-
tionalized linguistic knowledge in interaction. Some examples: "I am sick of him!" "What do you mean? 
Why, you should see a doctor if you are sick!" or: "Hi! What's up?" "Well, I don't see anything!" 
Garfinkel 1967, 49. 
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velop knowledge regarding them, and to act accordingly. This leads to the second 
point Giddens borrows from ethnomethodology, which is the assertion that actors 
are knowledgeable: they possess explicit as well as implicit, that is, taken-for-grant-
ed, knowledge of the social world. However, their knowledge does not necessarily 
need to be verbalized: that is, the mere fact that knowledge is not communicated 
does not mean that it does not exist or that the actor is unaware of it. 
The most outstanding representative of existential phenomenology is Peter 
Berger. 40 His basic assumption is that any body of knowledge can become socially 
accepted as reality. The body of knowledge comes to life through the acts of in-
dividuals, who continuously share and create reality through actions and inter-
actions. Berger termed this process the social construction of reality and contended 
that the task of sociology should be to examine the way this process takes place. He 
himself identifies three moments in this dialectical process: externalization, 41 objec-
tivation, 42 and internalization 43 . This indicates that Berger considers the presence 
of an objectivated world of institutions which seems to constitute an organized 
reality of individuals and is constantly re-created by the actors in it, an idea which 
occurs in the theory of structuration as well. But while Berger focuses on the non-
determined subjective meanings developed by actors and considers the constructed 
reality the background within which inquiry must begin, Giddens places equal 
emphasis on the analysis of the established social order and the interaction between 
the two levels: the individual and the institutional. 
2.4.2 Hermeneutical Phenomenology 
Hermeneutical social theory aims to reach "beyond the description and structural 
analysis of the text ... [to] find the hidden meaning" 44 in it. Its point of departure 
is rooted in the realm of social phenomena where actors act with a purpose; thus, 
individual actions can be interpreted by re-creating the actor's intentions and mo-
tives, in the course of which the real, but at the same time also hidden, meaning of 
the action may be revealed. Hegel's idea of historical cycles has resulted in the emer-
gence of the phenomenon of the hermeneutic cycle, which supposes that under-
standing can be constituted in cycles in which collective memories are continually 
and selectively re-assessed. 
4° Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 
1966) . 
41 	This refers to how the individual creates its own social world: its construction of his social reality 
and its re-creation of social institutions. 
42 	This refers to the notion in which the individual perceives everyday life as an objective and 
ordered reality which imposes itself upon the individual. The major tool for this is language. 
43 	This concept regards socialization by which the social order is legitimized and the individuals 
internalize objectified reality. If this process is disturbed, individual identity crises will occur. 
44 Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 
10. 
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Martin Heidegger 45 has also contributed greatly to the theoretical development 
of this school. He maintains that meaning is constituted, and, since it cannot be 
separated from the historical circumstances or traditions in which it comes about, 
it is context-bound. But what is behind knowledge or these secondary constructs? 
The task is to investigate Dasein, the world humans produce out of their experience. 
Considering time' a vital aspect of human existence, he assigns it a central place in 
his scheme. Everything can be defined and interpreted in terms of time: even indi-
vidual life, which is nothing but a temporal state spent while waiting for death. Gid-
dens draws on three of Heidegger's ideas in (1) arguing for a "hermeneutically in-
formed social theory"; (2) assigning a crucial role to time in social analysis; and (3) 
declaring that the human state of awaiting death results in social contradictions. 
Hermeneutic sociology is the science of social interpretation, and, consequently, 
developing a theory, a discourse is a hermeneutic activity in itself. But when apply-
ing a social theory, one may engage in two types of discourse: (1) on the level of the 
subject of the analysis; and (2) on the level of the theoretical discourse regarding the 
first. In order to elaborate on the relations between these two types of discourse, 
Giddens introduces the idea of double hermeneutics. He defines it as the inter-
section between two frames of meaning: one constituted by the lay actors regarding 
the social world, and another one which is the metalanguage introduced and used 
in social analysis by the scholar, who is also constituted as an actor in a given so-
ciety. When discussing what happens at the intersection of these two frames, Gid-
dens contends that inevitably slips may occur, working in both directions. 
2.5 Symbolic Interactionism 
Symbolic interactionism is a term first used by Herbert Blumer 46 in 1937 to 
refer to a field of social psychology which addresses the question of how individuals 
develop socially as a result of participation in group or social life, an issue of concern 
for Giddens also. In Blumer's view, infants depend on adults for direction in social 
action, i.e., they learn the rules, which constitute the community, through inter-
action. Blumer states that in the process of understanding action, each group relies 
on its own shared set of symbols and various meanings attached to them, which are 
transmitted to infants. As symbols call for a response in interaction, it is in a way key 
to the conduct of meaningful interaction. Moreover, proposes Blumer, stimulus and 
response are equally significant for interaction, and interpretation appears in the 
space between these two, it being an action consciously performed by an active, self-
identifying individual. Within the group, however, the individual is an entity and an 
45 Martin Heidegger, The Basic ProblemsofPhenomenology (1927) ( Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982). 
46 Herbert Blumer, Symboliclnteractionism. Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1969). 
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active constructor, who interprets, evaluates, defines, and maps actions. That is, 
meaning in everyday life emerges through interaction. 
Today scholars representing this school engage in research in four areas: (1) the 
production of meaning and culture through symbols, that is, through signifying 
practices; (2) the emergence of meaning and the processes involved in it in a social 
world where lives are always shifting and becoming; (3) the nature of interaction 
and its most basic unit, the self; and (4) the underlying patterns of social life 
through the study of symbols and interactions. Of these, Giddens is most interested 
in the nature of interaction and the ways the self may be conceptualized in order to 
emerge as a knowledgeable agent. 
One of the main scholars involved in researching this area, George Herbert 
Mead, states 47 that the self is acting and creative, and it becomes an individual 
through social processes. He differentiates between two phases of the self, which 
are: (1) the state of `I' which is unorganized, creative and spontaneous; and which 
reaches (2) the state of `me' once it possesses organized attitudes developed through 
responses from others—that is why it is often described as the self-concept, that is, 
the way people see themselves through the eyes of others. `Me' is social and de-
termined, and connects the self to the wider society, thus plays a crucial role in self-
interaction, which is role-play in the form of an internal conversation in which the 
self takes things into account and prepares for an interaction, as if rehearsing. This 
implies that there are pre-set norms and roles on the basis of which the individual 
may prepare for an interaction, presuming that it is aware of the role and the text 
the other participants will use in the course of the interaction. The self, thus, evolves 
through signifying practices, through symbols and communication in interaction, 
which also implies the sells relational position. The concept of the self , the manner 
of its participation in interaction and the process of the constitution of meaning in 
interaction are three major areas in which Giddens finds Mead's propositions sig-
nificant. 
Giddens also owes a great deal to Ewing Goffman" and his theory of drama-
turgy, which has evolved out of the idea of role play. Goffman also shares in the 
belief of the knowledgeability of the actor and views individuals as real-life actors. 
For him social reality is constructed by roles, played by every individual in accor-
dance with a script, which, in essence, is nothing more than a socially defined mode 
of behavior and way of speaking, acquired through practice until a routinized acqui-
sition. He makes a distinction between the public realm which he calls the front 
region and the private sphere which he terms as the back region. He considers social 
interaction as acting in the front region, while conceptualizes the back region as a 
place and time reserved for the self, where one can retire after the series of role plays 
47 George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). 
48 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959). 
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performed in public day after day—as if a domain of life outside and beyond the 
scope of roles. Goffman points out that the various roles are defined by place and 
time; consequently, the circumstances must also be considered when examining in-
teractions. He calls the method he proposes for the execution of such a project 
frame-analysis, indicating that his primary concern lies not with the action per se but 
the surroundings and circumstances under which it is performed. This idea can be 
linked to the work of Garfinkel, who calls attention to indexical expressions: terms 
which carry more meaning than what the actual linguistic utterances would imply 
due to the specific timing and spacing of their being used as well as the previous 
knowledge of the actors involved. 
Giddens also argues that social practices are constrained by time and space as well 
and believes in the routine nature of social reproduction. He concludes that indi-
viduals are not conscious of these daily routines, being governed by traditions, 
which are the dominant factors of day-to-day reproduction. Much like Goffman, 
Giddens considers face-to-face interactions and their analysis central to his theory. 
But Giddens refuses to focus primarily on micro-level analysis and calls for an equal 
consideration of macro-structures in social analysis. At the same time, he relies on 
Goffman's findings on routine actions, that is, roles, and his typology of interaction, 
wherein he isolates different types of gatherings on the basis of their nature, pur-
pose, and context. 
2.0 Time-geography 
The importance of individual time and space in social interaction has been ad-
dressed in the social sciences by T. Hagerstrand. 49 He assumes that daily life is rou-
tinized. In the course of interaction certain constraints occur, which he sets out to 
analyze, concluding that these are bound to time and space. 50 Thus, very often these 
limitations also contribute to the establishment of daily routines as they are the 
material axes of existence. Through an analysis of the physical domains of time and 
space, which enable him to map individual and social routines, he examines rou-
tines, which comprise a major portion of individual biographies. 
Although Giddens is rather critical of Hagerstrand's work in The Constitution of 
Society, he considers Hagerstand's findings regarding the impact of time and space 
on actions crucial and draws on them when developing his own concept of region-
alization. His main objections to Hagerstrand's time-geography include the claim 
that he, similarly to the structuralists, (1) employs a weak conception of human a-
gency; (2) renders individuals subject to the circumstances of action; (3) considers 
49 	T. Hagerstrand, Innovation as a Spatial Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
50 	For example, individuals have a limited capacity to participate in more that one activity at a given 
time; they can only be in one place at one time, that is, geographical location and movement are always 
connected to time. 
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structure not only as a given in everyday life but as a supreme force; (4) concen-
trates on the constraining properties related to the body; and (5) offers a deficient 
theory of power and change. 51 
2.7 Psychoanalysis 
Giddens draws on psychoanalysis in four major areas. First, he refers to the prop-
ositions of Sigmund Freud, founder of this discipline, in developing the notion of 
agency in the theory of structuration. Giddens departs from Freud's concept of the 
unconscious and his model of the psyche consisting of the id, ego, and superego, 52 
reworking their implications and combining them with theorems offered by Erik 
Erikson in his conceptualization of child development, discussed below. In the the-
ory of structuration, Giddens also considers routine vital to agency, as the force 
upon which individual ontological security evolves, as well as to social action, since 
he regards most daily action as routinized. Thus, he considers break in routine dan-
gerous, resulting in the emergence of critical situations. At this point he refers to 
Erikson and Freud, both of whom analyze anxiety and fear as reactions to danger 
and loss of trust, and propose models of tension management which Giddens finds 
inspirational in his discussion of the development of the self and in his analysis of 
critical situations. 
Giddens also draws on Erikson's object-relations theory. 53 Erikson is concerned 
with the dynamic internal aspects of individuals, but, at the same time, also acknow-
ledges the impact of the external world and social organizations. His theory, there-
fore, focuses on the way the individual behaves and adjusts to its environment. In 
his vital concept in the theory of structuration identified as the duality of structure, 
Giddens develops this further, capturing this interdependency between individual 
actions, on the one hand, and social circumstances and organizations, on the other. 
The second field in which Giddens draws on Erikson regards his analysis of person-
ality development and socialization. Erikson proposes that child development takes 
place through eight stages. Giddens borrows the first three, assigning a crucial role 
to the first one, in which the infant learns about routines and develops its own, as 
a result of which its sense of trust and of security emerges along with that of its 
personal identity. 
si 	The propositions of time-geography have been challenged by a new set of issues related to the 
wide and rapid spread of the various forms of media, which (1) question the absolutely constraining 
aspect of time and space on the selves; and (2) contribute to the appearance of a set of new concerns as 
the result of the recognition that the technological revolution and the media have challenged traditional 
conceptualizations of identities, agency, and interaction. On the analysis of these and the mediated self, 
see, for example, Debra Grodin and Thomas R. Lindlof eds., Constructing the Self in a Mediated World 
(London: Sage, 1996). 
52 Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1924) (New York: Perma, 1949). 
sa 	Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (1950) (New York: Norton, 1963). 
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2.8 Structuralism  
The beginnings of structuralism can be tied to the work of Ferdinand Saussure, 54 
who distinguishes between langue and parole, understanding them to mean the un-
derlying abstract structure of the language and its actual realization, a distinction 
which can be linked to Noam Chomsky's later analysis 55 of competence and per-
formance. Saussure believes that the analysis of language involves the identification 
of the rules governing the deep structures of the surface phenomenon of actual 
sentences. That is, this universal and finite number of rules which speakers are aware 
of only indirectly governs their production of an infinite number of sentences in 
their ordinary communication. Language, thus, consists of (1) a system, which ex-
ists prior to actual communication-it is socially constructed and shared, and speakers 
draw on it in the course of speaking; and (2) the utterance, the individual realization 
of the system in language use. His claim that there exists an underlying structure to 
any signifying practice has provided the key notion in structuralism. 
Saussure also views language as a system of signs, where signs are made up of 
two parts: the actual sound image, which he identifies as the signifier, and the un-
derlying concept, which is the signified. He considers the relation between these two 
parts arbitrary, which contributes another concept of structuralism. Moreover, Saus-
sure also claims that meaning is acquired as a result of relationality, which is cen-
tered around difference, thus providing yet another key concept for structuralist 
thinking. 
The term structuralism has become widely used in the social sciences as a result 
of the work of the French cultural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose anal-
ysis of kinship relations, myths, and religions has gained wide acceptance for this 
new approach. 5ó He is convinced that there is a deep structure, i.e., underlying rules 
and structures expressed in social realities and events, and that the role of a social 
scientist is to search for these deeply rooted rules, which are present in most cul-
tures, but are expressed in various ways on the surface level of social interaction be-
cause of the differing transformational rules that apply in the universally shared deep 
structure. His line of thinking is similar to that of Chomsky's in that he is also in 
search of the deep structure in grammar, common to all languages, such as the need 
for the grammatical subject and predicate for the ideal speaker to be able to create 
sentences. 
Structuralists believe that binary oppositions govern our thoughts: they are 
transformed into cultural signs by taking on meaning. The purpose of interpretation 
is to discover these and, in the process, to reach the deep structural framework invi-
sible to the subjects since individual life and the concept of reality are defined by 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1916) (London: Collins, 1974). 
Noam Chomsky, Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar (The Hague: Mouton, 1966). 





these underlying structures and rules. By identifying with this line of thinking, Vla- 
dimir Propp57 is able to identify 31 basic functions of narration and Lévi-Strauss ex- 
amines the system of mythemes, the units of myth, which recur in various cultures. 
Giddens applies the structuralist approach when developing his conception of  
structure, which he conceptualizes as rules and resources agents draw on in inter-
action, existing only in their memory traces. At the same time, he observes a discrep-
ancy between structure and practical, conscious activities on the part of individuals,  
a gap which, in his opinion, structuralism fails to bridge. He does not deny that  
basic structures exist and comprise an underlying framework of elements and regu-
lations which determine actual actions, but he also argues that actors are know-
ledgeable and powerful and thus able to act contrary to rules and expectations.  
Giddens also conceptualizes social action in sets of axes or dimensions. One type  
of these are related to Hagerstand who argues for the time and space constraints on  
the human body and action in using vertical and horizontal axes. However, Giddens  
introduces context as the third element which binds time and space together,  
drawing on Saussure's claim that meaning is relational. Moreover, Giddens employs  
another notion vital to structuralism, the distinction between syntagmatic and para-
digmatic dimensions in a system of axioms, the first one expressing the "patterning 
of social relations in time-space", the latter the "virtual order of `modes of struc-
turing' recursively implicated" in social action and reproduction. 58  
Giddens also concludes that performance—which is social interaction in his under-
standing—is rule following. However, Giddens criticizes the structuralist elimination  
of the role of the actor in performance on the grounds that rules are by nature  
transformative, so by virtue of this, people who apply these rules possess transfor-
mative power. Giddens also argues against the view of individuals as merely being  
subject to structures, institutions, or power, absolutely unaware of their own situa-
tions and constraints, as through reflexibility individuals become knowledgeable and  
aware of their situations.  
2.9 Post-sfructoraliam  
Post-structuralism 59 was born in France in the late 1960s, rooted in the same  
Saussurean linguistic tradition as structuralism. However, representatives of this  
non-specific, interdisciplinary school ó0 have re-discovered Saussure's theory by re-
alizing that language is self-sufficient: that words may mean something without  
57  Vladimir Pro pp, 	Morphology of the 	(1928) (Austin: Texas University Press, 1968). 
58 
PP S 	o~ 6y 	í ) ~ 	 t}' 
Giddens 1984, 17.  
59 	Although Giddens does not refer to specific post-structuralist ideas in his theory of structuration  
per se, he is intimately aware of them. Some of these seem to appear in certain places in the theory of  
structuration; therefore, it is necessary to discuss them among the intellectual currents which, even if in-
directly, helped in shaping it. 
60 	There is still an ongoing debate over the precise meaning of post-structuralism.  
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having a definite referent in the extra-linguistic world and that, therefore, all lan-
guages and language-related phenomena may be autonomous. Post-structuralists 
also identify with the concept of intertextuality, as proposed by Julia Kristeva, 61 
which signifies the conceptualizations of texts as inseparably interwoven with other 
texts, present, past, or future. This concept is rooted in Mikhail Bakhtin's model, ó2 
which views the text as a site for dialogic interaction between various modes of dis-
course and among a multiplicity of voices, all of which are expressive of social phe-
nomena, groups, and speech communities. ó3 
In his "Structuralism, Post-structuralism and the Production of Culture," 64 
Giddens examines the various themes which commonly recur in post-structuralist 
writings, which are: (1) linguistics; (2) the relational nature of totalities; (3) the de-
centering of the subject; (4) the relation between writing and text; (5) the question 
of history and temporality; and (6) signification and cultural production. Although 
he opens this study with the statement that post-structuralism is a "dead tradition 
of thought", ó5 some post-structuralist observations and notions have found their 
way into his theory. óó 
2.9.1 Semiotics 
Modern semiotics, the study of signs, is also rooted in the linguistic theory of 
Saussure. ó7 Its point of departure is the basic premise that meaning is defined by the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified, which relationship is understood 
to be arbitrary and conventional. If one accepts this thesis, then the referent, or re- 
61 	Julia Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
62 	Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics (1929) (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1973). 
63 	Christopher Bryant points out the fact that Giddens' structuration theory actually draws on this 
model and is dialogical in that it hopes to "refer to relations between the social sciences and the lives of 
the human beings whose behavior is analyzed." Christopher Bryant, "The Dialogical Model of Applied 
Sociology," in Christopher Bryant and David Jary eds., Giddens' Theory ofStructuration. A CriticalAppre-
ciation (New York: Routledge, 1991), 176-200, 189. He continues with the claim that it is through the 
dialectic of control that the knowledgeability and capacity which enable the positioned scientist to carry 
out such projects emerge. 
64 In Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner eds., Social Theory Today (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987), 195-223. 
65 	Giddens 1987, 195. 
66 Several authors, such as Roy Boyne, Susan Hekman, Wallace and Wolf, criticize Giddens for not 
taking post-structuralism and post-tmodernism seriously and for using only certain notions—at times with 
inappropriate interpretations—from the concepts of this trend. For the specifics, see Roy Boyne, "Power-
knowledge and social theory. The systematic misinterpretation of contemporary French social theory in 
the work of Anthony Giddens," in Christopher Bryant and David Jary eds., Giddens' Theory of Structur-
ation. A Critical Appreciation (New York: Routledge, 1991), 52-73; Susan Hekman, "Hermeneutics and 
the Crisis of Social Theory. A Critique of Giddens' Epistemology," in Jon Clark et al. eds., Anthony 
Giddens. Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990), 155-165; and Wallace and Wolf, 
1995. 
67 For a thorough analysis of semiotics from the beginning, see Winfried Nöth, Handbook ofSemiotics 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
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ality, is not part of the signifying system. Signifiers can also refer to various mean-
ings; any of these variations may, thus, occur in the mind of the listener. The speak-
er cannot control which exact meaning must be attached to the signifier; it would, 
therefore, follow that there exists a chain of signifiers along which meaning may 
slide. If this is the case, meaning is to be understood as unstable as well as individ-
ually constructed. Emile Benveniste ó8 observes that language, a social symbolic or-
der, is the means through which subjectivity is also constituted. But Giddens asks 
the question: what determines the signifiers? He proposes that it is the various social 
and political strategies which are historically specific to the culture. 
The other major linguist who has contributed to the development of semiotics 
is Charles Peirce ó9 with his theory of semiology. In his system, a signifying process 
called semiosis involves signs, their objects, and their interpretants as well as the 
grounds, which are the means through which signs signify, as mediated by the inter-
pretant. He also distinguishes between three types of trichotomies the interpretant 
may receive, the most important one being performance. In this realm three types 
of signs may appear: index, icon, and symbol. It is specifically the indexicality of the 
sign, that is, the context-dependence of meaning which has impacted Giddens' 
theory. 
Clifford Geertz argues for a semiotic concept of culture, viewing human behavior 
as "a symbolic action which signifies", i.e., as a system of signs, a text. Thus, he con-
tinues, "culture is an interworked system of construable signs; it is a context within 
which elements can be described." 70 Social action is the surface structure, the artic-
ulation of the deep structure, which is a collection of structures, that is, of cultural 
forms. Interpretation consists of the separation of these two levels and the ascription 
of meaning to the events—it is like the act of closely reading a text. This close analysis 
of the reading of social production is called thick description, which is the method 
for recovering the meanings of social events and texts, along with the various cul-
tural patterns and manners of thinking, which contributed to its existence and 
meaning. 
Scholars applying the study of semiotics in their analysis view cultural actions 
and processes as processes of communication; they, thus, suppose that linguistic 
analysis can be applied as a method for cultural analysis as well. In this process of 
analysis they also suppose that beneath the signs actually received, there lies another 
layer of signification and structure which govern these messages. The goal of the 
scholar is to analyze either of these layers or their relationship to each other, which 
is also one major concern Giddens addresses in the theory of structuration. 
68 Emile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society (London: Faber, 1973). 
69 	Charles S. Peirce, Peirce on Signs. Writings on Semiotics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 
1991). 
70 	Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Harper-Collins, 1993), 14. 
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2.9.2 New Historicism 
New Historicism, primarily shaped by the works of Michel Foucault and Louis 
Althusser, both of whom considered human experience to be shaped by social insti-
tutions and ideological discourses, gained popularity as of the early 1980s. It main-
tains that the historical and cultural context of a text's production along with its un-
derstandings, interpretations, and criticism must be considered when one reflects 
on a given text. New historicists also believe in the need for new approaches to 
texts; in this way, they do not depart from political or intellectual history, as this 
was also the case with traditional historicism, which considered literature and lit-
erary history as part of cultural history, but they rather conceptualize history as a 
narrative about past events and as a form of representation. Thus, in their under-
standing, there exist many histories, not just one homogeneous concept of history. 
As historians themselves are also involved in certain histories, they do not occupy 
an objective and detached position—a claim traditional historians upheld. 
Louis Althusser 71 regards ideology 72 as the major organizational principle of a 
culture's signifying practices which constitutes the social subject as well as maintains 
social unity and stability through ideological state apparatuses. Michel Foucault, on 
the other hand, defines power/knowledge 73 as the ultimate forces responsible for the 
formation of modern states and for the determination of social practices which are 
the means by which individuals are placed into subject positions. 
Among the works by members of this school, Giddens admires Foucault's the 
most: his fervent quest to locate regimes of knowledge as well as to arrive at a def-
inition of power and the way it is exercised in discourses as well as controlled 
through surveillance. He finds that what emerges as legitimate knowledge is the 
effect of complex relations of power. Power defines regimes of truth, which, then, 
establish ideological discourses and institutions through which the social is shaped. 
That is, knowledge and truth are themselves caught up in power and the social 
struggles over it. In his works, he textualizes history and examines the various dis-
courses specific to certain periods. He proposes that discipline, surveillance, and 
punishment play the key role in maintaining the social order in which individuals 
are merely subjected to the interests and workings of the power structure. Pow-
er—that is, action—truth—that is, knowledge—and ethics—that is, morality—are the three 
axes along which the Foucaultian subject is constituted. 
71 	Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-86. 
72 	He conceives ideology as a body of discursive practices, situated in material institutions, such as 
political, educational and religious institutions, which subject the individuals through interpellation. He 
sees the purpose of the dominant ideological discourses as serving the interests of the ruling classes. 
73 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 (New York: 
Pantheon, 1980). 
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Giddens refers to Foucault at several points, but his major interest lies in Fou-
cault's findings regarding power and ideology. Giddens believes that knowledge may 
not only restrict but liberate the actors, and, as such, can be a means of power. The 
theory of structuration regards human beings as knowledgeable agents "although 
acting within historically specific bounds of the unacknowledged conditions and 
unintended consequences of their acts.i 74 This statement, reflecting the Foucaultian 
consideration for historically determined circumstances, marks a crucial point in 
Giddens' theory: how knowledgeable and powerful the actors can be and how the 
impact and power of the institutions regarding the actors' potentials can be defined. 
At the same time, Giddens rejects the notion that power, discipline, and punishment 
are the sole true agents of history and believes that Foucault's work lacks both a 
comprehensive study of the state and a theory of the subject as such. 
2.9.3 Deconstruelioniam 
Deconstructionism also reaches back to Saussurean linguistics, drawing on the 
proposition that meaning is constituted in the course of signifying practices. The 
elements participating in this constitution are rooted in a hierarchy of conventional 
values. The signs gain their identity only insofar as they are differentiated from one 
another in a given context as opposition or differences. Jacques Derrida's concept 
of di/Prance is a further development of this notion, conveying the divided nature 
of signs. 75 Derrida also argues that the idea of structure always presupposes a center 
of meaning, which he explains by people's desire to center as this centering guaran-
tees presence. It is this centrality, for example, of the universal and homogeneous 
ideal subject, which is to be decentered, thus ensuring that neither part of the pole 
becomes central and guarantees presence. One way to deconstruct is to allow the 
marginalized one to subvert the dominant one—which is the method Foucault calls 
geneology in his work. 
Derrida's consideration of the notions of absence and presence is indirectly re-
flected in Giddens' theory as well when Giddens contends that the presence of one 
element automatically implies the absence of the other. Moreover, seeing human ex-
perience as a series of signifying practices and a play between sign and language ap-
pears in Giddens' concept of the discoursive nature of agency: the claim that agents 
always monitor their actions in order to understand and make sense of what is hap-
pening to them. 
The influence of Jacques Lacan 7ó and his works also appears in Giddens' theory 
of structuration. Lacan states that the human unconscious is structured just like a 
language, wherein one signifier can be attributed to different signifieds. The concept 
Giddens 1995, 265. 
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 1978). 





of the private chain of signifying in the unconscious is not new as it has already 
appeared in Freud's works, although only in his discussion of dreams. Lacan also 
considers difference, i.e., the notion of presence and absence, central to the estab-
lishment of the societal frame from early childhood on, and he constructs around 
this notion his model of the process through which an infant attains its sexual sub-
jectivity," a concept Giddens himself applies in his theory. Lacan's idea about sub-
ject positions, that is, culturally determined social locations, which speakers must 
assume each time they communicate, also appears in the theory of structuration. 
77 
	The three stages he examines are: (1) the imaginary state, wherein the subject is not differentiated 
from the world and unconscious and conscious images are not separable; (2) the mirror stage, which 
marks the transition to the symbolic stage, wherein awareness of differentiation develops and language 
as well as subjectivity are acquired; and (3) the symbolic state, which is characterized by language and rep-
resentation, the cornerstones of normalcy and sanity. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE GRAND THEORY 
The chapter to follow presents the theory of structuration itself: the basic terms 
and concepts used, the train of thought and logic applied. The structure of the chap-
ter endeavors to be faithful to Giddens' conceptualization and thus introduces his 
thinking in Section 1 regarding the micro-level analysis of actors and action, fol-
lowed by his ideas regarding the macro-level realities of the structure, structures, 
and institutions in Section 2, so that these could lead to the understanding of his 
conceptualization regarding the constitution of societies through a discussion of the 
essential notions of the duality of structure as well as power and change related to 
it in Section 3. 
1. Actors and Actions 
This section introduces concepts which are micro-sociological in nature within 
the framework of Giddens' theory: that of the individual, defined as actor or agent, 
and that of his social encounters, or actions. 
1.1 Actors 
The human individual in modern societies is granted the capability of acting and, 
therefore, can be defined as an actor or agent. This term signifies "the overall hu-
man subject located within the corporeal time-space of the living organism.i 2 Hu-
man agency is the result of the fact that Giddens . conceptualizes the individual as 
knowledgeable and powerful: through the reflexive monitoring of action and dis-
cursive offering of the assessment of action and interaction—including intentions and 
consequences, whether intended or not—the agent possesses knowledge about social 
action and life. Based on this knowledge and the fact that without actors and action 
society cannot exist, actors are empowered to act independently, of their own ac-
cord, even differently from or contrary to norms and expectations. 
1 	Giddens uses these terms as synonyms. 
2 	Giddens 1984, 51. 
3 	Giddens 1984, 9. However, Giddens fails to provide further, sufficient argument for why indi- 
viduals must be conceptualized as powerful and thus as possible originators of social change. His response 
to the frequent argument that individuals may have no choice to act otherwise because of social con-
straints is that having no choice does not automatically mean the dissolution of their possible action, as 
"action logically involves power in the sense of transformative capacity." Giddens 1984, 15. 
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Agency, thus, includes several factors: one's ability to perform actions,' one's in-
tentions in acting, and one's ability to intervene and act otherwise. However, agency 
is not identical with the `I/me' or the `self. The `I' is a linguistic category which 
"comes about only via the `discourse of the Other'—that is, through the acquisition 
of language—but the `I' has to be related to the body as the sphere of action.i 5 `Me' 
is also tied to linguistic competence; however, it presumes a more complex conduct 
of the language in which control over the body and knowledge of human conduct 
in various social contexts are also expressed. The `self, on the other hand, is the im-
age of the agent, "the sum of those forms of recall whereby the agent reflexively 
characterizes `what' is at the origin of his or her action." 6 The self is "the agent as 
characterized by the agent"' and is closely related to memory and body. 
In introducing how the agent develops, Giddens borrows from ego-psychology, 
mainly from the findings of Erikson.' Giddens proposes three stages of personality 
development resulting in the transformation of the body into an acting being. The 
first stage represents the development of trust 9 in the infant, closely bound to pre-
sence and absence, rooted in the infant's basic bodily needs. To achieve trust in the 
infant, parents and other social actors must display repetitive series of actions or 
routines, using typified schemes, 10 resulting in predictability and continuity as well 
as knowledge and certainty of how things happen and why. This trust, which results 
in confidence, is also a two-way process, since, although a basic trust with all its 
mechanisms develops in the infant, the social partners also need the conviction that 
the infant has trust in them; they, thus, will be able to act in accordance with the 
social dynamism of the given milieu. 
The second stage is tied to projection and introjection built around the mecha-
nisms of the personality, expressed in autonomy or certainty versus doubt or shame. 
It is rooted in one's self-esteem and self-image and can be traced in all walks of life, 
from bodily appearance to performance and talk. However, Goffman's distinction 
between front and back regions indicates that a full understanding of some features, 
4 	This ability is an indicator of individual power. 
5 	Giddens 1984, 43. 
6 	Giddens 1984, 51. 
' 	Giddens 1984, 51. 
8 
	Craib states that "the psychological processes are much more complex than Giddens allows for, 
and that [as a result] his analysis takes away an important depth and level of understanding of agency." 
1992, 143. 
9 Wallace and Wolf consider Giddens' discussion of trust and routine one of the strongest points 
of the theory of structuration. 
10 Here he borrows from Alfred Schutz, who maintains that the basic act of consciousness is typi-
fication, which is a process whereby actors group together typical elements in their series of experiences, 
thus building up typical models regarding social interactions—actions, objects, as well as people partici-
pating in them—which result in the construction of knowledge and of the shared social world. 
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such as doubt or shame, may be difficult to attain since they are more commonly 
expressed in the back region, which may be hard to map. 
The third, final stage coincides with the development of language skills and is 
centered around the appearance of initiative versus guilt. At this stage, the child 
comprehends the difference between the meanings of `I' and `me' and is able to 
locate itself not only in linguistic roles but also social ones. As the notion of initia-
tive implies, the child is able to break away from close family dependence, a process 
often referred to as the Oedipal transition, and moves toward autonomy and outside 
relations. In this way, the foundation for the reflexive monitoring of action is laid 
and the child is transformed into an actor.' 
What constitutes the actor? Giddens considers two constituents: the mind/psyche 
and the body. Upon discussing cognitive factors, he borrows from Freud, who di-
vides the psychic organization of man into three parts: id, ego, and super-ego. Gid-
dens applies this three-part model and, based on this, proposes his own model, 
which differentiates between the unconsciousness and consciousness, the latter 
being classified further as consisting of two components: practical and discursive 
consciousness, with no sharp dividing line between them. 
Bodily mechanisms 	Expression 	 Result 
Oral/Sensory 	 trust/mistrust 	 ontological security 
Muscular/Anal autonomy/shame, doubt bodily control 
Locomotive/Genital 
	
initiative/guilt 	 routine 
Figure 1: The development of agency' 
The unconscious provides the individual's "basic security system". 13 One is not 
able to give verbal expression to the unconscious; it can be understood only in terms 
of memory, that is, the Heideggerian presencing, which draws on the past in the 
present, relying on a recall device to help one remember. Closely linked to memory 
is perception, which is "the medium whereby the past affects the future," and is 
"identical with the underlying mechanisms'of memory." 14 This is a flow of activity, 
in the course of which the individual processes new incoming information as well 
11 	Barát comments that this conceptualization of the development of the agent is essentially evolu- 
tionist in that there seems to be a linear progress towards the utopia of a free and autonomous agency. 
12 Modified from Giddens 1984, 57. 
13 	Boyne criticizes Giddens for rejecting the notion that it is the unconscious that actually structures 
conscious life (1991, 69). 
14 Giddens 1984, 46. Barát points out that this model presupposes an unchanging, fixed uncon-
scious, which contradicts Giddens' earlier proposition that memory is the emerging result of remembering 
and forgetting, and as such it is situational and motivated by a particular moment of interpretation. 
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as mentally adjusting it to the pieces already stored and locates it in the societal 
framework. 
Here Giddens aims to overcome the difference between the traditional sub-
jectivist approach, which states that the individual is the processor of perception, 
and the objectivist approach, which holds that the object-word organizes our per-
ceptions. Perception, just like memory, is tied to time and presence, i.e., it repre-
sents spatial and temporal continuity and integrates the body with its various sen-
sory systems. However, it is significant to emphasize that perception is also selective 
as it is impossible for one to observe a number of elements in the course of an inter-
, action. He views this filtering as positive since it is an indicator of the individual's 
active engagement in the interaction. 
"If memory refers to [the] temporal mastery so inherent in human experience, 
then discursive and practical consciousness refers to psychological mechanisms of recall, 
as utilized in contexts of action."' Practical consciousness is closely tied to the capa-
city of the actors to monitor social actions in their environment, which provides 
them with the knowledge they possess regarding what is done, and how and why, 
in the flow of day-to-day conduct. Thus, practical consciousness is the major, 
though not exclusive, realm of the reflexive monitoring of action. Through the pro-
cess of reflective monitoring, the human being becomes a knowledgeable agent, 16 
possessing tacit knowledge of daily social conduct. 17 If this is the case, then regular, 
habitual actions, that is, routines, are also connected to this field; they are significant 
as they provide (1) social reproduction with a material grounding and (2) the agent 
with trust and ontological security, the key drives leading the agent in its parti-
cipation in the reproduction of social practices. 
Knowledgeability and the ability to verbalize knowledge offer a platform for 
shifting to the introduction of discursive consciousness. These are a result of the 
agent's permanent reflexive monitoring of action and account for the agent's credi-
bility criteria, i.e., both the agent's ability to provide reasons for its actions, thus also 
validating them, as well as its awareness of what is happening in the social envi-
ronment as well as how and why it is happening. It relies not on tacit but also on 
discursively available knowledge and gives way to the rationalization of action. 
ls 	Giddens 1984, 49. 
16 	Boyne, in his criticism of Giddens, finds it "hard if not impossible to speak of the `knowledgeable 
social actor'." 1991, 55. 
17 However, Giddens is not specific regarding the mechanisms which would guarantee actors the 
free intellectual capacity to know and the power to act differently; that is, he does not elaborate on what 
allows actors to go beyond the recognition of appropriateness in their assessment. If this is missing from 
his concept of agency, reflexive monitoring, knowledgeability and power only enable actors to notice and 
enact social norms, reducing change to mere accident. Giddens, however, emphasizes the inherent pos-
sibility of acting contrary to norms after recognizing and assessing them, which may lead to consciously 
induced change. However, this remains a claim as he does not support it with sufficient argumentation. 
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Discursive consciousness indicates those types of recall which the agent can ex-
press verbally while practical consciousness connotes the forms which the agent is 
familiar with in his actions but cannot verbalize. 18 As noted previously, the two 
types of consciousness do not comprise strictly distinct categories and may overlap 
as well as supplement each other. The intersection of these two, that is, of saying 
and doing, placed in a spatial and temporal continuum, accounts for the notion of 
praxis, discussed further in Section 2. 
unconscious 
consciousness a. practical consciousness 
b. discursive consciousness 
Figure 2: The cognitive model of the agent 
The second factor to consider in constituting actors is the body, the "locus of the 
active self'. Various issues, all related to the positioning of the body in time and 
space, such as the division of the body into front and back regions or the consi-
deration of presence, co-presence, and absence as well as bodily autonomy, control, 
and limitations, are crucial to the elaboration on the role of the body in a social 
context. 
Traditionally, social positioning has been connected to social roles: functionalist 
structuralists, such as Parsons, hold that it is tied to societal integration based upon 
value consensus, while the other school of thought, which includes Goffman and his 
dramaturgy, maintains that it is shaped by the individual and not structural pro-
perties—although allows that the sets, circumstances, and rules in role plays are de-
termined by these. For Giddens, "[A] ctors are always positioned in respect to the 
three aspects of temporality around which the theory of structuration is built." 19 
Thus, the positioning of the body refers to (1) the positioning of the body in re-
lation to others in co-presence; (2) one's relation to the seriality of actions across 
time and space; 2°  and (3) the intersection of the two, i.e., the actor's positioning 
within the much longer life span of institutions and structures. 
Upon dividing the body structurally, in terms of the nature of action, Giddens 
relies again on the findings of Goffman. He maintains that agents play roles which 
can especially be relatively freely observed in the front region, in the domain of 
18 	The unconscious also contains various modes of recall, but the agent has no access to them either 
because they are from the period when the agent could not speak—and thus the models became connected 
to the agent's basic security system—or because they have been repressed. 
19 	Giddens 1984, 84. 
20 	Everyone is positioned at the same time in (1) the durée of daily life; (2) in one's life span; and 
(3) in the duration of institutional time. These are the three time-relations Giddens considers in his 
theory. 
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public interaction. However, the actors also retire to their back region, which marks 
the intimate, private realm where they are likely not to play various roles or feel ob-
ligated to meet various social and behavioral expectations. 21 
Upon analyzing action in the front region, we must consider the question of 
absence, presence, and co-presence, which concerns the spatiality and movements 
of the body, as oriented toward itself as well as others. Goffman's considerations of 
the body as a means of acting and Wittgenstein's philosophical meditation over the 
issue of the context-dependence of action 22 entail closed, physical, face-to-face inter-
actions, the group of which should be extended to situations in which not all of 
these conditions would necessarily apply, such as telephone conversations. Investi-
gations regarding the significance of individual body parts, body language, the ex-
hibition of presence as well as the autonomy of the body, its limitations, and one's 
ability to control it may assist social scientists in clarifying the precise manner in 
which the body is a part of human interaction. 
The actor's position as situated in time and space refers to its position not only 
in encounters and in the durée of daily activities but also in the actor's life cycle, 
including its position in the web of its social relations, which is closely bound to 
social identities, 23 system integration, and system reproduction. The intersection of 
the individual's position and that of institutions, which provides the locus for system 
reproduction through reproductive practices in routinized and situated interactions, 
regulated by various clusters of rules, is also identified as a frame. Naturally, one 
may not be fully aware of all these rules and may err, in which case situational im-
proprieties may occur—but in most cases actors are aware of the bulk of the rules, 
and, consequently, their engagement in encounters results in successful interaction. 
This indicates that one possible reason behind change may lie in situational im-
proprieties. Although Giddens is often critical of other theorists for not offering a 
satisfactory model for agency and, thus neither power nor change, both of which he 
considers inherent in it, he falls short of providing such a model himself With 
regard to change, he already concludes in the "Introduction" that "the search for a 
theory of social change...is a doomed one." 24 The reason for that is, he continues, 
that Tin explaining social change no single and sovereign mechanism can be spe- 
2i 	Barát observes that this model conceptualizes the actor as caught within the theatrical metaphor 
indicating that the public/private divide comes to mean subjection/agency. If this is the case, there is no 
agentive action in the front region, but the performance of the norm, which is unlike the position of pow-
erful agency. Moreover, the private is also not necessarily free of socially prescribed roles, which often 
tend to be gender-specific. 
22 	His question regarding the difference between raising one's arm and one's arm simply going up 
is the example given to illustrate this point. 
23 	As Goffman points out, actors draw upon these identities in their daily interactions as they pro- 
vide the pattern to be followed in actions. 
24 	Giddens 1984, xxviii. 
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cified; there are no keys that will unlock the mysteries of human social development, 
reducing them to a unitary formula." 25 
Giddens conceptualizes agents as humans with transformative capacity, that is, 
power is a given feature of agency. 26 He writes: "to be an agent is to be able to 
deploy... a range of causal powers." 27 That is, agency and power are connected pri-
marily by logical implication through his definition of the term `agency'. This is 
confirmed as he continues: "An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capa-
bility to `make a difference', that is, to exercise some sort of power." 28 With this 
twist he turns his definition around and considers power a condition for agency, as 
opposed to earlier theories which conceptualized power as the result of that. A page 
later he also proposes that power should be conceptualized as having two faces, one 
of which is the "capability to enact decisions" which agents favor, the other is the 
"mobilization of bias" that is inherent in social institutions. 29 
Situational improprieties present one possible obstacle to the knowledgeability 
of the agent. 30 Knowledgeability expresses the agent's awareness of rules and tactics 
applied in a given social milieu, which is one of the necessary conditions for success-
ful interaction and the maintenance of social life. 31 Giddens identifies four factors 
which contribute to the production and content of knowledge which agents tend 
to draw on: "(1) the means of access actors have to knowledge in virtue of their 
social location; (2) the modes of articulation of this knowledge; (3) circumstances 
relating to the validity of the belief-claims taken as knowledge; and (4) factors to do 
with the dissemination of available knowledge." 32 The stock of knowledge agents 
draw on contributes highly to the success of social action. 33 
25 	Giddens 1984, 243. For further discussion of his understanding of change and power, see Sec- 
tion 3. 
26 Richard Kilminster, however, claims that agency and transformative power are often limited by 
complex social interdependence, which Giddens does not elaborate on. Richard Kilminster, "Structuration 
theory as a world-view," in Christopher Bryant and David Jery eds., Guldens' Theory of Structuration. A 
Critical Appreciation (New York: Routledge, 1991), 79-115. 
27 	Giddens 1984, 14. 
Giddens 1984, 14. 
29 This understanding of power foreshadows his concept of the duality of structure to be discussed 
in Section 3. 
30 We must note here that the knowledge Giddens refers to is not the Foucaultian knowledge ap-
plied in the constitution of subjects. 
31 	With this gesture, Giddens presents the "dignity of capable human actors", according to Kil- 
minster (1991, 79). 
32 	Giddens 1984, 91. 
33 	Nicos Mouzelis argues that structuration theory focuses on the individual actor and only briefly 
regards the study of collective actors. Nicos Mouzelis, "Restructuring Structuration Theory," Sociological 
Review 37 (1989): 613-35. 
28 
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1.2 Actions  
"Action is a continuous process, a flow... actors ordinarily sustain throughout 
their day-to-day lives" 34 and not simply a collection of discrete, independent acts. 
Giddens develops his stratification model, in correlation with his model of agency, 
to indicate the three major components of action as related to agency. However, 
although action is performed by agents, it is closely bound to the systems and to the 
given temporal, that is, historical and spatial circumstances, since these influence one 
another as well as define the context in which actions occur. Further explication of 
these areas, therefore, would be very much called for. 
The model of agency sheds light on and explains the components of action as a 
system parallel to it, as expressed in the figure below. The unconscious is responsible 
for shaping series of actions as expressed by the various drives, wants, and needs 
which motivate the actor into action. In Giddens' view, "[F]or the most part mo-
tives supply overall plans or programs—`projects' in Schütz's term—within which a 
range of conduct is enacted. Much of our day-to-day conduct is not directly mo-
tivated." 35 The actor may or may not be consciously aware of the complexity of 
motives just as it may or may not grasp the real motives underlying various series 
of actions. 
Personality 	 Action 
unconscious 	 —> 	motivation of action 
practical consciousness 	reflexive monitoring of action 
discursive consciousness rationalization of action 
unacknowledged conditions 	unintended consequences 
of action 	 of action 
Figure 3: Stratification model' 
Motives are sharply distinguished from reasons for actions; the latter is an out-
growth of the reflexive monitoring of action, 37 which is the permanent involvement 
Giddens 1984, 9. 
Giddens 1984, 6. 
Modified from Giddens 1984, 5, and John Scott, SociologicaJTheory. Contemporary Debates (Brook-
field, VT: Elgar, 1995), 205. 





of the agent in the conduct as well as in the context of social action and interaction, 
whereby it monitors not only itself but also all other participants as well as that 
which preceded and that which will follow the interaction. It is through the reflexive 
monitoring of action that the agent locates itself in action and is able to see its ac-
tions not as a series of separated acts but as a flow, a continuous process. Similarly, 
the agent's monitoring is also a permanent process, performed as if routine, that is, 
the agent may engage in it completely unaware that it is doing so. . 
However, when asked about what the agent has performed, or how and why it 
has done so, the agent is usually able to explain the nature of and steps in its action 
and offer the reasons/intentions, as a result of reflexive monitoring. The ability to 
verbalize about action, embedded in discursive consciousness, is defined as the ra-
tionalization of action. Just as in the case of the two kinds of consciousness, no 
sharp distinction can be made between reflexive monitoring and the rationalization 
of action since these two areas may often overlap. Again, rationalization does not 
mainly regard individual acts but rather refers to the notion of the agent's general 
idea and understanding of its own activity, including its ability to locate discrete acts 
in the overall flow of action and support them with reasoning. However, it is pos-
sible to fail to predict all the possible conditions and consequences of action which, 
structuration theory maintains, may result in change. 
If it is presumed that the reflexive monitoring and the rationalization of action 
are interlaced, how can motivation be connected to these activities? Or, in other 
words, how is consciousness connected to the unconscious in human action? If we 
accept Giddens' theorem that motives are clustered around the individual's drive to 
maintain ontological security resulting in trust through tact 38 in society, then two 
factors must be considered: one is related to the second field constituting the actor, 
namely the body; the other regards the type of action which may result in a feeling 
of safety. 
The autonomy of the actor's bodily control is the first condition of achieving 
ontological security. Bodily autonomy is linked to the feeling of shame by Erikson; 
this is the basis for the division of personal front and back regions which became 
essential in Goffman's dramaturgy later. In the early stage of development, shame 
is associated with the back region or `behind', where the child can hide until a 
proper action takes place in the vicinity, re-establishing his confidence in the front 
region. With time the front region expands, as Goffman points out, and becomes 
the indicator of the division between the public versus the private life as well as the 
difference between the conduct of activity in these two realms, similar to the 
difference in conduct in on- and off-stage performance. 
Ontological security, the drive which motivates actors and in which the auto-
nomy of bodily control is essential, is guaranteed and maintained in action; this is 
38 Giddens views tact as the group of mechanisms through which actors are able to maintain the 
conditions of trust through their constant reproduction. 
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the second component in granting essential trust. In order to define what kind of 
action can provide this, Giddens' typology of interaction 39 must be introduced. 
Giddens borrows it from Goffman, who proposes the following classification: 
Informal: gatherings —> a. unfocused 
b. focused: encounters (—> routine) 
Formal: social occasions 
Figure 4: Types of interaction 
Giddens understands gatherings as assemblages of two or more people in a non-
formalized context while he defines social occasions as formalized social events with 
sharp temporal and spatial boundaries in a given environment. He differentiates be-
tween unfocused gatherings, in which the main reason for communication lies in 
the co-presence of actors, and focused gatherings, which denote coordinated, plan-
ned gatherings in an informal manner, which both Goffman and Giddens define as 
encounters, or face-to-face interactions. 
However, Giddens adds that these encounters "typically occur as routines". 4° 
And it is this type of interaction, that is, routine, which can bridge the gap between 
the unconscious and the conscious since, by creating a safe context in which the 
agent can relate to his social milieu, it provides the basis for his ontological security. 
As Giddens notes, routine grants the predictability that contributes to the continuity 
of the personality of the actor as well as the reproduction of the institutions in so-
ciety. 41 However, it must be pointed out that these are not independent processes 
but are intertwined; thus, routine must also be viewed as a key element in con-
necting the agent and the society. 
As it has been previously mentioned, autonomy of the body and control over it 
provide a major aspect to be considered in the presence of the body in interaction. 
The other significant factor is the front region and Giddens' understanding of the 
term. In contrast to Goffman, he argues that the front region of the body must be 
more than a mere facade where one can witness the agent playing various roles; 
thus, the difference between front and back regions is not identical to the difference 
between disclosure and enclosure of the individual self Front regional action is not 
39 	The various typifications Giddens introduces imply that he envisions certain closed systems in so- 
cial analysis so characteristic of functionalism and structuralism. Moreover, here he regards only face-to-
face interactions, but ontological security may be affected by other factors, such as mental constructs ori-
ginating in one's reading/interpretation of the information presented by the media. 
4o 	Giddens 1984, 70. 
41 	Bryant and Jary, in the "Introduction" to their monograph on Giddens, point out that one of the 
limitations of structuration theory is the fact that it regards the reproduction of social relations and prac-
tices "as a mechanical outcome." 1991, 7. 
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experienced as a performance by most actors as their sense of ontological security 
is expressed in them. 
In certain cases actors may also express their enclosed selves in the course of their 
interactions as they may rely on their back region as a type of resource while acting. 
There are also highly ritualized social practices which may have a lasting impact on 
the back region, which may be disclosed during an interaction. These propositions 
lead to two implications regarding regions: (1) that front and back regions cannot 
always be sharply distinguished; and (2) that in the operation of the front personal 
region, surveillance plays a major role. 
In addition to agency, with its cognitive, psychological, and corporeal aspects, 
the second major field contributing to action is superstructure. Without going into 
further detail about it at this point since it will be discussed in the following section, 
it should be noted that it is present, directly or indirectly, in the constitution of the 
actor as well as in the temporal and spatial dimensions of interaction, which is the 
third component to consider in analyzing action. 
Upon discussing time-space relations in interaction, Giddens draws largely on 
the findings of time-geography, especially the works of Hagerstrand. Hagerstrand's 
basic premise rests on the conceptualization of everyday life as a series of routinized 
actions, bound to the body of the actors, its limitations, and its movements in time 
and space. 42 He points out five limitations constraining the body in the daily 
routine: (1) the indivisibility of the human body limits the capabilities of move-
ment; (2) the agent's life span is of a limited nature; (3) agents usually do not tend 
to perform more than one task at a time and each task has a duration; (4) move-
ment in space is always bound to movement in time; and (5) one body may occupy 
only one space at a given time. These five conditions comprise the material axes of 
human existence, both in daily and in longer activities, and can be visually illustrated 
in a set of coordinates where the possible time-space span, which is volume with all 
its constraints, is represented by a prism. 43 
Giddens supplements this notion with the idea of locales," meaning the space 
which serves as the constrained setting of interaction but also contributes to making 
the interaction meaningful. These locales are typically grouped into regions 4s which 
express zones of activity in time-space relations as connected to routinized social 
practices. The most common zones would be tied to daily and weekly practices, but 
42 	Late modern compression of time and space, as already pointed out earlier, may question the 
validity of this claim with regard to analyzing the conduct of daily life now. 
43 	The prism can best be used to represent possible realms of daily activity and the fields used express 
maximum volume. 
44 	Locales may range from a room or a shop to cities or even nation-states. 
45 	For example, modern Western houses are typically regionalized by floors: the ground floor pro- 
vides the place for daylight activities, while the second floor, with its bedrooms and bathrooms, is tied 
to resting and used mainly at night. 
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some may include one's entire life span. Giddens offers four modes for regionali-
zation: (1) form, meaning the boundaries, both physical and symbolic, of regions; 
(2) character, defining the arrangement of regions in the wider social system; (3) 
span or scale, indicating regional differentiations, often rooted in time or space but 
resulting in socio-economic and cultural differences; and (4) duration. When a long 
duration of time is under consideration, a distinction may generally be made be-
tween central and peripheral regions: the former indicating the establishment, the 
latter locating the outsiders. This may refer not only to institutions but also to so-
cieties as well as the geopolitical system of the world. 
Before proceeding any further, the nature of social context must be discussed in 
more detail. Contextuality is "the situated character of interaction in time-space, in-
volving the setting of interaction, actors co-present and communication between 
them."' Contexts are positioned and, thus, inform the agents co-present about the 
frame of the conduct of the interaction. This implies that context is often routinized 
and it "connects the most intimate and detailed components of interaction to much 
broader properties of the institutionalization of social life.i 47 However, when this 
routinized nature is disturbed, a critical situation may arise, which may ultimately 
result in the emergence of a new set of routines replacing the old one. 
An example Giddens discusses in order to illustrate this is Bruno Bettelheim's 
study of the interaction in the Nazi concentration camps during World War II. 48 In 
his book Bettelheim describes how some of the Jewish prisoners had lost their old 
selves and became akin to the Nazi soldiers, behaving, dressing, acting, and speaking 
the way the Nazis did. The major causes for this traumatic and completely unex-
pected change lay in the dramatic change in the context of interaction: the formerly 
applied institutional routines were destroyed in the camps and along with them the 
individuals. The process ofthis change took the following course: resulting from the 
lack of routine and the destruction of the autonomy of bodily control, including the 
disappearance of back and front regions, everything became unpredictable and 
senseless; consequently, the original individual trust and ontological security had 
disappeared. The only solution to this situation, which lasted for a longer durée of 
time, was for the prisoners to identify with the new representatives of authority, 
acquire new patterns of action modeled on them in the new context, and re-establish 
some sort of predictability and certainty through fresh rules learned though re-
socialization. Giddens uses this example to illustrate the significance of context in 
socializing, that is, uniting the actor with the institutionalized structures. 49 
46 
	Giddens 1984, 373. 
47 	Giddens 1984, 119. 
48 Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960). 
49 	Giddens uses this case study merely as an example of critical situations which may come about 
though the loss of ontological security resulting from the loss of routine. 
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2. Structures) and Institutions 
Having introduced the major ideas regarding actors and actions, this chapter will 
now turn to a discussion of the elements bound to macro-level analysis. The key 
terms to cover include societies and systems, structure and structures, as well as in-
stitutions and social collectivities. 
2.1 Societies and Systems 
Society is defined by Giddens as a marked unity of people with boundaries se-
parating them from others. Society, however, cannot be regarded as a single, indi-
vidual unit existing separately from other societies. Although, typically, societies are 
bound to locales, (1) they are open, that is, they are linked to other societies and 
may, therefore, impact each other; and (2) the way they are organized may not be 
solely characteristic of and integral to a single society but rather various types of so-
cieties. This is the basis for Giddens' conclusion that all societies must be viewed as 
part of an intersocietal system organized along time-space edges and are, thus, partly 
constituted by the intersection of the various social systems in this intersocietal con-
text. 50 
He distinguishes between three characteristic features of societies as follows: (1) 
they are bound to specific locales; (2) they maintain a legitimate claim on those 
locales as part of a whole set of normative elements around which a given society 
is organized; and (3) their members possess a shared feeling of common identity. 
These social systems are patterned as the outcome of reproduced social practices. 
Societies exist in time and space 51 and are based on various mechanisms of so-
cietal integration, that is, on structural or organizational principles. Depending on 
the types of structural principles used, Giddens proposes three basic types of so-
cieties, the typology for which can be seen in the following figure. 
50 	Through this line of reasoning he hopes to provide a definition of society which is able to unite 
the two basic meanings of the word, one being "social association", the other "a unity, a state". He defines 
societies as "social systems which `stand out' in bas-relief from a background of a range of other systemic 
relationships in which they are embedded." Giddens 1984, 164. 
51 	Gregor McLennan considers Giddens' emphasis on the significance of time and space inappro- 
priate as, in his opinion, they do not play a central role in social theory, as he points out in his work "The 
Temporal and Temporizing in Structuration Theory," in Jon Clark et al. eds., Anthony Giddens. Consensus 
and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990), 131-39, 139. 
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Type of society Structural principles 	Dominant locale 
and organization 
tradition (communal moral band groups or villages 
practices) 
kinship 	 no state 
group sanctions 
existential contradictions 
tradition 	 symbiosis of country and 
town 
kinship 	 agricultural state 
politics (military power) 
economic interdependence (low) 
formal codes of law 
symbolic coordination 
-± state develops 
existential and structural contradictions 
routines 	 city (created environ- 
ment) 
kinship (family) 	nation-state 
surveillance 
politics (military power) 










Figure 5: Typology of societies 52 
The differentiation between these three types of societies is based on a number 
of features. Tribal societies are structured around tradition and kinship as the most 
significant binding elements. They share the fact that their cultures are oral. This 
type of society includes hunter-gatherers living in hordes, bands, or tribes, and small 
52 	On the basis of Giddens 1981 and 1984. 
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agrarian communities living in villages. This type of society is characterized by exis-
tential contradictions which refer to "an elemental aspect of human existence in 
relation to nature or the material world", and are void of structural contradictions, 
which refer to "the constitutive features of human societies"' which first emerge 
in the second type of societies: class-divided societies. 
These structural contradictions evolve as the result of increased "time-space dis-
tanciation" resulting from the appearance of writing systems and advanced trans-
portation. These contributed to two significant changes: (1) a change in the nature 
of communication, which no longer needed to be face-to-face encounters; and (2) 
the possibility of information storage, which allowed for the emergence of the state, 
along with political and military power as its distinct features. Tradition and kinship 
in these societies remain significant; however, towns develop and become the dom-
inant locale as they evolve into "the `storage container' of administrative resources"' 
around which states are organized. The towns in this model, however, remain in 
close symbiosis with the country. This results in low economic interdependence 
between the urban and rural locales as well as between classes, which do occur, re-
placing the gender-based division of labor which characterizes tribal societies—al-
though, as Giddens claims, there is no actual struggle between the classes. Examples 
of this type of society include city-states as well as agrarian and feudal states. 
The third type of society is the class society, which is characterized by capitalism 
and nation-states. Modern capitalism, the outgrowth of the disembedding of state 
and economic institutions, is the first truly global type of societal organization, char-
acterized by a new interconnection between states and economies as well as the 
appearance of surveillance, the major form of social integration, which Giddens de-
fines as "the coding of information relevant to the administration of subject popula-
tions, plus their direct supervision by officials and administrators of all sorts."' The 
locales have become "manufactured or `created environments' centered in urban 
areas. This type of state is characterized by high economic interdependence, both 
within states and classes, and as theirs is a created environment, overall structural 
contradictions may appear. 
These types of societies do not represent an evolutionary model to be followed 
by all societies, nor are they solely characteristic of a given age; nowadays, for ex-
ample, all three types exist in various parts of the world. Giddens claims that because 
of the recent developments in technology and the expansion of politics and eco-
nomy, individual societies cannot really be studied separately but rather as parts of 
intersocietal systems, since different individual societies are indeed part of a global 
existence, influencing as well as being influenced by other societies around them. 
53 	Giddens 1984, 193. 
54 	Giddens 1984, 183. 
55 	Giddens 1984, 183-4. Interestingly, here he uses the attribute "subject" to capture the nature of 
the population, which is contrary to agency which he argues for otherwise in his theory. 
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Giddens maintains that societies are based on systems, meaning "the patterning 
of social relations across time-space, understood as reproduced practices", 56 con-
sisting of interdependent institutions and collectivities. Social systems establish the 
relations between actors and are organized as regularly performed practices, that is, 
they are reproduced by means of repeated social actions. Social systems are typically 
not in unity to the same extent that biological systems are, for example, and display 
a high degree of variety. They are organized hierarchically as well as laterally within 
societies, and institutions within them are viewed as "articulated ensembles". 
Actors are placed into these by way of integration, which indicates reciprocity of 
practices, the relations of autonomy, and dependence between actors and collec-
tivities. 57 Depending on these as well as their temporal and spatial framework, Gid-
dens distinguishes between social and system integrations. Social integration refers 
to the reciprocity of practices existing between actors in co-presence, thus uniting 
actors in face-to-face interaction, while system integration binds the actor to collec-
tivities over an extended period of time and space, thus uniting individual actors to 
groups of people in a more general sense and manner. 
2.2 Structure and Structures 
In Giddens' model, it is structure which contributes to the maintenance of the 
system. 58 He defines structure as reproduced social practices 59 embedded in time 
and space, always both enabling and constraining, deriving from the relationship 
between structure and powerful agency. ó0 These two features, that is, enabling and 
constraining, comprise a whole and are in a dialectical unity which can be best 
grasped in terms of various social constraints. 61 
56 Giddens 1984, 377. 
5' 	Although Giddens claims in a number of places that there is societal differentiation, he chooses 
not to elaborate on the origin and nature of this nor on the forces shaping their relations. 
58 Annus notes that Giddens does not offer a sufficient explanation with regard to the source of 
structure and the organizing principle behind it. She proposes that ideology may be viewed as one type 
of binding force which constitutes structure. Irén Annus, The Structuration ofMormon Identity (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation. Szeged: University of Szeged, 2000) 
59 Margaret Archer claims that there exist elaborate structures which cannot be reproduced by 
practice alone because of certain properties they maintain. Margaret Archer, "Human Agency and Social 
Structure. A Critique of Giddens," in Jon Clark et al. eds., Anthony Giddens. Consensus and Controversy 
(London: Falmer Press, 1990), 73-84. 
60 As Archer states, Giddens "never acknowledges that structure and agency work on different time 
intervals." 1990, 81. Moreover, she continues, he also fails to analyze fixity or duration resulting from his 
understanding of structuration as always a process and never a product, that is, always in the making and 
never in the being. 
61 J. B. Thompson claims that one of the drawbacks of the theory of structuration is the fact that 
it lacks a concept of structural differentiation, which is a truly significant component of social systems and 
analysis, in his "The theory of structuration," in D. Held and J. Thompson eds., Social Theory of Modern 
Societies. Anthony Giddens and his Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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Upon discussing constraints, Giddens relies a great deal on the writings of Durk-
heim. He distinguishes between four types of constraints—social, material, structural, 
and sanctional—which may be interpreted as essentially four aspects of the same no-
tion. Social constraint originates in the fact that the individual coexists with the 
given structure throughout its life span and becomes involved in the life of in-
stitutions by means of socialization, through which constraint on as well as enable-
ment of individuals and institutions coexist and emerge in a unity. 62 In this, both 
agents and institutions maintain their own constraints over the other. ó3 
Institutions cannot exist without human agency and the power associated with 
it to continue or change social praxis, which is essential to the maintenance of in-
stitutions. However, structure also exercises constraining power over agents, de-
riving from the fact that its existence is typically far longer than the life span of an 
individual; it may, as such, be presented to the individual as objectively given, com-
prising a collection of duties or obligations to be fulfilled, thus essentially limiting 
the power of agents to act otherwise. It can, therefore, be concluded that constraint 
appears at the crossing of structure and agents, representing not only limitations but 
also various forms of power, m  that is, enablement, as well. 
In addition to social constraints, Giddens distinguishes between three other types 
of constraints: (1) material constraints; (2) constraints associated with sanctions; 
and (3) structural constraints. The previously introduced material constraints in-
clude "the constraining aspects of the body and its location in contexts of the ma-
terial world."65 Sanctions, which are aspects of power which constrain and may be 
expressed and experienced in various ways and to varying degrees, ranging from dis-
approval to violence or death, typically entail the highest degree of asymmetries in 
power: they empower certain agents at the expense of limiting the power of others. 
Structural constraints' are rooted in the contextuality of the action, that is, in the 
structural properties of actors situated in interaction. These constraints are usually 
62 	Kilminster observes that structuration theory "does not at any level contain a fully relational 
conception of constraint because of Giddens' failure to incorporate the reality and concept of human 
interdependence into his theory." 1991, 97. 
63 	Giddens maintains here that the two parties have equal power and potential to intervene; 
however, in the case of agency, this power originates in the definition of agency, while in the case of 
institutions, it is supported by an elaborate system of surveillance, as Giddens notes in other sections. 
64 An important duality can be traced in Giddens' treatment of the term `power'. In the structural 
context, it is used to indicate hegemonic power, while power granted to the individual to act otherwise 
may present power which is a threat to hegemony. This duality may be understood if structural power 
is considered hegemonic, and, through various techniques, is able to utilize the power of the actors for 
its own maintenance. However, Giddens maintains, the power enabling one to act in a structurally non-
próefigured way leading to change which falls outside the existing system, remains a possibility. 
Giddens 1984, 174. 
66 	Giddens relates reification to these constraints, which signifies cases wherein social phenomena 
take on object-like properties which they actually do not have. 
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experienced as objective, given featuresó'that the agents are unable to change; there-
fore, they place limitations on human agency as well. 68 
Structure consists of rules and resources, implied in social practices, which can 
be traced back to human consciousness, as it comprises the theoretical framework 
within the individual memory regarding how a system is organized and maintained. 
This makes it possible for a variety of social practices to coexist and binds them to-
gether in time and space. The word `structures' in the plural is a term used to in-
dicate the transformed, specific sets of rules and resources which appear in the "in-
stitutional articulation of social systems". 69 
Rules are defined as "[T] echniques or generalizable procedures applied in the en-
actment/reproduction of social practices". 70 They can be formulated, that is, verbally 
expressed, and may, thus, result in 'a codified form, 71 which is limited only to an in-
terpretation of the rule and not the rule itself. These should be distinguished from 
exemplifying rules, which are not formulated, and may therefore be applied in in-
teractions. The awareness of how these rules or formulae relate to practices is at the 
core of the actor's knowledgeability, located foremost in its practical consciousness. 
These rules are used in daily activities as typified schemes of action. They may also 
be classified as rules of normative sanctions/elements and rules which function as 
codes of signification, that is, in operation in the constitution of meaning. As for 
their characteristics, they can be described in terms of four other distinct features 
which are summarized in the following figure. 
intensive 	tacit 	informal 	weakly sanctioned 
shallow 	discursive 	formalized 	strongly sanctioned 
Figure 6: The characteristic features of rules' 
Resources, which form the other constituent of structure, can be divided into 
two groups: (1) authoritative resources which indicate non-material resources, 
rooted in the fact that some agents have power over others in a given society; these 
67 	This is achieved by presenting certain situations as inevitable; this, in turn, is achieved by leaving 
no or only few options open to the actor. 
68 	Thompson maintains that Giddens underestimates the constraining- aspects of structure on agency. 
69 	However, Giddens fails to address the question of what the origin of these rules and resources 
is and what the consequence of changing them might be. 
7° 	Giddens 1984, 21. Thompson criticizes Giddens for not distinguishing between various rules, 
thus indicating that they are of equal significance in social life, when, in fact, some are more enabling and 
others more restraining. 
71 	For example, laws, bureaucratic rules, and regulations. 
72 
	Giddens 1984, 22. 
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include: aspects of the organization of time and space relations and paths; the pro-
duction and reproduction of the body, including human relations; and the organi-
zation of personal chances; as well as (2) allocative resources, which are material re-
sources deriving from human dominance over nature, including not only raw ma-
terials and powers of the environment but also the means of material production, 
such as technology and machinery. Both types of resources derive from various 
powers and, therefore, are involved in the generation of power in a given society. 
In terms of power, authoritative resources refer to the capacity to generate com-
mand over people while allocative resources denote the same capacity with regard 
to objects: the natural environment and physical artifacts. 
It is also clear that various sociological schools emphasize the significance of cer-
tain resources over others, e.g., Marxism considers allocative resources the gener-
ic/central force in the history of human development. However, Giddens maintains 
that these two types of resources are interdependent and work in union in social 
systems. 73 In modern nation-states, these resources are stored, recalled, and dissem-
inated by the media, which is, therefore, of crucial significance as the container of 
all information, that is, knowledge. The most recent developments in technology 
have elevated the media to an even higher and more prominent level since the infor-
mation which can be stored by the various existing technologies surpass the human 
capacity for information storage. Consequently, the media plays a key role in nation-
states in treating knowledge—such as collecting, storing, or disseminating it—and is, 
therefore, the most significant power container. 
Structure may be described in terms of structural principles and properties. 
Structural principles, as illustrated in Figure 5, refer to the principles or factors upon 
which societal totalities are organized, while properties indicate the already struc-
tured and institutionalized features of various social systems as they are reproduced 
across time and space. In discussing structural principles one may find various con-
tradictions, which can be classified as existential and structural. As mentioned ear-
lier, the first entail the essential contradiction between human existence in relation 
to nature and the material world while the second refer to differences between the 
various constitutive features existing in societies 
If structure is understood as a collection of rules and resources and, thus, pro-
vides the theoretical framework for social life, then structures should be interpreted 
as isolable sets of rules applied and resources used in interaction and in the arti-
culation of social systems. To use a linguistic analogy, structure is like language and 
structures are like speech, that is, language put into practice. 
73 The model Giddens offers actually captures the state of a hegemonic status quo, where certain 
agents have power over others and there is differentiated access to resources which are interdependent—but 
there is no discussion of possible situations characterized by lack of reinforcement between resources or 
conflict between agents, or other conditions which may challenge the hegemonic state and contribute to 
change. 
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Structure and structures are organized around three major roles in societies, 
which correspond to the various rules and resources structure entails: (1) signifi-
cation, resulting from rules of signification applied in social interaction; (2) legi-
timation, based on rules of normative sanctions; and (3) domination, reflecting the 
structure and functioning of resources. Two types of domination may occur: poli-
tical domination, which emerges as a result of managing authoritative resources, and 
economic domination, which is the outcome of the handling of allocative resources 
in societies. These three domains of structure(s) correspond to the appropriate types 
of institutions, which have developed in order to represent and maintain these do-
mains, as well as to different types of interaction, through which they may be at 
work. 
2.3 Institutions and Social Collectivities 
Institutions can be defined as chronically reproduced rules and resources on the 
societal level. The two types of rules as well as resources, therefore, contributed to 
and stimulated the emergence of four types of institutions in modern societies. 
Signification results in the appearance of social symbolic orders and defines modes 
of discourse; legitimation leads to the development of legal institutions, which are 
organized around and in accordance with various aspects of domination, exercised 
through two spheres: political as well as economic institutions. 
Agents participate in the functioning and maintenance of these institutions 
through interactions which are shaped by various modules, namely: (1) commu-
nication, which establishes the agents' link to discourse and symbolic order through 
interpretative schemes; (2) sanctions, which assist in binding actors to legal institu-
tions by urging them to maintain certain norms; and (3) power, which results in 
maintaining the structure of domination through various facilities. 
In this manner, as Figure 7 illustrates, the basic structure(s) give way to the de-
velopment of appropriate institutions which are maintained by the agents through 
their participation in social interaction. However, the knowledgeable agent, the one 
with the ability to monitor these interactions, is also capable of modifying or al-
tering these interactions and so too these institutions. This interdependence between 
agents and institutions is considered to be the key notion in structuration theory, 
signified as the duality of structure, which, in essence, describes the way social sys-
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4- Power (facility) 74 
Legal institutions 
E- Sanctions (norms) 
Domination - Authorization 
(D-S-L) 	!- authoritative resources 
Allocation 
E- allocative resources 
Legitimation Normative regulation 
(L-S-D) 	4-- rules of normative 
sanctions 
Figure 7: Structure and institutions 75 
The duality of structure involves not only the reproduction of institutions but 
also of collectivities, that is, of collective actors. Depending on the type of relations 
holding the groups together, Giddens distinguishes between associations and or-
ganizations. In the case of associations, reproduction takes place through the reg-
ularized conduct of the members, i.e., through routine encounters. Typically, they 
are reproduced on the basis of specific traditions, which legitimize the existence of 
these associations and act as the medium connecting the daily conduct of life to the 
longer durée of the institutional life of the associations. 
Organizations, on the other hand, are reproduced mainly because of the conduct 
of daily lives, are not rooted in traditions, and are characteristically bound to some 
segments of society; as a consequence, their appearance may be bound to the ex-
istence of class-divided societies or social movements. Social movements are usually 
highly regulated, aim at achieving a new social order, and, unlike organizations, are 
typically not bound to a specific locale but are applicable in more general terms and 
areas. 
Power and facility feature both types of institutions. 
Compiled from various sources in Giddens, 1984. The letter S refers to signification, D to dom-
ination, and L to legitimation. The order of the letters signifies the importance of the dimensions of 
structure in the given form of institution. Kaspersen states that these "represent Giddens' attempt to avoid 




3. The Constitution of Society 
Giddens, in order to overcome the dualism between theorizations in the social 
sciences which tend to favor either agency or systems, introduces the key concept 
of his theory to grasp the interaction between these two forces: this is the duality of 
structure. This model, however, captures system reproduction primarily. This brings 
about the issues of social change and power—two domains Giddens treats lightly in 
his theory. His thoughts on these notions, nevertheless, must also be presented in 
this section. 
3.1 The Duality of Structure 
The key concept in the theory of structuration is the duality of structure, the 
notion which combines actors and systems, binding them to structure in a dialectical 
interaction and making structure a property and feature of both. 76 It refers to 
"structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes." ' 7 
This structure, that is, the set of rules and resources, marked by the absence of ac-
tors, is recursively re-established through social systems, which are situated activities 
and reproduced relations between actors and collectivities, organized as social prac-
tices. The agents draw on the various rules and resources in their daily lives, and 
systems, grounded in these activities as well as also shaped by the same rules and re-
sources, are re-constituted, just as the agents are, through the very same process. 
Thus, structure can be conceptualized as both restraining and enabling, both for the 
agents and the systems. 
Agents are able to monitor their actions and possess knowledge regarding what 
is done, as well as how and why it is. However, their understanding may not always 
be proper or full, and their actions under certain circumstances may have unin-
tended consequences or unacknowledged conditions which may result in change. 
These unintended consequences, granted that they feed back into system repro-
duction, are called causal loops and lead to homeostatic system reproduction. How-
ever, agents can use their power to institute various changes in system reproduction; 
Giddens defines this notion as reflexive self-regulation. The workings of both agency 
76 A post-modernist reading of Giddens may allow for the consideration of this model as decentering 
and recentering. Giddens, in his model, proposes to overcome the traditional dualism in social sciences 
which have centered either on the agent or on the system as the dominating force behind social life, thus 
decentering their traditional opposition. However, by introducing the new model of the duality of struc-
ture with the claim that this is the concept truly signifying social processes, he places this duality in the 
center, thus performing an act of centering. 
77 Giddens 1984, 374. 
59 
and systems result in integration,' which, as has already been pointed out, may be 
of two kinds: (1) social integration, defining the reciprocity 79 between agents in co-
presence; and (2) system integration, which signifies the same process but involves 
agents not present in time and space during the encounter. . 
System reproduction is automatically accompanied by social reproduction in 
which actors rely on four key factors: (1) mutual knowledge; (2) autonomy; (3) 
trust; and (4) routine. These result in typified schemes which agents use to get 
through various situations, having considered the general rules applicable as well as 
particular features of each given situation. However, if these schemes or rules are 
damaged, thus leading to the emergence of crisis situations, the old manner of 
acting should be re-adjusted in order to build up individual trust again. If one is un-
able to do that, one will be found unfit to function in the given society and, as a re-
sult, treated as an outcast. 
Routinized practices are the primary form of expression of the duality of struc-
ture. Routine or praxis, which are encounters performed without direct motivation 
in a seriality, connects agents and systems by granting (1) the continuity of the per-
sonalities of the actors, giving them a sense of ontological security; 80 and (2) the 
continuity of social life and system by reproducing the institutions; thus, structure 
provides a "generalized motivational commitment", 81 whereas routine binds the 
actors to systems and vice versa. However, these practices may not simply be mecha-
nical repetitions: unacknowledged conditions, unintended consequences, or inten-
tional modifications may all result in change. Giddens, therefore, concludes that 
there is no determinism involved and that there are no a priori or absolute outcomes 
for actions. 
Practices are often related to social positions and roles, with various rights, ob-
ligations, and sanctions as well as standardized markers, such as gender or age. In 
this sense, they are one of the essential contributors to social identities which help 
agents to locate themselves in the social web of institutions as well as to maintain 
their continual sense of trust and security in the given society. 
78 	As the duality of structure Giddens proposes captures primarily integration and system main- 
tenance, his theory is that of hegemony, ultimately standing closer to theorizations which give primacy 
to systems over agents. 
' 	This is the reciprocity of autonomy and dependence in interaction. Giddens, however, does not 
elaborate on how true reciprocity comes about, that is, how equality to difference should be concep-
tualized. 
80 	His repeated emphasis on the individual's drive to reach and maintain ontological security signals 
that it would be contrary to the essential interests of the individual to engage in conflict or social struggle 
as that may threaten this sense of security. 
81 	This is Wolf's term. 
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Dimension of Structural Structural Feature 
interaction modality property 
Communication semantic rule signification cultural/interpretative 
Sanction moral rule legitimation cultural/interpretative 
Power resource domination transformative/regulative 
Figure 8: Dimensions of the duality of structure 82 
The structuring of interaction may occur in three ways, parallel to the three 
structural properties of social systems: (1) communication, that is, the constitution 
of meaning; (2) sanctions, meaning the constitution of norms and expectations; and 
(3) power. The first two are considered to be constitutive, cultural processes related 
to rules through which meaning and norms are standardized. Power is regulative 
and transformative and regards the management of resources, allowing for control, 
change, and achievement. 
Communication is bound to the reflexive monitoring of action: agents are able 
to view actions, including their contexts, temporal and spatial dimensions, as well 
as the behavior of other actors co-present. As a result, agents are able to make sense 
of what they have seen and to discuss it: they may offer accounts, reasons, evalua-
tions, predictions, etc. The constitution of meaning is achieved through various in-
terpretative, typified schemes incorporated in the stocks of knowledge of the actors. 
Communication may take an oral or written form. The unit of oral communi-
cation, that is, talk, is conversation with definite opening and closing limits, strict 
rules regarding turn-taking and coordinating who is entitled to participate and how. 
In both oral and written communication the issue of time and space is crucial: con-
versations presume co-presence in time but not in space, while the written form 
typically appears in situations of absence, both in time and space. 83 
Sanctions are normative features, establishing norms, rights, and obligations. 
They are expressive of accountability: for what purpose and with what justification 
an action is performed. They may be formal or informal: laws or regulations are 
usually formal, written expressions of sanctions. They usually entail constraints but 
may be enabling for some agents and are, therefore, closely linked to power. 
82 A modified and completed figure taken from Scott, 1995. 
83 	This has led Giddens to the consideration of transportation and technical development—especially 
that of electronic signaling—in his discussion of communication. 
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3.2 Power and Change 
Essential to the duality of structure is power, the third structural property Gid-
dens describes. 84  He conceptualizes power as the capacity and means to perform 
tasks and "the freedom to act otherwise". 85 Power is capability, the "capacity to 
achieve outcomes" 86 and the very medium of freedom—although he adds without 
any further elaboration that power also has constraining properties. He locates the 
source of power in action by maintaining that "action logically involves power in 
the sense of transformative capacity.i 87 This definition refers both to individual and 
social action, which he explains with the two faces of power as mentioned earlier: 
one denoting the power of action invested in the individuals, the other inherent in 
institutions. Giddens sees power being exercised through the media of resources, as 
"a routine element of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction." 88 
Agency's power is transformative, which in Giddens' model enables the actor to 
act otherwise by which he means "being able to intervene in the world or to refrain 
from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of 
affairs." 89 Action is the exercise of power in order to secure outcomes to the extent 
that the agent is able to do it. This condition is emphasized because unintended con-
sequences and unacknowledged circumstances may modify these outcomes as well 
as certain constraints, originating from the fact that interaction always contains both 
relations of autonomy and dependence—which is what he defines as the dialectic of 
control. Giddens claims that when the human individual ceases to exercise power, 
it ceases to be an agent. 90 
Power is also inherent in systems. Its features and manner of operation is the 
same as in the case of agents. Power is "generated in and through the reproduction 
of structures of domination" 91 which are constituted by allocative and authoritative 
resources. These resources are not fixed and as such are able to change and operate 
as the medium of power changing. The primary medium for domination per se is 
the information storage of the various resources. Giddens sees the nation-state as the 
new storing place of information and therefore the new type of power container. 
Through the criticism of power struggles and change as conceptualized by evolu-
tionary theorists and historical materialism, Giddens arrives at the conclusion that 
85 	Giddens 1984, 5. 
86 	Giddens 1984, 257. 
87 	Giddens 1984, 15. 
88 	Giddens 1984, 16. 
89 	Giddens 1984, 14. 
90 	Archer also criticizes Giddens for not elaborating on the conditions which make the agent's free- 
dom and use of power possible, that is, the nature and relation between enabling and constraining dimen-
sions of systems for the individual action. 
91 	Giddens 1984, 258. 
84 Giddens points out that power must be separated from exploitation. 1984, 5. 
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no single mechanism—such as struggle over economic resources—may be specified 
to explain social change, as it may be the result of a number of factors. 92 However, 
he defines the two major mechanisms through which change may come about as the 
consequences of agents' actions, both intended and unintended, and of unacknow-
ledged conditions. 93 Action and interaction are bound together and to the social 
system through signification, domination, and legitimation, so these are the dimen-
sions of structure which must be studied in an analysis of change. As these di-
mensions are materialized in various institutions, they may be analyzed through the 
study of the corresponding political, ideological, economic, and judicial institutions. 
Giddens considers these the first domain to consider in the overall conceptual 
apparatus he develops which may assist in analyzing social change. These are: (1) 
structural principles, meaning the study of the modes of articulation in various in-
stitutions; (2) episodic characterizations, referring to the delineation of change in 
modes in comparable form, as an episode with a specifiable beginning and end; 94 
(3) intersocietal systems, meaning the outline of the specifics of the relations be-
tween them; (4) time-space edges, denoting connections between various types of 
societies; and (5) world time, referring to the study of transformations in a temporal 
and historical context. 
92 	The lack of a definition of social change in the theory of structuration is one of the criticisms 
expressed by Kaspersen. 
3 Craib notes that Giddens offers no reasoning for "why unintended consequences should take the 
form of regular patterning." 1992, 159. 
94 	This episodic character, that is, discontinuist view of history and social action, is considered by 
Kilminster to be one of the weaknesses of the theory of structuration. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE AFFERMATH OF 
THE THEORY OF STRUCT 	U HÁTI ON 
This chapter examines the presence of the theory of structuration after its 
publication. Section 1 discusses the reception of structuration theory, with special 
focus on the various points of criticism it has received. Section 2 presents the ways 
Giddens and his theory have contributed to later theorizations—especially to the 
understanding of self-identity in late modernity—and social analysis. 
1. The Reception of the Theory of 1Stueturation 
Since the appearance of The Constitution of Society, the theory of structuration has 
been the subject of fierce debate in sociology. The concepts and ideas have been 
subject to critical evaluation, receiving vehement criticism from some scholars, such 
as Cohen, and appraisal from others, such as Craib or N. Gregson. z  However, all 
agree that structuration theory is one of the most original and comprehensive 
theories to propose to overcome the classic dichotomy of sociology: the question 
of whether theory should grant priority to individual(s) or institution(s)/struc-
ture(s) in an examination of the structuring and organization of modern societies. 
Most scholars acknowledge the significance of Giddens' efforts which, all agree, 
place the study of society in a new perspective by calling for an integrative approach 
which would incorporate findings in a number of disciplines over an extended time 
period, addressing a wide range of issues, placing ontology in the center of investig-
ation. 3 Bryant and Jary welcome his sensitivity to intersocietal relations and argu-
ment for a new aspect in social analysis: the consideration of global phenomena and 
world society. "It is difficult indeed to see how English-speaking sociology could 
have maintained any coherence at all without Giddens raising these issues, and I find 
it difficult to conceive of any social theory that would not find something in his 
The more significant works regarding the debate over the theory of structuration include: Ira 
Cohen, Structuration Theory. Anthony Giddens and the Constitution of Social Life (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1989); Craib, 1992; Jon Clark et al. eds., 1990; and Christopher Bryant and David Jary eds., 1991. 
2 	N. Gregson, "Structuration Theory. Some Thoughts on the Possibilities for Empirical Research," 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 5 (1987) : 73-91. 
3 	This feature is often welcomed, even if at times it is difficult to separate issues of ontology from 
those of epistemology. 
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work on which to build," claims Craib. 4 The often controversial nature of this the-
ory did indeed stimulate social scientists to re-examine and re-evaluate a wide range 
of concepts and notions, which in and of itself would already represent a major con-
tribution to the development of the social sciences. 
The series of debates, however, often point out a number of weaknesses in the 
argumentation and concepts of the theory of structuration, among which the selec-
tion of the more frequently objected to aspects are presented in the following. One 
common set of criticisms regards the interdisciplinary nature of the theory. While 
the idea itself is widely welcomed, Giddens receives attacks from Craib and Cohen, 
for example, for having drawn on various ideas from various schools and scholars, 
thus presenting a "theoretical omelette" 5 of some sort which was possible only 
through (1) the misreading the works of these other scholars and/or (2) the rein-
terpretation of their original ideas. 
The second group of criticism regards his conceptualization of agent and agency. 
His account of the agent rests on psychological processes which are considered nei-
ther sufficiently elaborate nor thorough and, as a result, fail to grasp the real depth 
and complex nature of human personality—as stated by Boyne and Craib. Barát 
points out that Giddens, although he criticizes evolutionary theory, conceptualizes 
the development of the agent as progressive, towards absolute free agency, which, 
in her opinion, is a utopian construct. Giddens' concept of free agency is also fre-
quently challenged as it lacks sufficient supporting argumentation, as do the con-
cepts of the knowledgeability and the transformative power of the agent, as con-
tended by Barát, Boyne, Craib, and Cohen. Giddens' agent seems to be locked on 
the level of assessment and action in accordance to norms and expectations, which 
is also strengthened by the fact that the Giddensian actor seems to be rather a sub-
ject in the front and an agent in the back region, as Barát observes, which calls for 
another line of criticism. This observation, however, is in line with the claim that 
Giddens discusses social action as a mechanical, routinized system reproduction, 
thus grasping the essence of agency in system reproduction and hegemony rather 
than power and change, as noted by Bryant and Jary, among others. 
Giddens also seems to be lacking in his discussion of social action and inter-
action. Cohen 6 argues that Giddens' account of social relations fails to regard se-
riously several important distinctions in social action, such as the nature of face-to-
face interaction. Kilminster also considers the discussion of other types of inter-
action as well as of social interdependence as a contributing factor to social action 
and reproduction lacking. Mouzelis notes that social action is also presented by Gid-
dens as primarily performed by individual actors, but the role of collective actors, 
4 	1992, 196. 
6 Ira Cohen, "Structuration Theory and Social Praxis," in Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner 
eds., Social Theory Today (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 273-308. 
5 	This descriptive term was introduced by Craib. 
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equally significant, is not really developed. Craib also calls for a serious consider-
ation of morality and trust in human action, which Giddens fails to elaborate on. 
The third area of criticism focuses on Giddens' treatment of structure, institu-
tions, and systems. Annus observes that the theory of structuration does not address 
the conditions for the emergence of structure nor describes its nature. These would 
be crucial as, according to Giddens, structure informs actors and defines the content 
and nature of the various rules and resources they draw on in action—thus, also de-
fines social institutions and group formations. Thompson claims that Giddens un-
deremphasizes the constraining nature of structure and, in so doing, assigns too 
much power to actors as well as fails to acknowledge the concept of structural dif-
ferentiation and the significance of social differentiation in daily life. Archer and 
Kilminster join him in remarking on the lack of a sophisticated discussion of con-
straint: its relational nature and position in relation to the enabling forces in systems 
and structure. Archer also considers Giddens' elaboration on time and place insuf-
ficient inasmuch as they are considered primarily as factors regarding individual 
action. Moreover, Thompson also notes that Giddens' conceptualization of rules, 
their nature, and various forms of operation is also oversimplified. 
Besides structure, practice is discussed in a random manner, claims Archer. She 
notes that for Giddens, practice is always a process and never a product and thus so-
cial system is never analyzed in a state of equilibrium nor as actually elaborate struc-
tures which are the outcome of various factors other than practice alone. At the 
same time, Giddens also argues against a continuist view of history, as well as 
against a dynamic principle that would help one in accounting for social change, 
claims Kilminster. Craib joins him in finding major shortcomings in Giddens' treat-
ment of power, regular patterning as well as change. Kaspersen comments that 
while Giddens discusses cultural production, he never actually offers a concept for 
culture, which would be necessary in order to account for differences in actors, 
action, rules and resources, etc. 
The fourth area of criticism regards the theory of structuration and social re-
search. Giddens claims to present a metatheory, which, according to Kilminster, is 
much rather "explanatory prescription" for social researchers than descriptive. Co-
hen even goes further when noting that "[I] f we adopt structuration theory, there 
will be things that we are not allowed to think and, depending on our commitment 
to the framework, things we do not want to think." 8 Structuration theory remains 
on the level of abstraction, comments Gregson, separated from and inapplicable in 
empirical social research. Kaspersen also laments that "the theory never produces a 
concrete analytical instrument," 9 and therefore remains isolated from the series of 
social phenomena it proposes to capture. Nevertheless, it has had an impact on a 
7 
	2000, 163. 




number of scientists who have carried out research in the spirit of Giddens' theory 
of structuration, as well as inspiring the emergence of new models, as introduced 
in the following. 
2. The Impact of the Theory of Structural' on 
Despite the criticism which the theory of structuration has received, it is regarded 
as a truly remarkable metatheorization on the social. Various concepts and thoughts 
have made their way into the works of a number of social scientists, both on the le-
vel of theoretical conceptualizations and actual research projects and analyses. One 
prominent area the theory of structuration has impacted on within the realm of 
theoretical sociology is that of theorizations on the social self and identity. Struc-
turation theory and the concept of the duality of structure have provided the es-
sential understanding of social realities underlying the internal-external dialectical 
identity model proposed by Richard Jenkins in 1996, the focus of the discussion in 
Section 1. Section 2 outlines Giddens' propositions with regard to social research 
in light of the theory of structuration along with some of the exemplary pieces of 
social analysis which have utilized the basic claims and notions Giddens has put 
forth in his theory of structuration. 
2.1 The Theory of Stracturation and Social Modeling 
The theory of structuration provided the basis for Giddens' later projects, one of 
which focused on the individual and self-identity. He summarizes his observations 
in Modernity and Self-identity, where he maintains that self-identity is a "reflexively 
organized project... [that] consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously 
revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as fil-
tered through abstract systems." 1°  He proposes that the central feature of modern 
self-identity is life planning in which the self develops a trajectory from the past to 
the desired future. 11  This process takes place with the purpose of locating the self 
in a framework which provides it with ontological security. 12 Giddens proposes that 
self-identity is routinely created and sustained by the individual through continuous 
reflexive activities. 
10 	1991, 5. 
11 	He claims that language is the mediator, the "time machine" that makes the repetition of social 
practices possible over generations as well as allowing for a differentiation between present, past, and fu-
ture. 
12 	This framework comprises one's responses to the four basic existential issues in the autobiogra- 
phical fashioning of one's identity, which regard: (1) existence and being; (2) finitude and human life; 
(3) the experience of others; and (4) the continuity of self-identity. Giddens 1991, 55. 
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Based on Giddens' theory of structuration and theorizing on the late modern self, 
Richard Jenkins proposes that, as identity is constituted by the social which is "the 
field upon which the individual and the collective meet and meld," i3 all types of 
identities must be viewed as social identities. Jenkins defines social identity as the 
"systematic establishment and signification between individuals, between collectiv-
ities, and between individuals and collectivities, of relationships of similarity and 
difference."' He proposes that his model, capturing the internal-external dialectic 
of identification, describes the process in which all identities are shaped. It is "an 
understanding...of the `self as an ongoing, and in practice simultaneous, synthesis 
of internal self-definition and external definitions of oneself offered by the others." ls 
Jenkins claims that both individual and social identities can be understood as con-
stituted in one and the same process, which is the interplay between internal and ex-
ternal definitions. 
Identities are rooted in social practices; 16 it is, therefore, through an analysis of 
these practices that collective identity may be mapped. Giddens locates identity "in 
the capacity to keep a particular narrative going," 17 as a result, he claims, capturing 
the social practices in the individual narratives of members of a given collective 
—whether in the form of an independently structured or guided, written or oral nar-
rative—is a useful method to reveal the dynamics of both the constitution of com-
munities and their collective identities. 
2.2 The Theory of Structural/on and Social Analysis 
Giddens presented his theory of structuration without ever applying it empi-
rically. 18 His theory is a mere theorization, which provides possible guidelines and 
offers researchers a series of ideas for consideration in social analysis. The discussion 
of these in the first part of this section is followed by a discussion of some of the 
studies which have drawn on the theory of structuration in the course of research 
and analysis. 
The very fact that the theory of structuration has overall remained an isolated 
metatheory never tested in specific analysis has provided Giddens' critics with a 
point of severe criticism which has frequently appeared in the literature. As a result, 
conceptualizations on how the theory may be put to use in social research is a 
13 	Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (London: Routledge, 1996), 17. 
14 	Jenkins 1996, 4. 
15 	Jenkins 1996, 20. 
16 	In the course of engaging in practices, the participants come to be positioned. These positions 
result from the relations of power, according to Jenkins. 
17 	Giddens 1991, 54. 
18 	Giddens states that structuration theory is not a research program: it offers concepts which may 
be used as devices in analyzing a variety of issues. 1991, 213. 
68 
constantly recurring theme in most works on structuration theory. Although Gid-
dens has not applied it in research projects, he does give it some thought in The 
Constitution of Society. Giddens proposes that the theory of structuration lends itself 
to two major types of social research which, in essence, are in line with the core 
proposition of his theory, grasped by the model of the duality of structure, namely: 
(1) institutional analysis; and (2) the analysis of individual actions and agents. De-
pending on which of the two is in the center of the research, two types of bracketing 
are required: in the case of institutional analysis, the conduct of the agents must be 
bracketed, while in the case of the analysis of agency, it is the institutions, structures, 
and structural properties which must be bracketed. 
This is not to suggest that once bracketed, these fields are rendered insignificant. 
On the contrary, only the combination of the examination of the two domains 
allows for the perspective put forth in the duality of structure and thus it serves as 
the requirement for a truly complex social analysis. Bracketing is simply a way to 
express emphasis at a given stage of the analysis, implying the necessity of focusing 
on one side of the social duality at a time, while considering the other domain as of 
secondary significance at the given stage. Naturally, an analysis of the duality of 
structure itself is also possible; in such an endeavor, institutional analysis and that 
of strategic conduct are united through conceptual shifts from one toward the other, 
with spatial and temporal features regarded as major intersections. 
Upon turning to examples of research wherein the theory of structuration may 
prove a useful tool, Giddens mentions two areas. In micro-level analysis, he sug-
gests: (1) the elucidation of frames of meaning, seeking answers to the `why-ques-
tions': the reasons for action, in a wide context, involving the issue of the know-
ledgeability of the agents as well; and (2) the investigation of practical conscious-
ness: its context, form, and ways of expression. As for macro-level analysis, Giddens 
proposes (1) an investigation into the bounds of knowledgeability in the context of 
time and space, including unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions 
of actions, and (2) the determination of institutional orders, involving the examina-
tion of social and system integration through an analysis of the major institutions 
of a given social system. 
Bryant and Jary note the significance of Giddens' notion of double hermeneutics 
which, in their view, calls for an anthropological aspect in social research. The im-
plications of this with regard to research are: (1) the significance of the style of the 
analysis; (2) the understanding of the role of the scientist as a communicator who 
introduces "frames of meaning associated with certain contexts of social lifei 19; and 
(3) the application of the method of thick description which aims to establish con-
nections between various levels and dimensions of meaning. 
19 	Bryant and Jary 1991, 15. 
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Although no study has been published in which Giddens' theoretical framework 
has been applied as a whole, Giddens contends that some analysis has been written 
in the spirit of his theory, two of which are discussed in the following. In the first 
piece, Paul Willis' 20 book entitled Learning to Labour, exemplary research is intro-
duced focusing on how, through daily strategic conduct, students, as a result of the 
unintended consequences of their actions, contribute to the maintenance of the ex-
isting power relations and institutions, thus also create a process at the end of which 
they are unable to move upward on the social ladder. That is, their social position 
and life chances are determined primarily because of their improper assessment and 
management of certain situations through their own actions and behavior. 
Another work Giddens highly praises is R.W. Connell's Gender and Power, pub-
lished in 1987. 21 In this study, Connell actually makes use of some notions set forth 
by structuration theory, but also applies certain other theories in the analysis. Al-
though Connell also expresses criticism of some aspects of structuration theory, 
Giddens 22 considers this work a good presentation of the duality of structure, the 
intersection of structure and social practice at work. Giddens is impressed by 
Connell's discussion of the role gender plays- in relation to both the individual and 
structure: this study illustrates how social practices constitute structures as well as 
individuals and how they contribute to the maintenance of gender-based social roles 
and classifications. 
A full-length study actually applying the theory of structuration was carried out 
by Annus in her analysis of the constitution of Mormon identity and social reality. 
The author regards social practices as the basic mechanisms in and through which 
the social, and thus identities also, are constituted. With a focus on actors and indi-
vidual action, she examines various, specifically Latter-day Saint practices, and finds 
that (1) ideology is the force which informs and operates structure; and (2) agency 
is bound to individual realities which are rooted in personal identities, always in pro-
cess, the constitution of which is marked by the interplay of not only realities em-
braced by the self—along with its Other(s)—but also of the cognitive framework and 
process through which one constructs identity by monitoring these realities, that is, 
practices. Thus, this work offers an empirical examination of some aspects of the 
theory of structuration along with a criticism which unfolds through this appli-
cation. 
20 	Paul Willis, Learning to Labour (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Giddens' discus- 
sion of this book can be found in Giddens 1984, 289-304. 
21 	R. W. Connell, Gender and Popper. Society, the Person and Sexual Politics (Stanford: Stanford Uni- 
versity Press, 1987). 
22 	For an elaborate methodological discussion of this study, see Anthony Giddens, "Structuration 
Theory. Past, Present and Future," in Christopher Bryant and David Jary eds., Giddens' Theory of Struc-
turation. A Critical Appreciation (New York: Routledge, 1991), 201-221, 215-6. 
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Bryant, in his discussion of the dialogical model in Giddens' theory, proposes 
that "social research and policy making are forged through an extended process of 
communication between researchers, policy makers and those affected." 23 This 
proposition, in line with Giddens' prediction that "[T]here will be a deepening in-
volvement of sociology with the formation of practical social policies or reforms," 24 
foreshadows Giddens' public role towards the end of the 1990s, when as a well-
known public figure and advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Giddens 
developed a new social program, the third way, which in certain ways may also be 
conceptualized as an actual application of his theory—but only in theory, as the third 
way is the proposition of a political program for the future. 25 This program, widely 
known by the key phrase "no rights without responsibilities", offers a new under-
standing of individual rights which cease to be unconditional in Giddens' vision of 
the renewed social democracy, thus placing the relationship between the individual 
and state/society on a new set of premises. He presents his theory as he finds it ne-
cessary to assist in creating a social milieu in which individuals and states will be able 
to integrate new issues and find proper solutions to newly emerging problems of 
the twenty-first century. 
23 	Bryant 1991, 194. 
24 Anthony Giddens, "Nine theses on the future of sociology," in Anthony Giddens ed., Social Theory 
and Modern Sociology (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1987), 22-51, 44. 




The theory of structuration has influenced Anthony Giddens' later work which 
can be best described as his analysis of late modernity. This analysis has been or-
ganized around two major areas: one moves in the direction of micro-level analysis 
of the individual,' examining the self in late modernity, addressing issues of self-
identity, trust, risk and ontological security, life choices and the transformation of 
intimacy, while the other area addresses macro-level issues related to post-traditional 
societies,' dealing with issues such as reflexivity, institutional dimensions, and glo-
balization. 
By the mid-1990s, he also became more concerned with political issues, 3 search-
ing for alternative forms of politics which would be able to respond better to the 
new social and political challenges, facing governments and parties, confronting the 
welfare state. This shift may be viewed as a partial outcome of his analysis of post-
traditional societies, and as the contribution of a sociologist to solving urgent 
societal problems, including an alternative way for politics and the redefinition of 
social democracy at the dawn of the 21' century. Whatever the topic of his works, 
he receives attention and impacts on manners of thinking, making him truly one of 
the most prominent social thinkers of our day. 
As for his theory of structuration, despite the fact that it seems to be an im-
possible task to construct one theory which is able to comprehend all the fragments 
of late modern individuals and societies, despite the flaws in the argumentation and 
conceptualizations, despite its descriptive tone and abstract nature, it does remain 
one central force stimulating further debate about the realm of the social. 
See, for example, Giddens 1991 and 1992. 
2 See his The Nation-State and Violence and his The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990). 
3 See Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right—the Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens 1998; and Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: 




One rather frequent comment on Giddens' theory of structuration is that it is 
rather complex and difficult to follow and comprehend. Perhaps some sort of a map 
leading the researcher through this labyrinth may be of help not only in gaining a 
more comprehensive understanding of the various categories and processes analyzed 
but also in pinpointing possible gaps or inconsistencies in this theory. This section 
on mapping Giddens does not follow slavishly the structure of his book, The Con-
stitution of Society, nor of any other study of the theory of structuration, but reor-
ganizes his train of thought so that it would follow a different system, perhaps easier 
to grasp. Naturally, this is only a map of his more essential theorems and categories; 
however, hopefully it proves a useful guide for all those who wander into the realm 
of structuration. 
l.Actors and Action 
1.1 Actor 
A. Definition of actor + relation to I/me and self 
B. The development of agency: Erikson 
Bodily mechanisms 	Expression 	Result 
Oral/Sensory 	trust/mistrust 	ontological security 
Muscular/Anal 	autonomy/shame, doubt bodily control 
Locomotive/Genital initiative/guilt 	routine 
C. The constitution of actors: 
a. mind/psyche 
unconscious 
consciousness a. practical consciousness 
b. discursive consciousness 
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b. body — positioned in time and space (roles and rules) 
i. positioning of body in encounters 
— front and back regions 
— presence/absence, co-presence 
— autonomy and limits of the body; control 
ü. positioning of actors in social relations 
iü. intersection of agent's positioning with durée of life of institutions and 
structures 
1.2 Action 
Definition of action (as opposed to act) 
How does action come about? 
a. agent 
i. cognitive/psychological aspect stratification model 
Personality 	 Action 
unconscious 	 motivation of action 
practical consciousness 	reflexive monitoring of action 
discursive consciousness 	—> 	rationalization of action 
1 
unacknowledged conditions 	unintended consequences 
of action 	 of action 
ü. corporeal aspects 
autonomy of bodily control 
overlapping of front and back regions 
system 
time and space 
time-space geography 
locales, zones, regions 
form, character, span, duration 
central and peripheral regions 
iii. context 
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C. Typology of interactions 
Informal: gatherings 
i. unfocused 
ü. focused: encounters (-+ routine) 
Formal: social occasions 
Routine: with the autonomy of bodily control results in ontological security 
2. Structure(s) and Institutions 
2.1 Society 
Intersocietal context -► intersocietal systems 
Features: i. bound to locales 
ü. set of normative elements 
iii. sense of identity 
Patterned E- reproduced social practices 
Agents 4- social integration (between agents in co-presence) 
4- system integration (with collectives in time and space) 
Typology of societies: 









band groups or villages 
no state 
75 




kinship agricultural state 
politics (military power) 
economic interdependence (low) 
formal codes of law 
symbolic coordination 
state develops 
existential and structural contradictions 
routines 	 city (created environment) 
kinship (family) 	nation-state 
surveillance 
politics (military power) 




2.2 Structure and Structures 
A. Structure: 
a. the societal theoretical framework consisting of 
— rules 	— of signification 
of normative sanctions 
— resources — allocative 
authoritative 
b. constraints — material 
structural 
sanctions 




definite sets of rules and resources based on structure 




2.3 Institutions and Collectivities 
A. Institutions: bound to structure(s) 
Structure(s) Theoretical domain 
4-- Rules and resources 
Signification Coding 
(S-D-L) 	<-- rules of signification  
Institutional order 
4-- Interaction (modalities) 
Symbolic orders/modes of discourse 
4- Communication 
(interpretative schemes) 
Domination - Authorization 	Political institutions 
(D-S-L) 
	+- authoritative resources 
Allocation 	 Economic institutions 
F- allocative resources 	4- Power (facility) 
Legitimation Normative regulation 







<- Sanctions (norms) 
3. The Duality of Structure 
Structure bound to agents through systems --> structuration of social relations 
A. In the course of this: 
reproduction 
if by unintended consequences(= causal loops) homeostatic system repro-
duction 
change 
if by intention -> reflexive self-regularization 
B. Result: integration (social and system) achieved by routinized social practices 
- grant continuity for systems and agents 
not deterministic 
- bound to social positions -+ social identities 
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Social life = series of episodes: — small-scale 
— large-scale 
The dimensions of the duality of structure 
Dimension of Structural Structural Feature 
interaction modality property 
Communication semantic rule signification cultural/interpretative 
Sanction moral rule legitimation cultural/interpretative 
Power resource domination transformative/regulative 
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INTRODUCTION:  
A NATION IN THE MAKING  
The present study traces the various theories and models of American identity  
which emerged in the US, especially in social sciences throughout the 20`" century.  
A study of this nature may be of importance for a number of reasons. It may high-
light how modern identities, and as such, American identity, are social construc-
tions, never-ending projects, which change in line with the corresponding dominant  
politico-economic interests, in the course of which these identities are continually  
re-created and reinterpreted. As a result, such a study may also reveal what strategies  
and forces may apply and in what particular manner in shaping and maintaining  
collective identities and social formations. It may also show how theorizations on  
social realities and identities are always embedded in specific times and locales and  
are the outcome of complex social, economic, and political factors. What this also  
indicates is that social sciences, therefore, cannot be considered a source of objective  
and independent representations of given phenomena, as they themselves are also  
products of these. A corollary of this embeddedness is the positioned nature of the  
scientists as well as the topics selected for investigation, also unfolding on these  
pages. 
In light of these, in order to enhance a better understanding of these theori-
zations, they are introduced in the sequence of their appearance and contextualized  
in their contemporary milieu and related fields of interest. As works related to the  
definition of American identity and their formation abound, this work offers a se-
lection of the more prominent trends and their representatives. A study of this sort  
must also touch upon major recurring notions in the field, such as `identity', `nation'  
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and `ethnicity', an understanding of which is essential in a discussion of these theo- 
ries. Thus, before an analysis of the various theories on American identity, con- 
temporary conceptualizations of these terms are discussed in the following chapter.' 
' 	The meaning of these terms has changed throughout the years; this study, however, cannot un- 
dertake an analysis of the various semantic changes nor consider all theorists who contributed to the 
discussions related to social identity, nation, and ethnicity, but offers a cross-sectional analysis of the more 
pertinent works primarily focusing on the contemporary American context. 
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1. Theories of Identity, Nationality, 
and Ethnicity 
Identity in general is considered a project characteristic of modernism, a phe-
nomenon which has filtered into all areas of life. Thus, a wide array of academic 
fields, including literary studies, anthropology, psychology, cultural studies, and so-
ciology, has focused on the analysis of identity: the ways it is formed, its content, 
manners of expression, representation, impact, and operation, along with its typol-
ogy. Of the various types of collective identities, national and ethnic identities have 
been in the center of attention for quite some time, as these types of collective 
identities are present in all corners of the world, impacting all walks of life, let it be 
on the level of the individual or that of small social collectivities, nations, or inter-
national communities. 
The works and approaches devoted to mapping the meaning of identities, both 
individual and collective,' are mainly related to two sets of epistemological prem-
ises. One of these is related to modernist and structuralist thinking, maintaining that 
identities may be related to essentialist, a priori, biologically given categories, which 
predetermine the nature and content of certain identities, calling for a normative, 
standardized outlook on social life and human beings and, therefore, on their iden-
tity. Structuralists claimed that identities draw on two types of sources: (1) a col-
lection of these essential or given features which are viewed as stable and fixed, such 
as sex or age; and (2) a collection of socially constructed features which may be a 
matter of choice, such as occupational identifications, which may change through-
out life. Structuralists also contended that social realities may be understood in 
terms of binary oppositions, which also applied to their understanding of identity: 
through identity the individual not only defines who it is but, also as importantly, 
who it is not. Embedded in this position is the possibility of practices of marginaliz-
ation, colonization, sexism, and various other forms of discrimination—and thus the 
constitution of the "Other." The series of differences are viewed as constructions, 
2 	Smith stated that collective identities are also cultural identities. He maintained that these col- 
lectivities may be castes, ethnic groups, religious denominations, or nations, among others. In these cases 
the sense of community is based on five basic cultural elements, namely, symbols, values, memories, 
myths, and traditions, which contribute to the main dimensions of this sense: a sense of stability, rooted-
ness, and unity; a sense of distinctiveness and difference; a sense of continuity; and a sense of destiny and 
mission, with its accompanying hopes and aspirations. This sense of community is in opposition to other 
collective identities, such as gender groups, classes, or regions, which Smith sees rather as interest groups. 
Anthony Smith, "The Formation of National Identity," in Henry Harris ed., Identity (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 129-53. 
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embedded in various realms of the social, and may therefore be explicable on the 
basis of material axes. 
The second stance is related to poststructuralist understandings of identity which 
contended that identities should be conceptualized as inventions. The understanding 
of the previously stable, essentialist categories as inventions stems from the interpre-
tation of the modern world as a culturally constructed domain. This cultural con-
struction is conceptualized as a series of productive and inventive acts performed 
through language: therefore, reality is read as a text or discourse, with signs or sym-
bols in operation. Identity is viewed as an ever-lasting project undertaken by the in-
dividual, emerging at the intersection of its multiple social positionings. As a result, 
identity is conceptualized as fragmented, always in the making, with no a priori, per-
manent core to build around. 
1.1 Conceptualizations of Collective Identities 
The term identity derives from the Latin word idem indicating sameness and con-
tinuity. Although this word has a long history, it really became a key term and the 
center of academic discussion in the first half of the twentieth century. The origin 
of these debates can be traced, on the one hand, to modern psychology, especially 
to the work of Sigmund Freud,' and his theory of identification. Rooted in Freud-
ian psychology, Erik Erikson's ideas contributed much to the establishment of 
identity studies in psychology. Erikson viewed identity as a process essential to the 
individual, the bond between the person and the communal culture, which re-
presents the community itself. Thus, through the concept of identity he established 
the relationship between the individual, culture, and community. When the indi-
vidual loses the sense of sameness and historical continuity which binds it to the 
community, identity crisis appears, as was shown in Erikson's studies during the 
1940s. These studies, therefore, also proved that identity is essential for modern 
man's proper operation in contemporary society.' 
The other field which contributed greatly to the emergence of identity studies is 
sociology. The more significant social theorists having influenced this field of scho-
larship include Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, George Herbert 
Mead, Thomas Merton, Pierre Bourdieu, Ervin Goffman, Herbert Blumer, Harold 
Garfinkel, Peter Berger, Anthony Giddens, Richard Jenkins, and Anthony Cohen. 
They all conducted research on the relationship between identity and the social 
3 Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1924) (New York: Perma, 1949). 
4 See, for example, Erik Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment (New York: Norton, 1975). 
Freud and Erikson were the most influential thinkers in the later development of sociological identity 
study. As this study is concerned with sociological investigation, the rest of this section focuses on socio-
logists and cultural theorists along with their ways of understanding identity. 
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domain, trying to locate the forces, dynamics and methods at play in shaping iden-
tity. However, some of the more recent theorists also hoped to combine the impact 
of the social with that of the psychological domain, such as Teun van Dijk, who 
proposed that identity is a mental representation, the result of personal constructs, 
not only of social ones. 5 
As for the classification of identities, they were traditionally regarded as either 
self/personal or social/collective identities. 6 The first type included fragments re-
lated to the body, gender, and sexuality as well as personality, while the second was 
tied to collectivities organized around class, religion, ethnicity, and nationality, a-
mong others. These classifications allowed for a series of presuppositions and ex-
pectations regarding social positions and actions as well as identities. Symbolic inter-
actionism, for example, as presented by Erving Goffman, developed out of the 
recognition that identity is closely tied to the representation of the self in various 
social settings, in which consensus and expectations play a determining role. This 
brought about the notion that identity may also be understood as an interface be-
tween subjective positions and social situations. 
Postmodernist theorizations, on the other hand, claimed that identity is a sym-
bolic production, based on human—episodic—memory, in which a constructed ab-
straction regarding one's life and experience gradually emerges and is verbalized in 
various forms of narratives, as emphasized by Michel Foucault, 8 Madan Sarup, 9 
Margaret Somers, Gloria Gibson 1°  and Stuart Hall, 11  among others. The signifi-
cance of memory on the level of the collective is captured by history, and, as Hayden 
White12 pointed out, by the twentieth century history was about describing or inter-
preting facts in order to support one mode of thinking over another. That is, mental 
processes related to identities are also bound to some purpose, which is often cap-
tured by the phrase `identity politics'. 
6 	The possibility of typology as such is a sign of a structuralist approach, as it operates with the 
possibility of a given number of choices and underlying structures, also seeing everything in a dichotomy. 
It is this dichotomy that post-structuralists later called into question. 
Erving Goffman, The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959). 
8 Michel Foucault, "Megírni önmagunkat," in Nyelv a végtelenhez: Tanulmányok, elárdások, beszél-
getések (Debrecen: Latin betűk, 1999), 519-46. 
9 Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1996), 130. 
10 Margaret Sommers and Gloria Gibson, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other'. Narrative and 
the Social Constitution of Identity," in Craig Calhoun ed., Social Theory and the Politics ofldentity (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), 37-99. 
11 	Smart Hall, "Who Needs 'Identity'?" in Stuart Hall and Paul du Guy eds., Questions of Cultural 
Identity (London: Sage, 1996), 1-17. 
12 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978). 
5 Teun van Dijk, Ideology. A Multidisciplinar y Approach (London: Sage, 1998). 
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The mental framework which provides the intellectual organizing principle for 
group formations is often defined as ideology, which in itself, in Slavoj Zizek's 
definition, is "a doctrine, a composite of ideas, beliefs, concepts, and so on, destined 
to convince us of its `truth', yet actually serving some unavowed particular power 
interest." 13 That is, various collectivities are formed in order to achieve certain in-
terests related to gaining some specific power within the power structure, and 
members of the various groups identify with the specific goals and interests and 
subscribe—fully or partly—to the ideology which provides the intellectual stimulus for 
their efforts. Moreover, as Chris Jenks 14 pointed out, ideologies are also able to gen-
erate "a practical sense of consensus," out of which a sense of unity and community 
may develop along with collective identity. 
Hall also emphasized that identity is formed in "particular historical moments," 
under given circumstances, 15 reflecting the specific interests at the given time. As 
identity is always bound to specific moments and circumstances, it cannot be con-
ceptualised as stable and completed, but as always in the making—a claim he shared 
with postmodernist thinkers. He understood identity as comprised of various frag-
ments, rooted in various experiences, both past and present, and personal under-
standings of these experiences in terms of their social implications. 
What it implies is that Hall believes that the wider context of the manners of 
identity formation and the content of identity may actually be related to pertinent 
social, cultural, political, and economic undercurrents—a notion this study also em-
braces as a basic assumption. This materialist approach separates him from other 
postmodernist thinkers. However, he cannot be regarded a Marxist either, since he 
did not single out one specific force, as Marxists did the economy, as the ultimate 
power responsible for the practices and positionings of human beings in modern 
societies. 
Modernists contended that group membership is maintained through various 
sets of practices and institutions, rooted in the specific group ideology characteristic 
of the given collectivity. Education, faith, socio-economic status, or class are often 
singled out as the most important factors to contribute to identity and membership 
maintenance, as claimed by Pierre Bourdieu, 16 Talcott Parsons, 17 Paul Willis, 18 
13 	Slavoj Zizek, "The Spectre of Ideology," in Slavoj Zizek ed., Mapping Ideology (New York: Verso, 
1994), 1-34, 10. Ideology-for-itself refers to its materialized forms. 
14 Chris Jenks, Culture (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
17 	Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1956). 
15 	Hall, 1996. 
16 Pierre Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education and Society (London: Sage, 1977). 
18 	Paul Willis, Learning to Labour (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 
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Michel Foucault, 19 and Louis Althusser. 20 Postmodernists, however, emphasize 
other, cultural aspects of collectivities related to various semiotic fields, such as 
dressing, music, eating habits, architecture, media, film, or literature, as pointed out 
by Mark Gottdiener," Jack Solomon, 22 Jean Baudrillard," and Roland Barthes. 24 
Moreover, they often conceptualized identity as emerging at the intersection of 
various experiences and positionings, such as gender, class or ethnicity. 
Identity defines a group, locating and describing its members, positioning them 
as different from other groups of people—that is, identity is constituted through, and 
thus itself also constitutes, difference, an act of both inclusion and exclusion. This es-
sentially structuralist approach, although still maintained as valid, has also been mo-
dified by more recent scholarship, aiming at determining the ultimate purpose and 
mode of operation of collective identities on the social level. Fredrik Barth 25 drew 
attention to the borders which delineate the dividing line between insiders and out-
siders. The borderline, he claimed, is not static, but changing, as is inclusion and 
exclusion of membership and the cultural field related to the given group. What are 
crucial, according to Barth, are the changes introduced in the process of redrawing the 
borders and the underlying reasons which contribute to them which also introduce 
modifications in group membership and the cultural meaning associated with it. 
Hall also pointed out the significance of boundaries, contending that identities 
must be conceptualized as "the point of suture." However, he located suture be-
tween discourses and practices—which aim to position human beings as "social sub-
jects of particular discourses"—along with various processes which constitute people 
as subjects. Thus, in his opinion, identities are "points of temporary attachment to 
the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us.i 26 Interpellation 
and subjectifying processes may be detected quite clearly in the case of nations and 
ethnic groups, as shown in the two sections to follow. 
19 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 (NewYork: 
Pantheon, 1980). In later works, however, Foucault seemed to move toward postmodernist interpre-
tations. 
20 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-86. 
21 Mark Gottdiener, Postmodern Semiotics. Material Culture and the Forms of Postmodern Life (Cam-
bridge: Blackwell, 1995). 
22 Jack Solomon, The Signs ofOur Time. The SecretMeanings ofEveryday Life (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1990). 
23 	Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983). 
25 Fredrik Barth, Ethmic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization ofCulture Difference (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co, 1969). 
26 	Hall 1996, 6. 
24 Roland Barthes, The Fashion System (London: J. Cape, 1985). 
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1.2 Nation and Nationalism 
The term nation was discussed at length by Liah Greenfeld 27 in a historical con-
text, tracing the changes in the meanings ofnation and nationalism through the ages. 
She analyzed the transformation of the idea of the nation, starting out from the 
original Latin form natio, meaning "a group o f foreigners." At medieval univer-
sities, the word nation indicated "a community of opinion" while later in church 
councils the very same word referred to "an elite." 28 In the course of further de-
velopments in England, this term came to be used as the expression for "a sovereign 
people," which, once borrowed by other countries and peoples by the modern age, 
indicated "a unique people." This "zig-zag pattern of semantic change" was always 
bound to specific locales, time periods, and power situations. 
Greenfeld put forth a number of propositions with regard to the contemporary 
meaning of the word, which is "a sovereign" and "a unique" people. One of these 
propositions is that this new understanding was essentially a principle out of which 
a political ideology emerged. As it was a generally applicable principle, it could not 
be specific to any group or locale, she contended. This ideology located sovereignty 
within the people, along with their recognition as fundamentally equal members of 
the nation. In this sense, argued Greenfeld, nationalism was the form within which 
democracy appeared. Nationalism, as a general principle, could not be bound to any 
specific group or locale. However, the meaning of nation as a sovereign people 
changed and, with that, particularism appeared while its unity with democracy dis-
appeared. The reason behind this is the fact that after a while sovereignty did not lie 
with the people who acted "in some way as a political elite"; 29 but rather the poli-
tical elite became comprised of a reduced number of people in power positions. 
Julia Kristeva called attention to the fact that the emergence of the nations as 
sovereign and unique social arrangements also resulted in the legal and political dif-
ferentiation between the Self(-ves) and the Other(s). She claimed that the modern 
concept of the political Other(s) was established by the French Revolution, but left 
its mark on the American Constitution as well. Kristeva argued convincingly that 
the Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens "shifts from the universal no-
tion—`men'—to the `political associations' that must preserve their rights, and en-
counters the historical reality of the `essential political association', which turns out 
to be the nation." 30 Rights were granted to the members of the nation, that is, the 
27 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992). 
28 	Greenfeld 1992, 9. 
29 	1992, 10. 
30 	Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 148. 
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citizens, but not to others, the foreigners. 3I  She contended that the "spreading of 
the French Revolution's ideas over the continent triggered the demand for the 
national rights of peoples, not the universality of mankind.i 32 It may, therefore, be 
concluded that nations are actually imagined and invented political communities 
which grant certain rights to their members, the people included—and, thus, with the 
same action, deprive the ones excluded of these rights. Therefore, humanism and 
true equality of men were disregarded and difference was justified and legalized. 33 
Greenfeld placed the beginnings of modern nations and nationalism at the time 
of the English Revolution." Werner Sollors, however, in his "Introduction" to The 
Invention of Ethnicity, traced the origin of nations to the French and American rev-
olutions, which, in his view, challenged the royal and aristocratic European order 
and replaced it with national bourgeois systems. 35 In this process, the nation—often 
claimed to be organized around an ethnic group—was the invention which laid the 
new foundation for the emerging national unity, thus replacing the previous or-
ganizing principle which had been based on royal and/or religious affiliation. With 
the change of the organizing principle behind group formation and cohesion within 
given countries—whether they were tied to ethnicity or nation or both—the signifi-
cance assigned to membership along with the manners and extent of the principle's 
internalization and power of organization had also increased greatly in the modern 
era. 
S. N. Eisenstadt3ó also placed the appearance of modern nations in the period of 
the American Revolution. Eisenstadt claimed that this Revolution was the only one 
which established a new collectivity, based mostly in religious-ideological and not 
primordial—or ethnic—terms, a nation based on the principles of equality, volun-
tarism, the sovereignty of the people, organized around the principle of newness, 
purity, and sacredness. Sollors considered the Declaration of Independence to be the 
31 	I must note that in the US, race, gender, and economic status also played a prominent role in the 
way rights were granted to the people. Thus, various dividing lines or boundaries were introduced and 
legalized, resulting in the development of seemingly natural group formations, already types of Others 
within the nation, although not foreigners in the legal sense of the word. 
32 	Kristeva 1991, 151. 
33 Erzsébet Barát in a comment noted that the members of the nation were understood as hetero-
sexual males and thus nation was exclusionary not only toward other people, but also people within. This 
means that nation was a highly normative ideological construct, operating through regimes of truth. 
34 Greenfeld holds that the revolution showed how the English identified themselves as a special, 
elect nation, a notion rooted in the glorious Elizabethan era and resulting in the emergence of English 
patriotism, which entailed both "the idealistic commitment to the values of liberty, equality, and reason" 
as well as "the emotional attachment to the land, government, and ways of England" (1992, 401) . 
35 Werner Sollors ed., The Invention of Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), xi. 
36 S. N. Eisenstadt, "Mirror-Image Modernities. Contrasting Religious Premises of Japanese and 
US Modernity," in Richard Madsen et al eds., Meaning and Modernity. Religion, Polity and Self (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 56-77. 
87 
source of "popular slogans for the termination of aristocratic systems, [after which] 
new hierarchies immediately emerged, often in the name of ethnicity."' 
The emerging European nations did claim to grow out of ethnic communities; 38 
this was the realization of `ethnicity as a political principle'. 39 The formal structures 
designed to host these nations were the modern capitalist or nation states which 
provided the legal, political, and economic unity necessary to hold together na-
tions—which constitute "a territorial community of shared history, culture, and legal 
rights" 40—functioning through bureaucracy, emerging systems of institutions and 
methods of surveillance, relying on a "shared public, mass education-culture" 41 and 
the media. 
James Kellas defined a nation—emerging in the course of the the formation of 
modern nation states—as a group of people who feel united by "ties of history, cul-
ture, and common ancestry," 42 sharing objective characteristics, such as territory, 
language, religion, and common descent, and subjective features deriving from the 
people's awareness of and affection for its nationality. Don Mitchell, 43 relying on 
the findings of Anthony Smith and Etienne Balibar, also noted that nations must 
also be viewed as "historical reality (a struggled-over people and place) ...a commu-
nity constituted through the institutionalization of practices of citizenship and 
socialized reproduction."44  He claimed that the state was not only the form, but also 
the force with the transformative power to constitute a given community as a nation 
through the creation of a certain kind of loyalty, emotional attachment, or a form 
of identification, maintained through the particular social practices and institutions 
people engaged in. 
This proposition is in line with poststructuralist conceptualisations of nations as 
inventions—as contended by Sollors, Don Mitchell, Benedict Anderson 45 and Terry 
3' 	Sollors 1989, xii. In his discussion of aristocracy and emerging ethnicity in the context of the A- 
merican Revolution and the Declaration oflndependence, he fails to elaborate on what group he is referring 
to. 
38 	This, of course, was not the case in the US, where the nation was bound to a state, established 
on the basis of economic and geo-political considerations, with its members being united by territory, 
citizenship, and residence, not by ethnic identification. 
39 This phrase is used in Ernest Gellner, "The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation. The 
Myths of Nation and Class," in Gopal Balakrishnan ed., Mapping the Nation (New York: Verso, 1996), 
98-145. 
4° 	Smith 1995, 136. 
41 	Smith 1995, 135. 
42 	James G. Kellas, The Politics ofNationalism and Ethnicity (London: Macmillan, 1991), 2. 
43 Don Mitchell, Cultural Geography. A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
44 	2000, 270. 
45 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(New York: Verso, 1991). 
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Pickett, 4ó among others. In this invention, as Anderson 47 pointed out, the most sig-
nificant factor was the appearance of printed national language: he contended that 
it had laid the foundation for national consciousness by creating "unified fields of 
exchange and community below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars," by giving 
"new fixity to the language" and by establishing a "language-of-power" which dif-
fered from that of the previous administrative era. As a result, members of these 
modern nation-states became united psychologically 48 and cognitively, 49 and the 
emerging national consciousness—with which people may identify in varying de-
grees—"which jells around a common descent, language and history, is itself mainly 
an artifact."' 
Sarup called attention to another significant aspect nations shared when defining 
a nation as "a political arrangement of boundaries" within which unification is 
achieved by "incessant propaganda of shared attitudes" by the state, including the 
glorification and enforcement of "ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural homo-
geneity," the selective construction of "joint historical memories" and the appraisal 
of a common destiny. 5'  The state, thus, develops nationalism, which, in Sarup's 
view, is the set of ideology which in essence is needed to legitimate the existence of 
the state itself: the state claims that it is necessary as it represents the nation. 
Sarup also proposed that that nationalism is so powerful because "it appeals to 
the real needs of people, their need for belonging." 52 Greenfeld also found the main 
drive behind the existence of nationalism today in the "psychological rewards in-
herent in nationality,"" making one feel good by amplifying one's sense of worth 
and dignity through participation in a greater and more powerful community and 
a share in its virtues and successes. Thus, nationalism is the basis of a type of col-
lective identity, rooted in power, constructed by the state at the intersection between 
the people, institutions, and practices, and assisting its members in maintaining a 
firm basis to position themselves in terms of their emotional and intellectual worth. 
46 Terry Pickett, Inventing Nations. Justifications ofAuthority in the Modern World (London: Green-
wood, 1996). 
4' 	1991, 44. 
48 	Emotional aspects of group sentiment, loyalty, devotion, etc., upon which nationalism rests, 
should also be considered. 
49 For example, knowledge channeled through education or the media, the major means through 
which nationalism may operate. 
5o Jürgen Habermas, "The European Nation-State—Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and 
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship," in Gopal Balakrishnan ed., Mapping the Nation (New York: 
Verso, 1996), 281-94. 
si 	Sarup 1996, 130. 
52 	1996, 131. Barát noted that these needs are actually pre-given, outside signifying practices. 
1992, 490. 53 
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In his discussion of nationalism, Craig Calhoun 54 defined it as a form of domi-
nant ideology, typically rooted in various insurgent movements, while Mitchell 
agreed with Smith who identified nationalism as "an ideological movement for 
attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population 
deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential `nation'." 55 
Calhoun defined nationalism as "the rhetoric of identity and solidarity in which 
citizens of the modern world most readily deal with the problematic nature of state 
power and with the problems of inclusion and exclusion." S6 He also claimed that 
nationalism is constructed, is specific to the modern world system, and serves as a 
"crucial basis for standing in world affairs, and potentially for autonomy, and in 
which claims to statehood can be justified most readily by professions of nation-
hood."' Basic tools used.to achieve nationhood were already demarcated bound-
aries within which internal integration and homogenization were achieved through 
administrative integration and language standardization. 
In his analysis of nationalism, Kellas claimed that it is a form of behavior as well, 
framed by the ideology of nationalism, providing the members of the nation with 
"a set of attitudes and program of action" in order to seek "to defend and promote 
the interest of the nation," 58 resulting in a behavior pattern often linked to patriot-
ism. That is, as Mitchell concluded, nationalism is also about the image of the ideal 
people, capturing the potential of a given nation not only in terms of what it can be 
but also in terms of what it wants to be. Thus, his view is in line with that of Ernest 
Gellner, who concluded that nationalism is not an invention and a type of ideology, 
but rather a phenomenon rooted in a "shared current condition," 59 a necessity of 
industrial economic development, for which a homogeneous society — with its 
shared language and common culture, as well as its provider, an educational system 
— was necessary. 
In this line of thinking, Benjamin Franklin, writer and printer, is often con-
sidered to be the founding father who not only spurred the emergence of the print 
media in the US but also united nationalism with literacy. The print media and 
literacy in the vernacular language are the two factors which Sollors regarded as the 
two prerequisites for the new cohesion in the modern states. In other words, he 
claimed that literature printed in the vernacular served as the basis for the invention 
of modern cultural communities as it could supply the ideology, language, and cul-
tural context with the neo-traditions necessary for the new social constructs. It made 
54 	Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination," 
in Craig Calhoun ed., Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 304-35. 
55 	Quoted in Mitchell 2000, 271. 
Calhoun 1998, 305. 
Calhoun 1998, 314. 
1991, 3. 






it possible for traditionally place-defined groups to be replaced by symbolically uni-
fied communities, where information channeled through various forms of the media 
could serve a dual purpose: to homogenize people as well as to differentiate among 
them and to maintain group formations. 6°  
Kellas provided a typology of nationalism in contemporary societies. He distin-
guished between three types of nationalism: ethnic, social, and official. He stated 
that 
ethnic nationalism ... define[s] ... nation in exclusive terms, mainly 
on the basis of common descent[;] ... social nationalism defines itself by 
social ties and culture rather than by common descent[;] ... official 
nationalism is the nationalism of the state, encompassing all those 
legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national 
identity, and culture. 61 
These seem to be in correlation with Smith's proposition of three patterns for 
state formation: a nation based on (1) a lateral-type of ethnie wherein nation is 
based on a given ethnicity with a national culture, largely defined by the upper 
classes; (2) a vertical ethnie wherein culture permeates all sections of the society, 
created by cultural revolutions under the intelligentsia; and (3) an emigrant-colonist 
ethnie comprising of various ethnic groups; in this case the "main agency for na-
tional transformation is utopian pioneering settlers who identify with their new 
environment and preach fulfillment in a promised land fashioned by their labors, 
often at the expense of indigenous peoples." 62 
All authors agreed in considering nations to be constructions of modernity, 
viewing them as a typical signifier of this historical era. Many, including Greenfeld, 
Mitchell, and Sarup, argued that nations will eventually be dissolved and nation-
states will be replaced by some other social structures, thus marking the beginning 
of a truly postmodern world. As nation-states emphasize dominance and bound-
aries, both physical and cultural, these will probably be replaced by some other 
organizing principles. As for what it will be, one can only stipulate, but certain 
contemporary tendencies provide a basis for more firmly based predictions. 
Internationalism is one possibility, but Sarup refused to believe that it will serve 
as the basis for the new form of organization, as internationalism supposes the ex-
istence of nation-states as they are the points of departure for its existence. The other 
frequently mentioned phenomenon which will probably impact on the future is 
60 	For a more elaborate discussion of the role of the media in group and identity formation, see 
Thomas Fitzgerald, "Media, Ethnicity, Identity," in Paddy Scannell et al. eds., Culture and Power (Lon-
don: Sage, 1994), 112-136. 
61 	1991, 51-52. 
62 	1995, 149. 
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globalization, often tied to Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory. 63 He 
argued that the global system today is held together by economic ties and relations, 
with core areas, which are the politically and economically most powerful states and 
the peripheral areas, which consists of the developing countries. The division of 
production and various economic functions between these areas contribute to the 
new world order. However, economic interdependence does not mean the dissolu-
tion of traditional state formations, nor, as Giddens noted in the "Introduction", the 
disappearance of political and military factors in the maintenance of the new world 
system. 
The third possibility is related to deterritorization. This is based on the assump-
tion that neither economic nor political structures of dominations can be located 
within the borders of given nation-states, but these can be conceptualized rather 
within "spaces of flow." At the present stage, as Arjun Appadurai ó4 claimed, there 
are disjunctions in the world which may be understood through an analysis of the 
five dimensions, or "scapes" of the global cultural flow: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, 
technocsapes, fmanscapes, and ideoscapes. These scapes, however, do not contribute 
to the development of a homogeneous world, but are as likely to strengthen dif-
ferences as they are to tone them down. The new leaders contribute to the emerging 
"globalized class," as Mitchell defined it, which is the only group appearing as ho-
mogeneous in this new order, characterized by cosmopolitanism, hyper-mobility, 
privilege, and luxury, "a class not tightly tied to any locale but at home in many." 65 
1.3 Ethnicity and Ethnocentrism 
The origin of the word reaches back to the Greek word ethnicos, meaning "na-
tional, of a certain nation or race." In English, the earliest meaning of the word 
ethnic was "a person who is not Christian or Jewish, a Gentile, heathen, pagan," 
while present-day definitions in standard dictionaries define an ethnic person as 
"someone of a racial, national or ethnic group." However, the meaning and signi-
ficance of ethnicity indicate that these definitions fail to capture the complexity of 
ethnicity as well as the energies which it channels and the power it maintains. 
The most recent debate over the meaning of ethnicity reaches back to the 1970s, 
when primordialist and biological interpretations of group membership achieved 
renewed currency. According to these interpretations, framed by the understanding 
63 	Immanuel Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis," in Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner eds., 
Social Theory Today (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 309-324. 
64 Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," in Steve 
Seidman and Jeffrey Alexander eds., The New Social Theory Reader (London: Routledge, 2001), 253-66. 
65 	2000, 280. 
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of ethnicity within the European historical context, ethnicity was viewed as a natural 
sociobiological force based on descent. óó  Membership was determined on the basis 
of blood relation and physical features, supposed a shared language and culture, 
values and traditions, a strong sense of history and ties to given locales. It was 
embedded in powerful narratives passed on both as historically verifiable facts and 
as part of traditions and elements of folklore. It was tied to emotions and symbols, 
had the potential of stirring people to action, unleashing enormous human power 
if necessary. 
Sollors found this essentialist approach lacking in capturing ethnicity in the 
North American context. In order to overcome the shortcomings of this under-
standing, he proposed the use of the consent and descent models as possible means 
of analyzing contemporary American groups commonly referred to as `ethnic'. In 
his 1986 book he illustrated how communities of consent are the outcome of cul-
tural construction, as groups evolved out of descent may also be, either partly or 
fully. Accordingly, ethnicity must be understood as partly the result of a cultural 
construction, but this construction may refer to the whole meaning of ethnicity as 
well. However, he offered no definition of ethnicity in the course of his discussion 
of these models. It was in a more recent piece, "Foreword: Theories of American 
Ethnicity," 67 that he provided the following definition, borrowed from R. Scher-
merhorn: 
An ethnic group is...a collectivity within a larger society having real 
or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and 
a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epi-
tome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: 
kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), 
religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nat-
ionality, phenotypal features, or any combination of these. A necessary 
accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the 
group. 68 
Although this is probably among the most compact definitions of `ethnicity', it 
falls short in a few areas. The discussion of these shortcomings may assist the reader 
to arrive at a better understanding of the term `ethnicity' for the purposes of the 
present study. One point missing from this definition is that it fails to reflect upon 
66 	Descent relations are based on "`substance' (by blood or nature); consent relations describe those 
of law or `marriage'." Werner Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity. Consent andDescent in American Culture (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 6. 
67 Werner Sollors, "Foreword. Theories of American Ethnicity," in Werner Sollors ed., Theories of 




the process of ethnicization, which could shed light on who may become a member 
of an ethnic community and in what specific ways, along with the manners in which 
ethnicity may become a social force finding its way into various walks of social life. 
A second point of criticism is that this definition treats the scope of the meaning 
of the term `ethnic group' in rather broad terms. It must be highlighted that ac-
cording to this definition (1) nationality may serve as the basis for ethnicity; ó9 (2) 
religious groups may also be considered ethnic groups ; 70 and (3) tribal cultures can 
also be viewed as ethnic communities. This indicates that the definition disregards 
any distinction on the basis of the nature and structure of society 71 or of time 72 in 
the application of ethnic categories, which would be desirable, as ethnicity is con-
nected 
 
to the emergence of capitalist or nation-states, and as such, is a modern con-
struction. 
The definition also fails to indicate that the nature of the sense of unity in ethnic 
communities is also crucial: members must signify their relational position as an 
ethnic identity—and not as something else—with a collective name expressing it as 
such. This challenges the possibility of externally imposed definitions of religious 
groups as ethnic communities if they are in disagreement with that—which is often 
the case with the Latter-day Saints or the Amish. 
This definition also disregards another important criterion Smith called attention 
to: the ethnic group's "association with a historic territory, or homeland, even if 
most of the community no longer resides in it." 73 This aspect cannot be neglected 
as the concept of homeland is a permanent segment in ethnic identifications: it is 
the concept through which the materialization and historical verification of a given 
ethnicity take place. The notion of historical identification bound to locales and time 
is always embeded in the idea of descent—whether real 74 or fictional—and as such, is 
key to ethnicity. 
Schermerhorn's definition also lacks any consideration of the fact that ethnic 
groups—especially in the US—are also interest groups, united by common economic 
and political interests which they communicate to the outside world. 75 However, 
69 	It must be pointed out that it is the other way round. It is possible not to have a nation built 
around an ethnic group-as was the case in the US-but there has never been a claim to a separate American 
ethnic group as such. 
70 It must be noted that no ethnic group can be defined on the sole basis of faith. Religion may be 
a significant factor in the constitution of ethnicity , but not the single feature. 
71- Primordial or modern social structures. 
72 	The pre- or post-Enlightenment era. 
73 	1995, 133. 
74 	The idea that necessitates the inclusion of descent, blood lineage, and historical identity in the 
notion of ethnicity derives from the sociobiologist approach. 
75 Naturally, 	groups are not homogeneous either; various sub-groups may, 	emerge,  
as socio-economic diversification often leads to the emergence of newer interests. Also, other interest 
groups may undertake to represent individual interests: this needs not be the exclusive purview of an 
ethnic group. 
94 
ethnicities cannot simply be reduced to identify classes, as Nathan Glazer and Daniel 
Moynihan's 76 or Milton Gordon's 77 somewhat Marxist proposals suggested when 
they claimed that one's position in the American socio-economic stratum is pri-
marily determined by one's ethnicity. They argued that members of various ethnic 
groups are typically represented in a given social stratum—e.g., Jews in the upper 
classes 78 or Puerto Ricans in the lower classes because their ethnicity predetermines 
their economic possibilities and positions within the American scene, thus their 
culture, social positions and political behaviour.. However, in most cases ethnic 
groups are not absolutely class-bound, and usually various ethnic groups are repre-
sented in most layers of American society. 
Instead of focusing on certain aspects related to given ethnic communities, such 
as their economic standing or culture, Barth' argued for the conseptualisation of 
ethnicity in terms of boundaries. He proposed that it is the boundary which defines 
an ethnic community, not so much the culture it encloses. He viewed the boundary 
as "a point of reference" 80 that signifies the group's relation to the outside, to its 
others, as well as the relation of the others to the group. He argued that the bound-
dary is not permanently marked but is in a state of flux as an effect of the constantly 
changing context of the cultures and the power relations within the group as well 
as with the others outside the group. 
Based on the primary principle along which ethnicities may be organized, Smith 
proposed a typology, distinguishing between three types of ethnies: (1) ethno-lin-
guistic, wherein members share "a common vernacular code and literature"; (2) 
ethno-religious, in which case religious aspects alongside linguistic ones figure as the 
most dominant feature in signifying an ethnic community; and (3) ethno-political, 
wherein the community defines itself "by historical memories and political tradi-
tions." 81  This classification sheds light upon the various forces along which ethnic 
communities may emerge, also identifying these as factors which may in part ac-
count for ethnicization. 
With regard to an understanding of ethnicity within the North American con-
text, the following points may be highlighted: ethnicity is a construction, based on 
the descent model—which is always regarded as real, although it may not actually 
be—in which peoplehood and the location of the group in space and time are as- 
76 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot. The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, 
Italians, and Irish of New York City (1963) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974) . 
77 Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life. The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
78 	Gordon proposes that US society can be divided into six classes: two layers (lower and upper) 
can be found within each of the three standard strata (lower, middle, and upper), each with its own 
features and characteristic eth-classes. 
79 	1969. 
80 A term used by Sarup. 
81 	1995, 133-34. 
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signed a central role: that is, a common homeland, shared ancestry, and historical 
past out of which a common culture with traditions, customs, shared language, etc., 
developed. This results in a strong sense of identification, both psychological and 
cognitive, a self-definition and a cultural context, 82 the boundary, thus the content 
of which is always in the change. In the US, ethnicity often appears in power 
struggles, and its strength and worth may be viewed in various ways depending on 
the period and/or the context. Depending on people's current views on their 
ethncity, their identification with it may weaken or strengthen. However, regardless 
of their ethnic identification, Americans strongly identify with the United States as 
their current home country. 
Clearly, the American nation developed out of the citizenry of a young country 
and not out of an ethnic community. Nations are modern constructions, related to 
the emergence of modern states. They are legal and political formations, and as 
such, can be characterized by the consent model. National consciousness—the ex-
treme case of which is nationalism—is often based on the state ideology necessary to 
justify the state's existence, define its positions, and maintain its citizens along with 
their support of state affairs. The citizens within a state are not merely united by 
cognitive and emotional ties but also by a highly developed system of various in-
stitutions, including administrative institutions which often practice various me-
thods of surveillance over the citizens. As a result, people are officially signified in 
the world as citizens, on the basis of their nationality, and not ethnicity. 
Nations, similarly to ethnic groups, attempt to establish a common symbolic 
culture based on descent, disseminated primarily through the media and the edu-
cation system. Nation states primarily draw on the culture of the dominant ethnic 
community within their borders. In the US, however, ethnicity is associated with 
minority group status, as Richard Schaefer indicated, stating that a minority group 
is "differentiated from the dominant group on the basis of cultural differences such 
as language, attitudes toward marriage and parenting, food habits, and so on.i 83 As 
members of a minority group, he continued, members of an ethnic group tend to 
have less control or power than members of the dominant group—therefore, may feel 
the need to enter into power struggles for which ethnicity may offer a seemingly 
natural organizational form. 
82 	In most cases, a separate language also marks the boundaries of an ethnic community. 
83 	Richard Schaefer, Racial and Ethnic Groups (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman and Co, 1990), 10. 
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2. The Beginnings:  Shoping a Nation 
Smith considered the US an example of an official nation: one resting on the 
principles of Calvinism as channeled through the Puritans and the founding fathers. 
The War of Independence was a political act—based on consent and not descent—
with the purpose of achieving economic goals for a particular group of people in a 
particular geographical region, but not for an ethnic community, as was the case 
generally in Europe. However, in the early phase of colonial history, one ethnic 
group was often singled out as the one which had shaped the new nation of North 
America: the Anglo-Saxons. 
Since Columbus' discovery of the Americas, immigrants from all corners of the 
Western world ventured forth to this New World. Columbus, of course, was not the 
first European to set foot on this continent,' but was the first one to create an image 
of the new land which could capture the contemporary imagination—and has done 
so ever since. His accounts of a land,' rich in resources and natural beauty, inhabited 
by natives filled with generosity and hospitality, offered a formula which various 
groups seeking a better life could tailor to their own desires. The word `America' has 
come to signify a haven for all those who sought asylum from religious persecution, 
political distress, or economic hardships, as well as for those who hoped to make the 
most of their lives in a number of other ways. 
By the time of the War of Independence, people from most European countries 
were represented among the inhabitants of the colonies, who totaled over 2.5 mil-
lion. The territory of the contemporary US had been ruled by various countries, 
including Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, implanting their 
various cultures, values, and manners of thinking. This land was used to make the 
colonizing powers even richer but also offered a place where religious dissenters 
from these countries could find peace and the promise of a fresh start. Jews, for ex-
ample, arrived early on, on the East Coast, 3 along with the British Puritans, fol-
lowed by members of other Protestant sects from Britain, such as the Quakers, and 
1 	The first verifiable European traveler to land on the shores of the American Continent was Eric 
the Red, who established a small settlement around 985. 
2 
	On the analysis of Columbus' letters and other sources which assisted in the development of re- 
ferential practices contributing to the constitution of the American continent as the land of desires, see 
Kenneth John Myers, "On the Cultural Construction of Landscape Experience. Contact to 1830," in 
David Miller ed., American Iconology. New Approaches to Nineteenth-Century Art and Literature (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 58-78 and Nigel Spivey, Enduring Creation. Art, Pain and Fortitude 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 173-80. 
3 	Jews arrived only on the present territory of New York and Rhode Island as all the other colonies 
prohibited permanent resident status for non-believers and non-Christians up to the second half of the 
eighteenth century. 
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still later the Methodists and Baptists, who appeared primarily in New England and 
the Middle Colonies. The French Huguenots also arrived in New England in higher 
number in the 1680s, but after receiving "less than an enthusiastic welcome,» 4 
continued on to South Carolina. Of all the colonizers, the British were represented 
in the highest number and had the greatest commitment to settling in the colo-
nies—they did not intend simply to pass through, as many of the other nations did. 
Therefore, it was inevitable that British culture and people would play a prom-
inent role in shaping the future of the country. This chapter discusses the aspects of 
their cultural, religious and political heritage which left their marks on the new 
country established after the War of Independence. 
2.1 Anglo-Conformity 
The European nations which shared in the exploration of various parts of the 
North American continent were also driven by expansionism, hoping to gain eco-
nomic advantages by securing control over certain areas. Of these powers, the En-
glish dominance in the North Eastern region of today's US was the most prominent 
by the mid-seventeenth century. As a result, all the thirteen colonies there were 
under British rule. Up to the late seventeenth century, English people comprised the 
largest immigrant group entering North America, making it "England's law, letters, 
and social patterns that had been transplanted to the colonies that became a nation. 
...England's imprint on the land was the most distinctive, the most visible, the most 
determinate of things to come." 5 Although the various colonies differed and the 
English community was also quite heterogeneous, they had all these in common. 
Anglo-Conformity is the phrase which came into common use to express the 
English dominance and the fact that newcomers' integration into the emerging 
colonial society naturally meant the acceptance of and identification with the English 
language, culture, way of life, and manner of thinking, the English rule, political in-
terests and form of taxation, among others. This is a concept which, in certain pe-
riods even after the War of Independence, has recurred in varying degrees, last in 
the 1970s in Michael Novak's concept of WASPification. 6 
The thirteen colonies are often divided into three groups: Northern, Middle and 
Southern colonies, each with their own distinct features. In the North, the Puritans 
had become the dominant force, as the first large group of immigrants to the New 
Land to arrive with the purpose of establishing permanent settlements, as of 1620. 
4 Leonard Dinnerstein, Roger Nichols and David Reimers, Nativesand Strangers. Ethnic Groups and 
the Building of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 25. 
5 Bernard A. Weisberger, Many People, One Nation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 33-34. 
6 	This concept will be discussed in Section 6.1. 
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"The New England people, almost to a man, were English and Puritan. ...The great 
mass of emigrants to New England were middle-class farmers, tradesmen, and 
artisans."' They arrived with a twofold purpose: (1) to find a refuge and a free land 
where they could freely practice their beliefs as well as (2) to build a stable economy 
which could provide them with security and strengthen their overall position. 8 As 
they were determined to make the new land their permanent new home, they also 
realized the significance of establishing and developing the essential institutions 
necessary for the conduct of their daily lives as they had known them to be in 
England. They built their meetinghouses or churches, which initially operated as the 
center for various communal events and faciliated the management of the whole 
community. 9 Besides operating as places of worship, churches also functioned as the 
city halls and courts, separated physically, and in terms of power and operation, only 
later. In the early years, the sacred and secular were intertwined, being separated by 
law only in 1791 in the Bill of Rights. 
The Puritans instituted the first free popular education system in the New Land, 
first in the form of home schooling, then in the form of institutional public schools 
in 1647. Their faith in higher education was indicated by the fact that they also 
established the first universities in the colonies, Harvard having been the very first, 
founded in 1636 and opened two years later. The Puritans also set up the first print-
ing press in 1639, which stood alone in the Colonies for almost 100 years, as well 
as launched the first successful newspaper in 1704. The first English also introduced 
town planning by rationalizing the structure of their settlements: the division of the 
land, the arrangement of lots and houses, streets and public buildings, along with 
the surrounding forests, meadows, and farmland. They also started to develop roads 
and trade routes, leading to the birth of a rudimentary form of business and trading 
activity within the colonies. A community and life with the potential of future 
independence started to evolve, based entirely on the English model, culture, and 
language. 
Conformity to this system was an essential requirement for everyone in the com-
munities. Any divergence resulted in exclusion, which may be considered natural, 
as early Puritans were strongly united by their belief system. Dissenters were forced 
out of the communities primarily because of religious disagreements, as was the case 
with Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams.'" The Puritan community comprised 
' Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People, Vol. 1, Prehistory to 1789 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 112. 
s Morison 1972, Weisberger 1987, 47. 
9 	Actually, during the early years the realms of the secular were ruled by the sacred. 
10 Anne Hutchinson was advocating the power of grace and the belief in personal revelation, down-
playing the role of the Puritan clergy. She was tried and banished after having been found guilty in 1637. 
Roger Williams, ordained as an Anglican clergyman in Cambridge, offered his unrestrained criticism of 
the Puritan system, vehemently arguing for the separation of state and church as well as criticizing the reg-
ular violation of Indian rights in Massachusetts. He was found guilty by the General Court for advocating 
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a whole operating social unit, with a firm belief in its ability to survive and accomp-
lish remarkable things on earth as the chosen people of God. Their firm belief en-
abled them to establish community cohesion with shared values, transplanted tradit-
ions, and the promise of a new life in the New World with a sacred mission to 
fulfill. 
Besides the Puritan dissenters, other groups from Britain contributed further to 
the development of the Colonies; however, the contribution of these groups is often 
not highlighted as much as that of the Puritans. 11 Daniel Boorstin 12 pointed out 
three other forces which were significant in shaping the future nation: (1) Quak-
erism, with its pacifism and its religious freedom and tolerance; (2) the model of 
rural Virginia with its aristocratic overtones; and (3) Georgian philanthropy, the 
example of an experiment at assisting the disenfranchised. Due to Quakerism, the 
middle colonies were more varied and tolerant than New England. Quakers were 
probably the most persecuted believers in England as well as in the Northern colo-
nies. Their belief in the inward light, a direct form of communication with God, 
made them question the need for any form of clergy, religious leadership and hier-
archy, a fundamental concept staunchly upheld within traditional denominations. 
They were characterized by tolerance and understanding, therefore refused to bear 
arms or to take oaths and believed in non-violence and individual conscience. These 
ideals made them a group with a sense of social sensitivity and responsibility. Their 
appearance in Rhode Island, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, the last being the primary 
destination for their migration, made it possible to place white and Native Indian 
relations on a new basis and to legalize freedom of religion and tolerance. 
Virginia and Georgia offered two other contributions, according to Boorstin, 
associated with the South. The Virginia model was a societal model developed out 
of a structure of primarily rural settlements, based on large plantations and on 
smaller lots of land cultivated by yeoman farmers. The planters, who were primarily 
Anglican in faith, owners of slaves, and holders of political as well as economic 
power, had understandably transplanted an aristocratic mentality, so alien to New 
England and the Middle colonies. Their wealth, refined taste, and love of beauty 
resulted in a number of outstanding pieces of art, especially in architecture, which 
are highly regarded in American art history today. 
Unlike Virginia, a place where the most controversial American institution, 
slavery, was part of daily life, Georgia was built on goodwill and humanitarianism. 
"new and dangerous opinions" and was banished from the colony. Later, he founded Rhode Island, 
where his ideas of tolerance and democracy were put to practice. 
11 	Miller and Johnson contributed this to the fact that "it was the first of these traditions to be fully 
articulated, and...it has inspired certain traits which have persisted long after the vanishing of the original 
creed." Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson eds., The Puritans, Vol. 1, (New York: Harper and Row, 
1963), 1. 
12 Daniel Boorstin, The Americans. The Colonial Experience (New York: Vintage, 1958). 
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It wanted to create an environment which could help people to have a fresh start in 
their lives, thus banned slavery as well as hard liquor. Georgia was started as a Uto-
pian experiment in 1732, by English philanthropists James Oglethorpe, with the 
purpose of offering a number of people a chance to start anew, especially debtors 
who were imprisoned indefinitely in England. His efforts were based on his strong 
sense of optimism and belief that the new land with its moral purity may contribute 
to the transformation of these fallen people. 13  
Greenfeld studied the relationship of the English colonists to their mother 
country in detail. She argued that the colonists had no desire to be separated from 
Britain for a long time. Moreover, being English was a significant factor which 
united all inhabitants of English descent in the Colonies, regardless of their place of 
residence or religious convictions. Greenfeld claimed: "The sense of,exemplary de-
votion to and implementation of English values was shared by the Colonists every-
where and became a central element in the local American identity. Not only were 
they, indubitably, English, but they were better English than the English. Beyond 
this Americans of different colonies shared little...." 14 She maintained that they, as 
Englishmen, were members of one nation, that of Britain, but as Americans, they 
were simply inhabitants of various provinces. 
In Greenfeld's argumentation, the explanation for the reasoning behind the col-
onists' decision to fight for independence from Britain was also rooted in their 
strong sense of English national identity. Time and distance, she contended, 
prompted the Englishmen in the Colonies to embrace a rather idealistic and abstract 
form of patriotism. This "idealistic loyalty to national values, which could be and 
usually was as ardent a patriotism as the more earthly love of country, was by its 
very nature a stimulus for disaffection and revolt, for the more intense the com-
mitment to the ideals, the more sensitive, the more intolerant, one became to the 
imperfections in their realization."' Greenfeld saw this idealistic patriotism at play 
in the course of the English Revolution and then again in the War of Independence. 
This sense of Englishness and commitment to English values and ideals and the 
strong sense of national identity were by far superior to any other group identity in 
North America at the time. Thus, it was inevitable that it would remain a dominant 
force, influencing significantly the distinct American identity which was constructed 
after the War of Independence. 
13 	Weisberger 1987, 48. 
14 	1992, 409. She defined the core English values or ideals as commitment to liberty, equality, and 
reason, often complemented by emotional attachment to the native land, government, and ways of Eng-
land. 
15 	Greenfeld 1992, 412. 
101 
2.2 The Puritan Heritage 
The cultural background of the Puritans, which was their Englishness, was em-
bedded in their faith which was the second force at play in shaping the people to 
emerge in the US: Puritanism. 1ó The first exodus of Puritans consisted of Separa-
tists, who arrived at Plymouth in 1620, from Leiden, the Netherlands. They were 
followed by a more moderate group, who arrived on the shores of Massachusetts 
bearing a charter to establish the Massachusetts Bay Colony. These settlers were 
formally entitled by Charles I to establish settlements, but they themselves set forth 
to accomplish a great deal more: to build a "city upon a hill," as their leader, John 
Winthrop, defined it, "a model Christian state that all the world could imitate." 17 
This phrase has since regularly been employed to express the intensity of Puritan 
faith and convictions regarding their future role in the New World. The Puritans 
accepted the authority of the Bible alone for the way they conducted their lives, 
finding the model society they wished to establish in their colony in God's go-
vernance of Israel, as described in the Old Testament. Central to this model was the 
idea of the covenant which determined the success of a nation in its relationship to 
God. In this interpretation, keeping faith and morality in accordance with biblical 
law was the key to the future success of the nation. Therefore, it was essential for 
their successful survival to insist on strict religious practice and daily life. Related to 
the covenant tradition is the idea of the jeremiad, first appearing in Puritan preach-
ing in the 1660s. It refers to the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah's lamenting over 
things having gone astray, which he explained by the nation having turned away 
from God and morality. Since then, jeremiad has often appeared in the US, espe-
cially in critical times, as the response to growing secularism or moral disorder, 
warning people and calling for a return to faith and biblical values. 
Biblical imagery and events also framed their Puritan mindset and were applied 
to their experiences. Their transatlantic voyage was interpreted as a new Exodus, 
which meant the projection of a sacred meaning on a secular act of migration. It 
signified the Colonies as the New Canaan, the Promised Land, and the people cros-
sing as the Chosen People who were on a mission to prepare the way for Christ's 
Second Coming. This belief resulted in their conviction that the Americans as a 
nation are on a mission on earth as well as in their fascination with the future, also 
characterized by change and progress, as Sollors argued in his Beyond Ethnicity. The 
Puritans also understood it to be their mission to transform the wilderness into a 
garden. As Alan Heimert pointed out, ."[S]ubduing the wilderness quickly became 
16 	This section focuses on the discussion of the Puritan belief system and its direct implications, as 
the more secular, social, and cultural aspects of Puritanism have already been outlined above. 
17 George Marsden, Religion andAmerican Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), 
16. 
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an exalted calling for the Puritan." 18 However, they interpreted this call both lit-
erally and figuratively: they were not only to tame nature but also those who 
inhabited it—the Native Americans. 
Other specific Puritan tenets contributed further to the prominent role played 
by the Puritans. These included the belief in a personal relationship with God and 
in the view of work on earth as God's handiwork. These provided the Puritans with 
a sense of certainty and superiority, confirming their sense of being the elect. Their 
virtues and strict orthodoxy encouraged hard work which was often rewarded by 
financial success. Their sense of obligation to help others made their community 
strong, their feel of the need to share their wealth contributing to emerging phi-
lanthropy. Their congregationalism gave an impetus to individual rights and expres-
sion of opinion through votes, establishing equality and independence among 
church members as well as creating a sense of social awareness and responsibility 
along with the identification with the governing body as a forum of true repre-
sentation. Thus, congregationalism is often interpreted as a form of organization 
which introduced the seeds of democracy, election, delegation, and representation 
of individual power. 
Sollors also argued that their belief in being one nation, the Chosen People, gave 
them a strong impetus to community building and the construction of peoplehood. 
As the Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, was viewed as the body of Christ, 
it meant a peoplehood knit together by love—that is, by consent. However, he 
argued that the descent model had grown to significance among Puritans through 
faith, as "Christianity promises the transcendence of descent... [and] has given 
whites, and especially Anglo-Americans, distinct advantages, privileges, and even a 
superiority over other races." 19 This may provide another explanation for Puritan 
supremacy in New England, the institutionalization of Anglo-American white male 
supremacy in the US, as well as Americans' overall respect for and fascination with 
the descendants of the early Puritans, the founders of the nation, who comprise the 
upper-upper class, in Gordon's societal model of the US. 2° 
In his influential work The Puritan Origins of theAmerican Self, Sacvan Bercovitch 
demonstrated that the Puritan legacy the US inherited was their rhetoric which 
survived "because it was compelling enough in content and flexible enough in form 
to invite adaptation." 21 With regard to the mechanisms through which Puritan 
rhetoric could be used by generations of Americans to follow, he proposed: 
18 	Alan Heimert, "Puritanism, the Wilderness, and the Frontier," in C. K. McFarland ed., Readings 
in Intellectual History. The American Tradition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 60-73, 
73. 
19 	1986, 62. 
20 	For a discussion of Gordon's notions, see Section 2. 
21 	(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 186. 
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Colonial Puritan hermeneutics...evolved through an essentially 
symbolic interaction of perceiver and fact, thus allowing for different 
kinds of perceivers and a variety of historical contexts. The perceiver 
had to identify himself as a regenerate American but since the meaning 
of America lay in an act of will and imagination, he could claim that his 
interpretation embodied the only true America... [and] the terms of 
signification could change with changing national needs. 22 
It was through these signifying practices of Puritan rhetoric that hegemony 
within the Puritan communities could be attained through the neutralization of 
conflict within the groups. Janice Knight proposed23 that the result of the fact that 
Puritan rhetoric successfully intertwined sacred and secular purposes as well as the 
personal and group identities of the Puritans, was "America's claim to an excep-
tional destiny and the concomitant yet delusive claim of every citizen to share in the 
American dream of success."' 
2.3 The Enlightenment 
The political tradition the English colonists shared before the War of Inde-
pendence was also key to the construction of the new state, as expressed in its 
founding documents. These sacralized documents, the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution, which established the new country, introduced a new typology 
of political discourse and argumentation, drawing on the notions of the Enlighten-
ment, which had been put into practice in these, as Sollors proposed. 25 "More uni-
versally accepted in eighteenth-century America than in Europe, they [the political 
and social ideas of the European Enlightenment] were more completely and more 
permanently embodied in the formal arrangements of state and society; and, less 
controverted, less subject to criticism and dispute, they have lived on more vigor-
ously into later periods, more continuous and more intact." 26 
In Bernard Bailyn's interpretation, the real American Revolution was actually the 
rationalization, symbolization, completion, elevation, and empowerment of the 
social and political forces and Enlightenment ideas in America—forces which had 
1975, 186. 
23 Janice Knight, Orthodoxies in Massachusetts. Rereading American Puritanism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
24 	1994, 4. 
1986. 
26 	Bernard Bailyn, "Political experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-century America," 
in C. K. McFarland ed., Readings in Intellectual History. The American Tradition (New York: Holt, 




already existed as a result of the political milieu in the Colonies and the close in-
tellectual ties which had never ceased to exist between the Colonies and the Old 
Continent. As William Nelson observed, "Americans did not in 1783 cease to be 
historically English, to speak English, to live by what had once been English law and 
English political theories, to follow English practices in local government and Eng-
lish habits of political compromise." 27 However, they were able to articulate "a 
remarkable ideology" which captured "political individualism: individual man—his 
life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness—became the central concern of the whole 
political order". 28 Philip Gleason also pointed out the ideological nature of Amer-
ican identity, locating its origin in the era of the Revolution. He proposed that the 
American sense of nationhood and identity could be founded only on ideas, which 
he summed up as the nation's "commitment to the principles of liberty, equality, 
and government on the basis of consent." 29 
The roots of the ideas which are identified as the segments of the ideology upon 
which the United States was established are propositions associated with the En-
lightenment. Deism and rationalism framed Enlightenment thinking, which could 
be exercised only through individual freedom of thought, speech, and worship. The 
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness constituted the natural rights of 
people in line with the Enlightenment. Relying on Locke and Voltaire, Enlight-
enment thinkers maintained that mankind had left its natural state and lived in 
societies which were based on the notion of social contract. In this manner of 
thinking, the government had to represent and protect the people who elected them, 
and a long series of abuses of power should result in a change of government. 
Moreover, the Enlightenment also embraced the belief in the perfectibility of 
mankind and thus in human progress. 30 But progress propagated the possibility of 
the improvement of conditions on earth, thus providing the opportunity for more 
happiness for men here on earth. Man was viewed as whatever he makes of himself: 
his happiness and success depended only on him, which also lent a sense of opti-
mism to the Enlightenment. Overall, claimed Horton and Edwards, "the En-
lightenment has ...made a greater contribution to our social ideology than any other 
body of thought. In its emphasis upon rationality, in its faith in human progress, in 
its belief in the benevolence and perfectibility of man, in its desire for social im-
provement, it has set a pattern" 31 to be achieved in the future in the US. 
27 William H. Nelson, "The Revolutionary Character of the American Revolution," in C. K. Mc-
Farland ed., Readings in Intellectual History. The American Tradition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1970), 147-160, 157. 
28 	Nelson 1970, 158. 
29 Philip Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," in Oscar Handlin ed., The Harvard 
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 31-58, 31. 
30 Rod Horton and Herbert Edwards argued that this idea was the secularized counterpart of the 
Puritan notion of establishing heaven on Earth. Rod W. Horton and Herbert W. Edwards, Background 
of American Literary Thought (London: Prentice Hall, 1974). 
31 	1974, 78. 
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Greenfeld claimed that Thomas Paine—who had arrived in America only in 1774—
in his Common Sense32 successfully used reason to argue why Americans should not 
be viewed as English. 33 Paine suggested that the "parent country" of America is not 
England, but the whole of Europe, and, accordingly, the American nation should 
identify not only with the English, but with "every European Christian," therefore 
could do away with British rule. His proposition regarding the definition of the 
American people, thus, was more universal and inclusive than previous interpreta-
tions, in line with the universal principles Enlightenment thinkers seemed to ad-
vocate in general. 
Within the Colonies, Benjamin Franklin was considered to be the main rep-
resentative of Enlightenment ideals. As a deist and a rationalist, he believed in "the 
will of God and nature," 34 and expressed his hope that the spirit of the French Rev-
olution, "the Love of Liberty [and] ... Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may per-
vade all the Nations of the Earth." 35 His Autobiography, written between 1771 and 
1789, has been read as if the book of American virtues by generation after gene-
ration. Kenneth Silverman in his "Introduction" to Franklin's writings proposed 
that his Autobiography owes much of its vast fame to the fact that "in tracing his 
development Franklin gave classic expression to three powerful ingredients of the 
American Dream: the ideals of material success, of moral regeneration, and of social 
progress." 36 
The two most influential documents to spring from the War of Independence, 
which were framed by the ideas of the Enlightenment, were the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution. The Declaration was drafted by Jefferson in 1776. 
The text drew primarily on the theory of Locke, his concept of the unalienable nat-
ural rights of men, namely equality, rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness. Jefferson also drew on the notion of social contract in his argumentation to 
present the Americans' case and explain the reasons for doing away with the British 
rule. As the text, which is political in its premises, contains references to God, it is 
also considered key to the emergence of civil religion 3'  in the US. It is also a 
document which was written in a simple, easy-to-understand manner in the lan-
guage of the common man, presenting values and beliefs Americans still deeply 
identify with. 
The Constitution, on the other hand, is void of any religious references and is a 
crystallized modern political document. It was the outcome of a thorough revision 
32 Quoted in Greenfeld 1992, 422. 
33 This conceptualization was advantageous to those who argued against English rule as it challenged 
one of the basic presumptions justifying the English presence in the Colonies. 
34 In a letter to Elizabeth Hubbart, Febrúary 22, 1756, quoted in Benjamin Franklin, TheAutobi-
ograpLy and Other Writings (London: Penguin, 1986), 250. 
35- In a letter to David Hartley, December 4, 1789, quoted in Franklin 1986, 259. 
36 	1986, ix. 
37 	See Section 3.2. 
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of an earlier experiment, the first document to outline the operation of the new 
nation, theArticles of Confederation, in effect between 1777-87. The Constitution was 
a product preceded by fierce debate and intellectual struggle but was finally accepted 
by the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and has been in effect since then. Ken-
neth Janda et al. contended that the Constitution is rooted in the following four 
intellectual currents: (1) Republicanism, which envisioned a type of government in 
which "power resides in the people and is exercised by their elected representatives; 
government is the common business of the citizens conducted for the common 
good'38 ; (2) Federalism, a distinctly American phenomenon in which state and fed-
eral governments share power and the responsibilities of ruling; (3) the notion of 
the separation of powers as proposed by Montesquieu; and (4) the idea of checks 
and balances, a principle developed by Englishmen Henry Bolingbroke and William 
Blackstone. These principles, along with the rights granted to the people in the Bill 
of Rights in 1791 and later amendments, including the right to freedom of speech, 
of the press, of assembly, of gun ownership, to mention just a few, have since 
shaped the political thinking and behavior of the American people 39 who embraced 
these as essential to their American identity. 40 
The significance of texts and written discourse in general in the course of gaining 
independence and the emergence of the concept of American nation has also cap-
tured scholars' imaginations. Wayne Franklin 41 argued convincingly that texts, let 
them be the Bible and other religious texts, charters, grants, personal writings, or 
diaries, were essential to the creation and operation of the Colonies in their relatively 
long history. By identifying with his proposition, it may be concluded that the text 
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were equally prominent in 
shaping the future of American society. On the other hand, Emory Eliott 42 argued 
38 Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey Berry and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge of Democracy. Government in 
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 82. 
39 	The question of citizenship also emerges here. Naturally, the various rights were granted to the 
citizens of the US, the circle of which has expanded significantly since then. However, citizenship is a legal 
category and is not bound to personal identification with the people residing in the US—especially since 
it has been home to constant waves of newcomers, thus often home to people who do embrace the Amer-
ican values, traditions, habits, and mindset, but are not citizens. 
40 One of the more prominent early accounts on how democracy and sovereignty of the people, 
instituted by the Constitution, was put to daily practice was given by Tocqueville, a Frenchman who spent 
nine months travelling in the US in 1831-32. His observations published in 1835 and 1840, confirmed 
majority rule in the US, but also warned of its danger which he saw in its efforts to homogenize society 
and to standardize daily actions, while demonstrating disrespect of differing or dissenting views and mar-
ginalizing divergence from the norm. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Signet, 
1984). 
41 	Wayne Franklin, "The US Constitution and the textuality of American culture," in Vivien Hart 
and Shannon C. Stimson eds., Writing a National Identity. Political, Economic, and Cultural Perspectives on 
the Written Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 9-20. 
42 Emory Eliott, "Constitution and imagination. The myth of reason—the reason of myth," in Vivien 
Hart and Shannon C. Stimson eds., Writing a National Identity. Political, Economic, and Cultural Perspec-
tives on the Written Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 21-33. 
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for a demystification of these sacred texts by claiming that the splendid ideals of the 
Enlightenment presented in these were considerably far from realization. Never-
theless, proposed Bercovitch, 43 "because the United States was conceived when its 
founders composed a written body of ideas, the result is that a person's identity as 
a citizen depends not upon birth, but upon the individual's allegiance to texts." 44 
Based on this proposition, one's American identity involves belief in the Consti-
tution, the rule of law, and compliance with the national ideology which is "the 
American Middle-Class Way," in Bercovitch's words. The constitutive power of the 
early texts was pointed out both by Stephen Fender45 and Christopher McCrudden, 
the latter of whom also problematized the possibility of the constitutional con-
struction of national identity. He concluded that 
the success or otherwise of a constitutional construction of national 
identity seems to me to depend more on the extent to which it, first, 
addresses issues germane to what is perceived as the construction of the 
national identity; second, constructs issues which are accepted as con-
stitutional, around which national identity can develop; and third, pro-
vides mechanisms by which the principles espoused are put into prac-
tice effectively.' 
This proposition is in line with later interpretations which regard social for-
mations as constructions, also assigning texts an exceptional position in the process. 
Based on these arguments, however, the prominence of the early documents and the 
ideals which took shape in them must be regarded as a factor impacting American 
identity and various theorizations on it. With regard to the overall impact of the 
early immigrants to the Colonies, Greenfeld maintained that the American identity 
"was formed in the process of systematic, though presumably not entirely inten-
tional, selection of certain characteristics of the colonial way of life and careful 
weeding out of others, the result of which was a uniform and eminently positive 
image.i 47 
43 Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 
45 	Stephen Fender, "Constitutional discourse. A commentary," in Vivien Hart and Shannon C. 
Stimson eds., Writing a National Identity. Political, Economic, and Cultural Perspectives on the Written 
Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 33-38. 
46 Christopher McCrudden, "Written constitutions and negative rights. Some comments on Pro-
fessor Currie," in Vivien Hart and Shannon C. Stimson eds., Writing aNational Identity . Political, Econom-
ic, and Cultural Perspectives on the Written Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 
39-64, 63. 
47 	1992, 406. 
44 	Eliott 1993, 25. 
108 
3. Religion at Play: A Nation with a Soul 
Religion has played a prominent role in US history since the arrival of the early 
colonists, thus is a significant factor to consider within the American mindset. The 
North American continent has offered refuge to followers of numerous other faiths 
beyond the Puritans who feared for their lives because of their beliefs. A series of 
awakenings signaled renewed interest among the Americans in the issues of the 
spiritual, laying the groundwork for a number of new religions to develop within 
the borders of the US. The fact that the first Amendment to the Constitution 
separated state and church and legalized the freedom of belief and speech, trans-
formed the US to a state in which the freedom of conscience and faith is guaranteed 
to the citizens. The very fact that an amendment was needed to establish this, how-
ever, also indicates that religion represented a considerable force towards the end of 
the eighteenth century and it has remained the case since then. Religion provides 
people with a set of beliefs and a world view which impacts their lives at the core, 
leaving no areas of life untouched: faith may impact political behavior, 1 economic 
conduct,' social life,' education,' the arts,' family life, 6 etc. A country where over 
90% of the people claim to be religious and to believe in the existence of God, is 
indeed a "nation with the soul of a church,' as Chesterton put it—therefore, aspects 
of the faith cannot be disregarded in a discussion of identity. 
The wealth of literature regarding the religious impulse in the US forces One to 
be highly selective when determining which areas and works to touch upon when 
discussing American identity. This section focuses on two phenomena, both re-
garded prominent from the point of view of American identification: (1) religious 
awakenings in the US which, rooted in revivalism and the need to revitalize faith 
and fill it with renewed intellectual and emotional zeal, also marked major phases 
in the development of American society and identity, according to William Mc- 
1 	For example, influencing voters' behavior by placing certain issues on the campaign agenda, such 
as abortion. 
2 The first classical piece regarding this is from 1904, Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism (New York: Scribner, 1958). 
3 	Examples include the attitude towards alcoholic beverages which resulted in the temperance 
movement in the nineteenth century, or the issues of homosexuality or gender roles. 
4 For example, the introduction of Darwinian evolutionary theory or Creation Science in school 
curricula. 
5 	Decisions regarding the exhibition of certain pieces of art based on their religious overtones and 
iconography or the lack thereof. 
6 Interfaith marriages or the conduct of daily family events, among others. 
' Quoted in Marsden 1990, 237. 
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Loughlin; 8 and (2) civil religion, a term which was introduced by Robert Bellah 9 
in the late 1960s to describe a phenomenon which has been part of the American 
scene from the very outset. 
3.1 Awakenings  
Basing his investigation on Tillich's proposition that religion is the soul of cul-
ture, McLoughlin ventured forth in his influential essay to analyze how religion can 
be mapped as the soul of American culture and in what way awakenings, these spe-
cial moments in religious history, can be interpreted in relation to this presumption. 
He understood awakenings as long-term cultural revitalizations, originating in gen-
eral cultural crisis and confusion, leading up to their resolution and the restoration 
of culture with a new world view. McLoughlin proposed that American history has 
been marked by five awakenings, namely: "the Puritan Awakening, 1610-40; the 
First Great Awakening, 1730-60; The Second Great Awakening, 1800-1830; the 
Third Great Awakening, 1890-1920; and the Fourth Great Awakening, 1960— 
90(?) »io 
He related the Puritan Awakening to the Puritan heritage of the American 
nation. Understanding Puritanism not simply as a form of theology but also as a 
social and economic theory enabled McLoughlin to present Puritanism in England 
as a form of challenge to the prevailing English world view which was primarily 
framed by Anglicanism. This challenge, however, was not well received; as a result, 
many Puritans felt threatened. The extremist wing left England, ultimately reaching 
the Colonies, where their tenets enabled them to transform "from rebels to found-
ers," as McLoughlin put it, with a dynamism which would contribute to the emer-
gence of a new culture, a civilized place, becoming the cradle for a new nation, 
different from England in a number of ways. 
However, he argued, by the 1660s the religious fervor started to fade away in the 
Puritan communities, and by the early 1700s the voluntary covenant structure in 
them had also broken down. He located the main causes in the general cultural 
distress as well as in significant social and economic changes, the spread of En-
lightenment ideas which challenged some of the tenets of Calvinism, as well as the 
changes in the relationship within the Colonies and between them and the mother 
country. Change was felt in all areas of life, and a new frame of mind had to come 
about to adjust to the new realities. These, of course, also prepared spiritually and 
8 William G. McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, andReforrn. An Essay on Religion and Social Change 
in America, 1607-1977 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
9 	Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," in Daedalus 96 (1967) : 1-21. 
10 	1978, 10-11. 
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intellectually the way for the War of Independence, establishing the common desire 
and spiritual strength to follow through with complete separation. 
The pietistic group, as McLoughlin identified the energizing power behind the 
First Great Awakening, was represented by the influential British Calvinist George 
Whitefield and the leading American preacher Jonathan Edwards. Edwards main-
tained an evangelical Calvinistic theology but offered a world view which had shaken 
congregational life, injecting renewed zeal and belief into the faith and its followers. 
Besides spiritual regeneration, the people experiencing the awakening received a 
more optimistic, progressive, individualistic, and democratic world view, which 
combined sacred and secular life and placed them on more of an equal basis. In the 
course of the Awakening, essentially theocratic local societies had been transformed 
into communities where the need for the separation of state and church was under-
stood if not desired. This revitalization was also powerful among the poor and the 
disenfranchised,  including women and Blacks as well as Native Americans. As a 
result, in the course of this awakening, "God was democratized," 11 preparing the 
Colonies to be democratized also. 
This awakening had an especially significant social impact in the Middle colonies: 
it assisted acculturation in that region, where the inhabitants represented a variety 
of ethnicities and religions. The awakening gave the opportunity to these Dutch, 
Scandinavian, and German immigrants living in poverty to rid themselves of their 
earlier ties and to re-direct their attention to their present state, life and environ-
ment. This way, the awakening gave primarily "self-confidence and American iden-
tity to the recent immigrants." 12 
In the Southern colonies, however, revivalism went beyond providing a platform 
for renewed religious zeal; it contributed to a form of "social revolt," which aimed 
at replacing the relatively weak Anglican Church and its highly educated and well-
to-do representatives with preachers who were of the people, the poor, the every-
man. The success of Methodist and Baptist ideas and their rapid spread in this re-
gion by the end of the eighteenth century bear witness to this. Overall, argued Mc-
Loughlin, the First Great Awakening functioned as a force of intellectual and reli-
gious standardization and was the first current to impact people in all of the colo-
nies, thus making the first step towards some type of unification and understanding 
which could serve as the platform for the upcoming fight for independence. 
However, it was the Second Great Awakening which specifically expressed the 
new nation's search for national unity and identification. McLoughlin argued that 
through the War of Independence, Americans achieved independence and ceased to 
remain colonies and that through the founding documents they determined the 
modes of operation of this new state and the values to be maintained, but that they 
11 	McLoughlin 1978, 75, after Alan Heimert. 
12 McLoughlin 1978, 88. 
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could not capture what it meant to be an American in common terms and, thus, 
how the new nation should proceed in meeting its full potential. Political debates 
and compromises, controversies between the Jeffersonian program envisioning a 
primarily agricultural country of independent farmers and the plan presented by 
Hamilton defining the future US as primarily a manufacturing and mercantile state, 
also added to a general sense of political uncertainty. Territorial expansion, in-
creasing sectionalism, and the debate between believers of Calvinism and the ration-
alists of the Enlightenment contributed further to the general feeling of confusion. 
In this milieu, McLoughlin claimed, the Second Great Awakening helped to 
define what being an American meant and what the future may hold for the nation. 
Timothy Dwight, clergyman and President of Yale, along with his best students, 
Lyman Beecher and Nathaniel Taylor, represented the beginning of this awakening 
in New England, hoping to give new life and meaning to faith from within. Their 
new-light theory later became known as the New School, which claimed the "con-
sciousness of freedom within the self, plus the doctrine of self-love enlightened 
through the sensibilities under divine influence." 13 
The Midwestern phase headed by Charles Finney focused on perfectionism. His 
work turned Western New York State into a "burnt-over district" where preachers 
from a variety of faiths spread the Gospel. Finney's "professional mass evangelism," 
as McLoughlin defined it, offered a method which made mass revivalist meetings 
and major public preaching possible. He embraced the revival techniques used on 
the frontier, and made them applicable in the urban environment. The South-
western camp meetings were the largest forum for revivalism, where crowds gath-
ered, usually quarterly, for a long meeting, which often lasted for a week. Methodist 
and Baptist preachers were in the lead in these, turning their religious group into 
the single largest US denominations by the end of the period. 
In addition to the spread of older Protestant faiths, this awakening also gave the 
impetus for the first American faiths" to be born and develop. This awakening rep-
resented the stage at which the American nation had to come of age as an in-
dependent nation, fulfilling its potential to the utmost and outlining the best pos-
sible future for the country. This included the recognition of the need for a change 
in the treatement of previously disenfranchised groups, such as Blacks or women. 
Although the US was still dominated by a white Protestant male majority, the in-
creasing public appearance of women 15 as religious or moral leaders marked the be-
ginning of a new era for them as well. 
13 McLoughlin 1978, 119. 
14 These included Mormons, Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. 
15 Women played significant roles as the leaders and major supporters of the temperance movement 
and of the overseas missionary activities among the highly evangelical Protestant denominations as well 
as being among the founders of certain religious organizations, such as Christian Science founded by 
Mary Baker Eddy or later the Theosophical Society headed by Helena Blavatsky. 
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It is this spirit of providing a platform for the previously marginalized popu-
lation to become religious leaders and public figures, no longer reserving these roles 
for the privileged well-to-do or highly educated that captured Nathan Hatch's 
attention. He proposed 16 that the most important feature of the Awakening was 
that it had democratized Christianity in the US. He understood this awakening as 
part of a general struggle to establish real equality and to become free of the binding 
influences of the past. As a result, low churches, such as the Methodist and Baptist 
Churches, managed to achieve major popularity, and poor, not highly educated 
people, such as Joseph Smith' and William Miller, 18 were able to appear in public 
as prophets and establish denominations—still thriving and with us even today. Thus, 
this awakening in Hatch's interpretation was also a social movement fighting to put 
the grand American values into practice and to seize the opportunities defined in 
political terms in the Constitution in actual reality. 
McLoughlin claimed that the Third Great Awakening was related to the Civil 
War and its aftermath. The War confirmed the unification of the US, and the need 
for this unity to be expressed in terms of cultural and identificational unity became 
apparent. Regional differences marking culture, economy, and political thinking had 
to be harmonized in order for the country to be able to operate without disruption. 
However, the economic boom and industrial development which followed the Civil 
War not only added to the already existing regional differences but also amplified 
them and introduced other ones. In the North, the gap between the poorest and the 
richest had grown immensely, as industrialization called for unskilled labor which 
was provided by the greatest wave of immigrants to the continent at the turn of the 
century. Urbanization, the rapid development of science, progressive ideas and in-
dividualism, evolutionary theories and the spread of Freudian psychoanalysis as well 
as increasing social illnesses resulted in cultural confusion as well, generally under-
mining previously held Christian beliefs. 
In this environment, the "old perfectionism and free will of Romantic Evan-
gelism [which] portrayed man as unconditioned by nature, unbound by contin-
gencies of heredity and environment, and capable of miraculous power over all ob-
stacles in personal or social reformation" 19 could not be maintained. McLoughlin 
proposed that the Third Awakening was a revival which aimed at purifying this 
belief of its miraculous nature and at pointing out man's limitations in trying to 
overcome some of these. It was a message primarily delivered to city dwellers, under 
16 Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989). 
17 Founder of the Mormon Church and faith. 
18 	Originally a Baptist lay preacher, whose teachings resulted in the emergence of the Adventist de- 
nominations. 
19 McLoughlin 1978, 156. 
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the leadership of preachers such as Billy Sunday, 2°  Richard Ely,' Washington 
Gladden, and Walter Raushenbusch. 22 
The last of the awakenings is tied to the social and political unrest which started 
in the 1960s. The series of problems bound to the failure of liberalism indicated that 
there is yet another crisis under way. The old optimism and faith in America's mis-
sion and success were called into question by those opposed to the Vietnam War, 
and commitment to the old values was challenged by various minority groups, such 
as those of Blacks or women, or by the youth. Harold Bloom wrote 23 that Wood-
stock reminded him of a revivalist camp meeting where participants were spiritually 
revitalized. But Woodstock also meant drugs and violence, other symptoms of the 
1960s. 
The reaction to this loss of faith was twofold: conservative if not fundamentalist 
reaffirmation of the old order and belief, represented by preachers Norman Peale, 
Fulton Sheen, and Billy Graham, on the one hand, and the appearance of new 
alternatives, including oriental faiths, occultism, and other, semi-religious ideolo-
gies, such as Scientology or New Age. This awakening was to reshape America's 
spirit, to overcome various social, economic, and generational gaps, and to re-
establish the belief in a common destiny and value system which had been chal-
lenged in the preceding decades. The original innocence and optimism were re-
placed by "premillennial pessimism among major segments of the population." 24 
However, an overall survey conducted in the second part of the 1960s showed that 
"modernized, liberal theology" was gaining acceptance fast, along with orthodoxies 
in the Christian faiths. 25 
The questions of whether the US is a Christian nation or not and how significant 
the role faith plays has often been debated. Some 50 years ago, Will Herberg pro-
posed2ó that the US had been shaped not only by Christianity but also by Judaism. 
He argued that the immigrants, in order to be accepted in their new homeland, were 
expected to change their language, culture, and nationality—but not faith, which, 
thus, remained "the differentiating element and the context of self-identification and 
20 	He is also often referred to as the national prophet, due to his wide influence and efforts to de- 
plore new naturalism and to save Christian teachings against Darwinism. 
23 He was a Reform Darwinist who tried to overcome the discrepancy between Darwinism and the 
Christian teachings on creation. 
22 	Both were leading figures of the social gospel movement which focused on social responsibility 
and called for cooperation and a sense of brotherhood. 
23 Harold Bloom, The American Religion. The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation (New York: 
25 Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, American Piety. The Nature of Religious Commitment 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 213. 
26 Will Herberg, Protestant—Catholic-Jew. An Essay in American Religious Sociology (New York: 
Doubleday, 1955). 
Simon and Schuster, 1992). 
24 McLoughlin 1978, 212. 
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social location." 27 These differing faiths, however, also comprised a unity: he 
claimed that the Judeo-Christian tradition framed the "American Way of Life 
[which] is, at the bottom, a spiritual structure, a structure of ideas and ideals, of 
aspirations and values, of beliefs and standards." 28 Moreover, he continued, the 
"very expression `way of life' points to its religious essence, for one's ultimate, over-
all way of life is one's religion." 29 
The search for the American religion as such was continued by Bloom who, 
unlike Herberg, claimed that American religion is neither Christian—which is about 
believing—nor Judaic—which is about trusting—but is expressed by a set of beliefs 
which captures Americans at their core: their focus on knowing, on individualism 
—which often leads to loneliness—and on freedom—frequently resulting in solitude. 
In this sense, he conceptualized the American religion as the "religion of the self" 
which is not "a religion of peace, since the American self tends to define itself 
through its war against otherness." 30  Protestant Christianity is a "mask," and the 
various Christian symbols are either not used at all, or if used, the understanding of 
their meaning has shifted significantly from the original Christian meaning. 31 
Robert Wuthnow's proposition that "God is relevant to contemporary Americans 
mainly because the sense of God's presence is subjectively comforting" 32 signals one 
possible interpretation of the individualized, lonely religious experience Bloom was 
also describing. 
However, neither Wuthnow nor other major scholars tend to challenge the belief 
that religion maintains a significant role in the life of most Americans. Wuthnow, 
unlike Bloom, did not argue for the loss of true religion and belief, but proposed 
that the American religion had undergone a major restructuring after World War 
II. Some of the phenomena he observed are identical with the ones described by 
McLoughlin as features of the Fourth Great Awakening. Wuthnow captured the 
more significant changes in this restructuring period as follows: "High rates of de-
nominational switching and interdenominational marriage, reduced levels of de-
nominational identity and cross-denominational tensions, as well as a pervasive 
amount of contact across denominational lines all point toward a declining mono-





31 	The cross, for example, is typically not used by the Latter-day Saints; but 
understood to signify the resurrection with its powerful and optimistic overtones 
crucifixion and suffering. 
32 Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring ofAmerican Religion (Princeton: Princeton 
1988), 300. 
33 Wuthnow 1988, 301. 
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Renewal and decreasing influence of the mainline churches, a variety of religious 
groups, spiritual innovation, responses to the challenges of the period, including 
responses to AIDS, homosexuality and changing gender roles are the major features 
of the religious pluralism at the end of the 20th century, according to Thomas Rob-
bins and Dick Anthony. In an excellent collection of essays,34 they argue for religion 
still being a central aspect of American existence and identity, but with increasing 
tolerance and pluralism, on the one hand, and strong fundamentalism, on the other. 
3.2 Civil Religion 
The "essentially irrelevant role of religion in the very secular society that is 
Americai 35 was pursued by Bellah who examined it through the analysis of political 
rhetoric in the US, focusing on various inauguration addresses. He proposed that 
the majority of Americans share in having a religious orientation which provides a 
significant dimension not only in the religious but also in the secular life. Bellah 
called this shared religiosity civil religion which, in Rousseau's definition, is charac-
terized by belief in "the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and 
punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance." 36 Civil religion 
unites Americans in the public secular realm, legitimates their actions and those of 
their leaders, and provides a moral frame of reference which never ceases to exist. 
It could only be achieved in a multi-religious country only if the terms and notions 
applied are non-specific. Civil religion is not bound to any particular religion: it 
lacks specific references to Jesus, Moses or any other figure or faith, talks about 
religion and God in general terms, in relation to the role and future of the US. Civil 
religion is indeed works with such vague concepts that it makes it possible for 
believers from various faiths to read their gods and beliefs into the texts, thus iden-
tify through it with the American nation and the goals it has set forth to pursue. 
Marsden interpreted civil religion as "a sort of deification of the national enter-
prise, ...the attributing of a sacred character to the nation itself." 37 He located the 
origin of civil religion to the end of the eighteenth century, where the three major 
aspects of civil religion in his understanding of the term appeared. These were also 
means through which the Puritan heritage could be harmonized with the secular 
principles upon which the founding documents of the US were based. Marsden 
listed them as (1) "the natural laws on which American rights were founded de- 
34 Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony eds., In Gods We Trust. New Patterns of Religious Pluralism 
in America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993) . 
35 Bellah 1967, 2. 
36 1967, 5. 
37 1990, 42. 
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monstrably originated with the Creator"; 38 (2) both civil and political leaders car-
ried on speaking about the nation as if it were a biblical or Christian nation; and (3) 
the public veneration of the nation and its principles appeared through the institu-
tionalization of a set of rituals and symbols, holidays and heroes, along with national 
shrines which bore a resemblance to Christian rituals and symbolism, holy days and 
saints as well as places of pilgrimage and worship. These were features believers 
from almost all religions could consider as being consistent with their specific 
faith—except for a handful of religions, such as ones confessing pacifism. 
The phenomenon of civil religion has also been identified by a number of other 
terms, including public religion, the American religion, common religion, operative 
religion, political religion, or the religion of the republic. These terms may imply 
a slight difference in meaning, such as Herberg's understanding, according to which 
civil religion is "an organic structure of ideas, values, and beliefs that constitutes a 
faith common to Americans as Americans, and is genuinely operative in their 
lives.i 39 It includes belief in a supreme being, "idealism and moralism," liturgy and 
so on. Anthony and Robbins pointed out that "civil religion...imparts a religious 
dimension to the whole fabric of American life especially to the political realm.i 40 
Marty proposed that civil religion may be highly individualized, that is, every citizen 
may have his/her own civil religion, thus calling attention to its episodic nature and 
questioning its real unifying functions in society. 41 
An overarching typology of the various meanings of the American civil religion 
was offered by Donald Jones and Russell Richey who proposed the following 
meanings: (1) civil religion as a folk religion which emerged out of the "actual life, 
ideas, values, ceremonies, and loyalties of the people." 42 Herberg's proposition of 
viewing civil religion as "The American Way of Life" reflects this manner of think-
ing. (2) Civil religion as "the transcendent universal religion of the nation," as ex-
pressed by Mead who viewed it as "the religion of the Republic" along with Bellah, 
both of them understanding it to be a prophetic, universal and thus formative, 
transcendent religious form. This understanding contributes to the interpretation 
of the American experience in the context of a universal reality. (3) This meaning 
is signified by the phrase `religious nationalism'. It views the nation as "the object 
of adoration and glorification... [with] a sovereign and self-transcendent charac- 
38 	1990, 43. 
39 Will Herberg, "America's Civil Religion. What It Is and Whence It Comes," in Russell E. Richey 
and Donald G. Jones eds., American Civil Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 76-88, 77. 
40 D ick Anthony and Thomas Robbins, "Civil Religion and Recent American Religious Ferment," 
in Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony eds., In Gods We Trust. New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in 
America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993), 475-500, 476. 
41 Martin E. Marty, "Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion", in Russell E. Richey and Donald 
G. Jones eds., American Civil Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 139-160. 
42 	Donald G. Jones and Russell E. Richey, "The Civil Religion Debate," in Russell E. Richey and 
Donald G. Jones eds., American Civil Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 3-20, 15. 
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ter." 43 In this sense civil religion is like the religion of patriotism as understood by 
Marty. (4) Civil religion as democratic faith, a collection of enlightened human 
values and ideals Americans are able to identify with. (5) The last aspect is defined 
as Protestant, civic piety or Protestant nationalism, expressing the fusion of Prot-
estant roots and American nationalism. 
Whichever meaning is considered, conceptualizations of the relationship between 
state and religion, on the one hand, and citizen and believer, on the other, also re-
main another central issue. The First Amendment granted the legal separation of 
church and state, but a number of cases indicate that these two realms have not been 
successfully separated in all walks of life. 44  On the individual level, the question that 
arises regards the relationship between one's role as a citizen and as a believer, that 
is, how an individual can differentiate between its disposition defined by the sacred 
and that related to its secular position, two roles which may be in contradiction at 
times. 
John Coleman 45 proposed that the reason for a possible lack of harmony be-
tween these two roles is that Christianity has not presented one with a proper the-
ology of citizenship. He contended that religion provides people with guidelines 
with regard to their behavior in most domains of the secular, such as in the family, 
at work, or in business, but not as citizens. Harvey Cox argued that the reason be-
hind this discrepancy is that "the concept `citizen' is itself an ideological construct.' 
The two forces that shaped the relationship between the religious and the secular 
public domains were the separation of the two in the public sphere after the birth 
of nation-states, in the Protestant world primarily in the form of "various consti-
tutional arrangements." ' The second reason, according to Cox, lies in the definition 
of the public realm: it was defined as a free, independent realm, established for 
"rational politics and social emancipation." 48 This was an ideological construct, 
claimed Cox, as it was established by the victorious bourgeoisie in order to cement 
their own exclusive leadership without any challenges from the religious establish-
ment who had shared in power previously. Originally, the public realm was de-
signed to be free of value commitment and religious argumentation; therefore, 
bourgeois ideology could become the singlé vehicle dominating public debate and, 
therefore, could successfully secure bourgeois position and power. 
45 John Coleman, "The American Civil Religion Debate. A Source for Theory Construction," in 
43 
44 	For example, prayers at school or having in Congress or army chaplains. 
Jones and Richey 1974, 16. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 20 (1981) :51-63. 
46 Harvey Cox, "Citizens and Believers. Always Strangers?" in Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony 
eds., In Gods We Trust. New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 
1993), 449-461, 451. 
4' Cox 1993, 453. 
48 	Cox 1993, 453. 
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However, Cox also pointed out that the two realms cannot be fully separated as 
the same individuals act both as citizens and as believers and, as politics is a type of 
action guided not only by logic and interest but also morality and ethics, religion 
is likely to inform the believer's decision in the areas of the latter two when acting 
as a citizen. Cox understood civil religion to have developed in order to overcome 
the discrepancy between these two realms, but it has just caused further problems, 
as it is "neither completely civil nor completely religious. At points it contradicts the 
symbolic universe of those in religious communities and... it evokes images and 
values with which most secular participants in the civil community understandably 
feel uncomfortable." 49 
At the same time, as of the 1980s, two obstacles to the possible development of 
an adequate theology of citizenship started to crumble in the US: (1) as a result of 
an "emerging international community," the exclusive borderlines for citizen action, 
that is, the organizational power of nation-states, have been brought into question; 
and (2) the leading figures of religious life have been invited to political events in 
the spirit of pluralism to express their views, thus helping shape political decisions, 
finding their way back to the public sphere and, through morality, to politics. Thus, 
in Cox's proposition, the dysfunctioning of civil religion may eventually disappear 
and a proper theology of citizenship develop, re-establishing the classical and "more 
wholesome idea of citizenship in the civitas," thus doing away with "the more mo-
dern bourgeois idea of the citoyen." 5°  
The crisis of civil religion was first indicated by Bellah himself51 who saw con-
temporary spiritual turmoil as a response to the "empty" civil religion, an attempt 
to introduce "new American myths." In a discussion of the literature regarding the 
erosion of civil religion in the US after Bellah's critical piece, Robbins and Anthony, 
through a systematic analysis of the various new movements and faiths, concluded 
that "the present climate of moral ambiguity and the consequent polarization of 
monistic and dualistic world views are related to the erosion of a dominant Ame-
rican political-moral ideology or civil religion that we call implicit legitimation." 52 
This "erosion" is the result of the fact that the key elements of civil religion had been 
challenged in the post-World War II era by (1) a rejection of the laissez-faire econ-
omy as a result of increased state regulation; (2) a general feeling of the loss of per-
sonal autonomy in a highly bureaucratic society; (3) "moral pluralism and he-
donism"; and (4) challenges to America's leading position after Vietnam, Water-
gate, and US-Soviet détente. They saw a polarization in the moral attitudes, New 
49 Cox 1993, 454. 
50 Cox 1993, 452. 
51 	Robert Bellah, [ e Broken Covenant (New York: Seabury, 1975). 
52 	1993, 196-97. 
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Age occultism being at one end of the spectrum and "revitalized conservative Chris-
tianity" at the other. 53 
In the last ten years, Christian fundamentalism has gained a stronger public voice 
than New Age movements; thus, the continuum seems to be stretching between 
fundamentalist and moderate Christians who, although higher in number, are 
quieter in voice. The struggle between the two groups continues. After 9-11, a new 
consensus and unity seemed to have emerged, but it fell into pieces once the War 
on Terror started to take shape. However, regardless of whether the fundamentalists 
or moderate Christians will take the lead in the future, one thing remains certain: 
faith has been, still is, and will continue to be a key component of American iden-
tity, a force the significance of which may be argued but not disregarded. "For 
countless individuals and groups in late twentieth century America, their religion 
is of primary value by which they seek and sometimes find allegiances higher than 
simply the nation and meanings deeper than those defined by a cultural con-
sensus."' 
53 	1993, 499. 
54 Marsden 1990, 278. 
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4. One out of Many: Creating a Nation 
The War of Independence offered the possibility for the American people to 
establish their own country, the basic structure of which was determined in the 
Articles of Confederation, soon replaced by the Constitution. However, by the end of 
the eighteenth century the political elite of the US had split into two over dominant 
issues concerning the future of the new country. One significant difference between 
the leading figures of the two forces, Alexander Hamilton of the Federalist Party 
and Thomas Jefferson of the Republicans, regarded the nature of society. Jefferson 
favored a democratic agrarian society based on the free individual farmer, while 
Hamilton envisioned a diversified industrial society, with strong trading and manu-
facturing. This disagreement foreshadowed not only a series of problems for the 
nineteenth century, but also the first two models which proposed to capture the 
nature of the emerging American nation and locate its place of birth. 
One of these models was presented in the most elaborate way by Turner in his 
frontier hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, a new and unique American na-
tion was on the rise on the American frontier, shaped by the native land and nature 
as well as the frontier experience. The other model which is known as the melting 
pot theory claimed that the new nation was to be born in the industrial urban set-
ting: this superior nation was to emerge out of the immigrants representing many 
ethnicities. Both of these theories share in their proposition of conceptualizing the 
emergence of one American nation unified by descent, shaped by no single Euro-
pean nation or immigrant group. Both theories viewed the emerging community 
as a superior nation which is more noble, able, and virtuous than any of the ones in 
the Old World. The differences between the two theories regard the place and 
mechanisms through which this new nation develops, which may be explained by 
the differences in the time and the socio-economic context out of which they 
emerged. 
4.1 The Frontier Hypothesis 
This hypothesis claimed that the distinct American nation was to be born on the 
frontier, on the rural land, far from the civilized coastal towns. The theory was 
named after Frederick Turner's influential essay "The Significance of the Frontier 
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in American History" 1 written in 1893. Turner was the first historian to capture the 
importance of the frontier, the West, and the land, but not the first author to write 
about it. One famous piece had been written by J. Hector Crévecoeur, who, al-
though often classified as a melting pot theorist,' is more a representative of the 
frontier hypothesis. 
Crévecoeur's work' was published in 1782 and was among the first attempts to 
describe the nature of American people and society as something distinct and 
unique. He himself a Frenchman who did farming in the Colonies between 1769 
and 1776, published his personal experiences in the form of a series of letters, a 
format which allowed him to use a personal voice and validated the experience he 
had put into words. It is in this volume, in Letter 3, that he posed his famous 
question: "What, then, is the American, this new man?" He proposed that the new 
man is someone who became regenerated in his humanity as a result of his life on 
the frontier. The new American is someone who had nothing and, thus, was nobody 
in his former home in Europe, but became a citizen in America, a full man again, 
whose efforts and work were rewarded. This new American is neither European nor 
of European descent, as he has a "strange mix of blood" resulting from intermar-
riages between the immigrants of various European descent. "Here individuals of 
all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one 
day cause great changes in the world." 4 The American transplantation, thus, also 
gave an inherent greatness to the new American, who acts on new principles of 
democracy, obeys new laws and government, and embraces new ideas and opinions. 
Crévecoeur stated that the East is dominated by the English, but the rest of the 
land is the meeting place of "the poor of Europe," where farmers, faced with the 
same circumstances and hardships, driven by the same desires, forget about their 
past, leave behind their manners and prejudices, and melt into one new, noble 
nation. The place where this new man and nation is born is the frontier, the farm-
land, where breaking the soil and cultivating their own land gave the people inde-
pendence, dignity, satisfaction, and enormous happiness. And, as they work for 
themselves, they are very industrious and devoted, innovative and peaceful. 
Crévecoeur's interpretation is highly optimistic and idealistic. He captured the 
essence of the American nation in an idealized and uniform description of immi-
grants who, as yeomen, lived in a democratic political structure in accordance with 
values, manners, and habits which were shaped by their daily lives and experi- 
In C.K. McFarland, Readings in Intellectual History. The American Tradition (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 246-64. 
2 	For example, in William Fischer et al., Identity, Community, and Pluralism in American Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 12. 
3 J. Hector St. John de Crévecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches ofEihteenth-
Century America (New York: Penguin, 1987). 
4 	Crévecoeur 1987, 70. 
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ences—and not forced on them by the Anglo-American elite. This milieu, however, 
was not representative of town life, the life of the manufacturers and traders, nor 
plantation owners and their slaves. The world Crévecoeur described was charac-
teristic of one segment of society and thus cannot be accepted as the standard norm 
at face value. However, Crévecoeur was not the only author who assigned primacy 
to the impact of the frontier in the shaping of the American nation or evaluated 
change in an evolutionist manner. The most influential essay propagating this 
notion was presented over a century after Crévecoeur, by Turner, at a conference 
for American historians. 
Turner, a historian himself, was born and raised in the West, which had a lasting 
impact on him and his thought. His paper on the significance of the frontier pro-
posed that the colonization of the American continent ran in tandem with social 
evolution and transformation among the colonizers. Through capturing the land, 
the immigrants were forced to return to primitive conditions and advance from 
there anew. This was a kind of rebirth which offered them new opportunities, in-
cluding that of creating a new country and nation. He proposed that the very first 
frontier, which was on the Atlantic Coast, remained under European influence, but 
the further West the frontier line moved form the coast, the less English and Euro-
pean and, thus, more independent and American it had become. The frontier pre-
sented the newcomers with the challenges of nature and wild life, transforming their 
former manners of dressing, modes of traveling, housing, ways of living and think-
ing. Frontier life "promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the Amer-
ican people. ...In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, 
liberated and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor charac-
teristics.i 5 In parallel, dependence on England had also decreased, allowing for "the 
growth of nationalism and the evolution of American political institutions.i ó The 
frontier line in the middle region represented the most homogeneous society, where 
the people were tolerant, content, and easy-going, democratic in their thinking and 
appreciative of financial well-being. They represented mobility, optimism, an inven-
tive spirit, and faith in themselves. All of these were features which frontiersmen 
shared and which had become characteristics of the American nation as well. The 
concept of free land had also become associated with opportunity and individualism 
along with hard work, all associated with the American people. 
Although his hypothesis has remained key to students of American culture and 
the image of the frontier a driving force in history, this theory has its own short-
comings, as it has been pointed out a number of times. Ray Billington 7 offered a 
5 	Turner 1970, 257. 
6 	Turner 1970, 258. 
Ray A. Billington, "How the Frontier Shaped the American Character," in C.K. McFarland, 
Readings in Intellectual History. The American Tradition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 
272-281. 
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summary of the various points of criticism, which most often indicate the over-
simplified nature of Turner's argumentation and hypothesis. Billington illustrated 
how the Westward movement, life on the frontier, the variety of people present and 
the growth of institutions there were all parts of a much more complex process than 
Turner described in his essay. With regard to certain aspects and features of the 
emergence of the American nation on the frontier, Billington agreed with Turner's 
statements, although assigned less significance to them. However, Billington, unlike 
Turner, argued that "democratic theory and institutions were imported from Eng-
land," but the "frontier environment tended to make them, in practice, even more 
democratic." 8 In his understanding, besides contributing to the strengthening of 
democracy, the frontier also "accentuated the spirit of nationalism and individualism 
in the United States." 9 He saw other traits of the nation, such as inventiveness, 
being less bound by place and tradition, anti-intellectualism and materialism, op-
timism and belief in progress, as also part of the frontier experience, but not features 
which were born and shaped solely along the frontier lines. The frontier, he claimed, 
should be viewed as an area which, with its potential and abundant resources "pro-
vided an unusual opportunity for the individual to better himself"' but cannot 
alone account for the distinctive characteristics of the American nation and civi-
lization. 
The concept of the frontier, however, has remained a significant part of the A-
merican identity and imagination. It has ridden itself of the environmentalist 
theoretical background as well as the evolutionary nature and transformed into an 
idea which symbolizes the next challenge the US must overcome in physical terms. 
The last frontier now is space, which presents both an intellectual and technological 
challenge. But the concept of the frontier also captured the energy of the American 
nation, its strength, dynamism, and self-confidence, along with dreams and aspira-
tions, all features which make them Americans. Therefore, the significance of the 
concept of the frontier and the values and features associated with it must be re-
garded as another prominent part of American identity today. 
4.2 The Melting Pot Theory 
By the time Turner presented his hypothesis, the American frontier had reached 
the Pacific Coast and had thus been closed. With the closing of the frontier, a signi-
ficant phase of American history had also come to an end. That and the outcome of 
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precedented industrial development, social and economic restructuring, urbani-
zation, and mass immigration. The War evoked hope for the end of sectionalism and 
for cultural and economic integration and unification of the various regions and 
their inhabitants. Moreover, the sheer number of immigrants and their background 
called for a vision and a policy which could assimilate them into mainstream A-
merican culture rapidly, with minimal effort. The vision was captured by the symbol 
of the melting pot, the policy by the notion of Americanization. 
The image of the melting pot was introduced by Israel Zangwill in his drama The 
Melting Pot." This play is about a Jewish immigrant, David Quixano, and his efforts 
to start anew in New York where he has immigrated after the slaughter of his family 
in Czarist Russia. His hope to be able to step beyond the images of his past 
haunting him is his faith in America and the potential of a new nation which he 
imagines is then in the making. He states that "America is God's Crucible, the Great 
Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming! i 12 He bor-
rowed an industrial image in the period of the industrial boom to capture the dy-
namics through which the new nation was coming about. This new American "has 
not yet arrived. He is only in the Crucible, I tell you—he will be the fusion of all 
races, the coming superman." 13 And later he continued: "East and West, and North 
and South, the palm and the pine, the pole and the equator, the crescent and 
cross—how the great Alchemist melts and fuses them with his purging flame! Here 
shall they all unite to build the Republic of Man and the Kingdom of God. ...what 
is the glory of Rome and Jerusalem where all nations and races come to worship and 
look back, compared to the glory of America, where all races and nations come to 
labor and look forward!" 14 
These frequently quoted sections express the meaning of the melting pot theory 
in its full form. Similarly to the frontier hypothesis, supporters of this theory firmly 
believed that a new, united nation was to emerge in the US, but they saw the urban 
environment, the city as the birthplace of the nation and not the rural areas or the 
frontier. This was a consequence of the fact that by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, urbanization and industrialization were developing dynamically, and thus 
urban areas were the sites of unprecedented changes in the US, decoded as part of 
the national progress. The immigrants arriving in order to provide the labor force 
for this unique boom also concentrated in the big urban centers and thus the pri-
mary place for their assimilation had to be conceptualized as being there. Since a 
large number of the newcomers also worked in mining and heavy industry, an 
image borrowed from that environment seemed a fitting one to grasp the way the 
nation was to emerge. 
(New York: Macmillan, 1909). 
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Supporters of both theories also believed that the emergence of the new nation 
would be accompanied by a change in quality as well: the immigrants were to lose 
their previous manners, values, mindset, and lifestyle and melt, creating a new na-
tion which was to be superior to any of the Old World nations. However, unlike the 
frontier hypothesis, where Turner focused on the revitalizing nature of the frontier 
where the new values and features were exclusively characteristic of the American 
nation, Zangwill conceptualized the new nation as specific to the American land and 
characterized by a composite of the best features of the various ethnic and racial 
groups—therefore, combining the impact of the environment with that of heritage. 
The melting pot theory also addressed the issue of race and envisioned an amal-
gamation of all races into a nobler one. Zangwill envisioned the complex process of 
amalgamation as a long one, primarily boosted by intermarriage between racial, eth-
nic, and religious groups—which also appeared as a subplot in the drama. The act of 
becoming a real American is also depicted as a process of purification, as expressed 
by the phrase "purging flame," in which all the previously held prejudices and hatred 
disappear, all wounds become healed, and thus members of various ethnic com-
munities can indeed come together in harmony to create a superior community. 
The process described is highly idealistic and mechanical, uniformed and stan-
dardized. It is also, as Gleason pointed out, deterministic in that it defined with cer-
tainty the nature of the upcoming nation; optimistic in supposing that the immi-
grant-experience would strengthen one's commitment to the new home; and mini-
malist in its expectations of the immigrants in the process, assuming that "the 
conditions of American life, particularly egalitarianism and the opportunity for ma-
terial improvement, would automatically transform foreigners into Americans."' 
The melting pot theory was in essence an assimilationist theory, with the presump-
tion that every newcomer desired to change and assimilate into American society in 
a uniform manner and would do so—and whether everyone actually wanted to was 
never asked. 
The policy of Americanization was born out of the desire to hone the immi-
grants' assimilation process and thus gained increased public support fast. With 
time, it had also become associated with strengthening nationalism and nativism, 
reaching its peak in the years during and right after World War I. Americanization 
was a phenomenon which first appeared in the nineteenth century, as a part of the 
antebellum nativist controversies, present in the public effort to deal with the in-
creasing immigration of the first significant Catholic group from Europe, the Irish, 
on the East Coast and of the non-white Chinese who landed on the West Coast in 
high numbers. 
However, the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of 




immigrants, primarily Catholic in faith, ethnically highly diversified, of peasant 
origin, uneducated, illiterate, and often in poor health, who had flooded the Eastern 
industrial areas. After the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the primary labor force 
to enter the Pacific Coast was of Japanese descent, adding further to the Asian com-
ponent of the local population. The appearance of these masses so different cultur-
ally, ethnically, and linguistically from the majority of the population in the US, 
who formed their own ethnic-based neighborhoods, religious, benefit, and cultural 
organizations, was experienced as a threat by many Americans and, therefore, be-
came a powerful drive for many to call for their assimilation. Cosmopolitans and 
liberal-minded citizens saw the need to help the newcomers to integrate into the 
American society soon, bearing in mind the immigrants' interests and advancement, 
while loyalists and patriots sought for a program which would assimilate the im-
migrants as soon as possible for their own sake and interests. 
As a result, Americanization programs were launched all over the US, primarily 
using public schools and adult education. Courses on the responsibilities of US 
citizens, the meaning of the American Constitution, hygiene, home economics, and 
the English language were widely taught in various states, complemented by eve-
ning classes for adults in English as a second language and American civics as of 
1907. These programs were designed to enhance assimilation as well as to speed up 
the process itself. These were standardized programs, with no consideration for the 
immigrants' position, life, and struggles, nor the fact that many of them were ac-
tually sojourners who were planning to return to their home countries. These pro-
grams and the various groups and agencies in support of them were on the increase, 
becoming ever more powerful, reaching forceful assimilation by the mid-1910s. 
Of all these agencies, the National Americanization Committee was in the lead, 
launching new courses and programs, connecting them to already existing welfare 
programs, insisting on tying certain jobs and positions—such as public school teach-
ing—to citizenship. During World War I, the US also expected immigrants to con-
firm their loyalties, and either apply for citizenship or return to their homeland. The 
fear that immigrants may present a possible threat to American society did not abate 
after the war, but intensified in the course of the Red Scare: the fear of possible 
political unrest within the borders of the country as the result of the spread of com-
munism, captured by the so-called domino doctrine. However, the tightening up 
of immigration policy as of 1921 and the Palmer Raids in 1920-21 helped to ease 
the situation, and by the mid-1920s, the major phase of Americanization was at an 
end. 
Americanization, actually, was in a way contradictory to the melting pot theory, 
although it was presented as if it were supplementing it. The melting pot theory 
conceptualized mainline American culture not as already existing, but as something 
in the making. The notion of Americanization, however, drew on the assumption 
that there was already a completed process which brought about a distinct main- 
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stream American culture and nation, and the Americanization programs assisted the 
immigrants in melting or assimilating into it. 
The next question to arise then, is, what this American culture and nation to be 
embraced was about and what it represented. Walter Foster claimed that national 
unity "sought expression in political-social ideology... [with] a hard core of perma-
nent values primarily in political institutions." 16 These values, proposed Gleason, 
were framed by Anglo-Saxonism, praising pride in the English heritage and lan-
guage, interwoven with Protestant religious overtones. This idea was modified by 
Novak 17 who, although maintained that Anglo-Saxon domination was the norm, 
added that the American culture was a Nordic jungle, also impacted by the heritage 
of the earlier Germanic and Northern European immigrants. 
The superiority of the Anglo and Nordic peoples and cultures was also supported 
by contemporary scientific theories. The most influential work was probably Wil-
liam Ripley's Races of Europe published in 1899. His anthropological classification 
of the three groups of European nations, the Teutonic, the Alpine, and the Medi-
terranean gave supremacy to the first race, basing the determining racial factors in 
the environment and not heritage. Seventeen years later, another work by Madison 
Grant entitled The Passing of the Great Race was published, which continued the 
same tradition, declaring the Nordic race to be the master of all races. "He regarded 
as "pathetic and fatuous" the belief that such miserable human materials [as the new 
immigrants] could be transformed into acceptable citizens through the influence of 
American institutions and environment." 18 
The melting pot theory was placed within a wider context in the works of Robert 
Park, founder of the Chicago School, the first American sociological school. This 
school became famous for establishing urban sociology as a separate filed within so-
ciology and for introducing the study of urban ecology. Park viewed the city as a 
community with a moral order as well as the site of modern features and changes 
in humanity—therefore, he contended that the study of the urban community and 
environment should be the primary task of sociology. He maintained that in the 
urban environment the traditional kinship relations were transformed and, as a re-
sult, so too were urban inhabitants. He proposed that the four characteristic features 
of this new type of social life were competition out of which conflict developed, 
followed by accommodation, which resulted in assimilation. 19 In the US cities, he 
observed competition and conflict between ethnic groups—and not between classes, 
16 Walter O. Foster, "The Immigrant and the American National Idea," in Colin Greer ed., Divided 
Society. The Ethnic Experience in America (New York: Basic, 1974), 67-83, 68. 
17 Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York: Macmillan, 1972). 
19 Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the Study of Society (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1921) . 
18 	Gleason 1980, 42. 
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as Marxist theorists claimed—and, granted that his model holds true, ethnic conflict 
would be followed by the immigrants' accommodation and assimilation. 
In a 1928 piece he outlined his ideas regarding migration and the new com-
munities which were the outcome of these human movements. 20 He proposed that 
human character was not determined either by physical environment or climate, as 
Montesquieu envisioned, nor by biologically inherited, innate qualities, as seen by 
Gobineau, but by a series of conflicts and cooperation, as maintained by Hume and 
Teggart. Migration is one of these, resulting in new contacts and "fusion of native 
with alien peoples." 21 He conceptualized it as a process, in which first changes in 
culture, customs, and habits take place, followed by "changes in race... as a result of 
interbreeding, by corresponding modifications in temperament and physique." 22 
The acculturation, assimilation, and amalgamation of the various peoples, however, 
may take different forms and proceed at different speeds, but the process eventually 
will take place, primarily as a result of intermarriage. Thus, Park outlined a general, 
highly deterministic model, in support of the melting pot theory, proposing that full 
assimilation will take place in the US, too, with time. 
However, as early as the turn of the century, studies addressing certain flaws in 
contemporary Americanization and assimilationist tendencies pointed to certain 
shortcomings in the melting pot theory as well. One of the first ones expressing cri-
ticism was Charles W. Chesnutt. In his classic piece "The Future Americani23 pub-
lished in 1900, he criticized the melting pot theory 24 on the basis of it being in-
complete and oblivious to certain facts. He saw "the future American race—the fu-
ture American ethnic type" to come about through the mingling of immigrants with 
various racial and ethnic backgrounds. In this, he evoked the image of the melting 
pot. However, he envisioned this as a long process, and although he contended that 
it had started already, he predicted that it would take a very long time to complete. 
He saw the Black population in the US as the main factor significantly impeding the 
process. "The Negro element remains, then, the only one which seems likely to 
present any difficulty of assimilation. The main obstacle that retards the absorption 
of the Negro into the general population is the apparently intense prejudice against 
color which prevails in the United States." 25 Prejudice against Blacks, he claimed, 
was expressed all over the US, but it was especially noticeable in the Southern states 
where not only customs and public view, but legislation and laws also operated to 
20 Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," in Werner Sollors ed., Theories of 
Ethnicity. A Classical Reader (London: Macmillan, 1996), 156-167. 
21 	Park 1996, 159. 
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23 	In Werner Sollors ed., Theories ofEthnicity. A ClassicalReader (London: Macmillan, 1996), 17-33. 
24 	Naturally, it was not called the melting pot theory at the time, but the process he describes is the 
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25 	Chesnutt 1996, 28. 
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the effect of trying to keep the Black race apart from other races. He noted that the 
only hope he could see for reversing this situation may come from the "moral 
sympathy and support" of the North. Chesnutt, in essence, did not deny the pos-
sibility of the amalgamation of various ethnicities into a united American nation and 
race, but expressed concern for its future in the light of contemporary socio-political 
realities, also highlighting sectional differences within the US regarding the treat-
ment of Blacks. 
The melting pot theory had remained part of the American imagination for most 
of the century. Time, however, offered a new perspective on the great immigration 
wave of the turn of the century. Studies with new claims and understandings ap-
peared in the 1940s as part of an unprecedented scholarly interest in American his-
tory, and as part of that, immigration history. A whole school of historians, headed 
by Oscar Handlin, published their stories of the immigrants and the way they 
shaped the American culture and nation. Ray Billington's The Protestant Crusade 26 
focused on the story of Protestant immigrants and their role in the New World, 
especially in the antebellum period. Carl Wittke's We Who Built America' was a 
saga of the mass immigration which resulted in populating the US and developing 
it into an economic power. In line with this, Marcus Lee Hansen's The Atlantic 
Migration 1607-1860. A History of the Continuing Settlement of the United States 28 
and Oscar Handlin's The Uprooted 29 focused on the series of contributions of the 
peasant immigrant stock, carefully analyzing the composition of the immigrant 
waves, various push and pull factors at play, the immigrant experience in the US, 
and their ultimate success. 
These studies all seemed to imply that the immigrants had found their way into 
society as well as contributed to the host culture and society. As Handlin concluded, 
"the adverse effects of immigration seem to have been slight, the gains for Amer-
icans and newcomers considerable." 30 Handlin also maintained that "American 
practice has come to accept the premise that all men are created equal no matter 
what degrees of diversity divide them. In this sense, it may no longer be appropriate 
at all to refer to `minorities'." 31 That is, ethnic diversity—which, in his view, entails 
strictly cultural and not biological differences—prevailed, and the various ethnicities 
enjoyed equal status. With this, Handlin offered an understanding which reached 
beyond the melting pot theory and moved in the direction of another theory which 
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5. Many in One: The Pluralist Society 
In parallel with the melting pot theory and Americanization programs, dissenting 
voices started to emerge, but gained real weight only in the post-World War II era. 
These voices described a pluralistic society where immigrants and their descendants 
from various racial and ethnic groups may coexist without any forceful attempts 
made to create a homogeneous American society. Of the two theories which cap-
tured this pluralism, cultural pluralism developed at an earlier stage, and structural 
pluralism became a truly dominant voice in the late 1950s and '60s. 
5.1 Cultural Pluralism 
The term cultural pluralism has been tied to Horace M. Kallen and his essay 
"Democracy versus the Melting-Pot: A Study of American Nationality" first pub-
lished in 1915. 1 He proposed an anti-assimilationist theory, arguing for a "feder-
ation of nationalities" in the US, borrowing Isaac Berkson's term. 2 Basing his 
argumentation on the basic political principle in the US, democracy, along with the 
notion of natural rights as defined in the Declaration oflndependence, he posited that 
the US had been unfaithful to these ideals. "To conserve the inalienable rights of the 
colonists of 1776, it was necessary to declare all men equal; to conserve the in-
alienable rights of their descendants in 1914, it becomes necessary to declare all men 
unequal.i 3 That is, he viewed contemporary ethnic policy and Americanization ef-
forts as being in opposition to the basic spirit upon which the US was founded. 
He argued that assimilationist efforts aimed at "the adaptation of English speech, 
of American clothes and manners, the American attitude in politics. ... [and fusing 
immigrants] into beings similar in background, tradition, outlook, and spirit to the 
descendants of the British colonists, the Anglo-Saxon stock." 4 Thus, he identified 
the common American with Anglo-Saxon descent, and Americanization with the 
attempt to transform all people into the image of these. "English is to us what Latin 
was to the Roman provinces and to the middle ages—the language of the upper and 
dominant class, the vehicle and symbol of culture." 5 In this context, Americaniza-
tion was interpreted as a form of domestic subjugation and colonization, which is 
In Werner Sollors ed., Theories ofEthnicity. A Classical Reader (London: Macmillan, 1996), 67-92. 
2 Quoted in Gleason 1980, 43. 
3 	Kallen 1996, 68. 
4 	Kallen 1996, 72. 




contrary to the notion of democracy. The acceptance of difference is an integral part 
of real democracy, he claimed, and thus immigrants so different in so many ways 
must be accepted as they are and for what they are. In this sense, as Gleason also 
noted, he conceptualized the US not as a "nation with its distinctive nationality but 
a political state within which dwelt a number of different nationalities.i ó 
His writing was a plea for a "truly democratic commonwealth" in a federal re-
public, in which all nationalities would enjoy the right to maintain their own tra-
ditions, ways, and cultures, in harmony with each other. He argued for the recog-
nition of the advantages a heterogeneous American society may offer, a nation 
united by geography and political principles. His view of the various groups as cul-
tural entities within the American society prompted him to name his theory cultural 
pluralism. However, his argumentation remained a theoretical exercise, as he never 
gave concrete recommendations with regard to the specifics of the implementation, 
organization, and maintenance ofhis vision in reality. He believed that things would 
eventually fall into place, which was highly idealistic of him, as was the presumption 
that his political idealism may have such a major persuasive power that it could 
transform the American people into a commonwealth of the nations, living in full 
respect and harmony. 
Another classic piece to contribute to the popularization of cultural pluralism 
was Randolph Bourne's "Trans-National America" published in 1916.' He claimed 
that assimilation was not taking place because the various groups were powerful 
enough "to take a share in the direction of their own destiny" and not tailor their 
lives to those of the Americans in every possible way. He regarded it as part of a 
longer continuum, starting with the first Puritans who, he claimed, had not crossed 
the Atlantic Ocean to assimilate into an already existing culture and society, but 
insisted on living up to their dreams: to find freedom and peace in a society with 
their own institutions and organizations. Bourne argued that the new immigrants 
followed the same traditions: they came to the new world to fulfill their dreams 
under circumstances of their own choosing, including maintaining their culture and 
organizing ethnic-based groups, schools, churches, etc. He continued with the prop-
osition that the American culture was dominated by the Anglo-Saxons not because 
of some innate supremacy but simply because they were the first immigrants there 
to establish a colony. In the light of this, Americanization, which is in essence 
"Anglo-Saxonizing," 8 was wrong and doomed to failure. 
Bourne also called attention to the fact that immigration to the US was the result 
of a need for their labor. "Let the Anglo-Saxon ask himself where he would have 
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been if these races had not come?"' The American economy needed the immigrants, 
that was why they were there. They had been exploited so that the dominant Anglo 
culture could become even more powerful and, therefore, consider itself even more 
superior to the immigrants and entitled to expect them to happily embrace the 
Anglo-American way of life, culture, and language as superior. The other well-
placed point he made is his reference to the seeds of ethnic politics, a phenomenon 
widely researched only a number of decades later. "It is not the Bohemian who sup-
ports the Bohemian schools in Chicago whose influence is sinister, but the Bohe-
mian who has made money and has got into ward politics." 0  Members of ethnic 
groups who had learned the power of money and politics were the ones who would 
have a real say, influence and power in the long run. 
The fact that various ethnic and racial groups have existed in the US side by side, 
within their cultural milieu, indicates that the US had become the "intellectual battle 
ground of the nations." 11 This means that the meaning of the American nation and 
culture would emerge out of this battle sometime in the future. He contended that 
members of the second generation will play a key role in this future, as they are 
American as much as ethnic, carrying in themselves a sense of cosmopolitanism. 
This, he argued, may contribute to a more cosmopolitan nature of the American 
people which may distinguish them from, or even elevate them above other nations. 
He understood this cosmopolitanism or transnationalism as a "new consciousness" 
which is optimistic, filled with idealism, focusing on the future and, thus, ridding 
itself of the romanticized past. It is this transnationalism which may unite the nation 
by bringing new dimensions and understandings among the people. 
The difference between generations and their attitude towards ethnic heritage 
was addressed later by Marcus Hansen, whose principle, referred to as the Hansen 
Law, has become a classic notion in the sociological literature. Presenting his thesis 
in 1938, 12 he proposed that the third generation tends to be the most successful in 
terms of mobility, economic success, and social integration. However, it is also the 
third generation that feels no sense of belonging and thus, in terms of identity, starts 
to return to the ethnic roots of the ancestry. Hansen's famous concluding remark 
goes : "what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember." 13 Through 
a series of examples he illustrated how generational differences do a great deal to 
prevent the emergence of a homogeneous American society and identity in the sense 
melting pot theorists had envisioned it. His argument, which was not void of poli-
tical overtones at times, led to the conclusion that "the epic of migration" to the US 
9 Bourne 1996, 97. 
10 Bourne 1996, 99. 
11 	Bourne 1996, 102. 
12 Marcus L. Hansen, "The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant," in Werner Sollors ed., 
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is "a simple story of how troubled men, by courage and action, overcame their diffi-
culties, and how people of different tongues and varied culture have managed to live 
together in peace.i 14 Thus, what he was really proposing is that the cultural pluralist 
model had been successfully realized in the US. Considering the era in which his 
study appeared, Hansen may actually have seen this to be the case, but not in 
absolute terms, only in comparison to other parts of the world. 
The notion of cultural pluralism gained public recognition in the 1920s. This 
decade witnessed the introduction of a series of immigration restriction laws, based 
on national origin, which resulted in a relaxing of tensions and worries over assimi-
lation and Americanization. World War I put a natural halt to mass immigration 
and encouraged the clarification of loyalties and attachments among the immigrants. 
Thus, the restriction laws were to maintain the status quo which had developed as 
a result by 1921, when the Palmer Raids were over and the first quota act was in-
troduced. Conceptualizations of various ethnicities living in peace side by side, 
united by a common set of political and human values seemed to calm the worries 
voiced by the various parties involved. Those who still doubted the possibility of this 
coexistence organized themselves individually, without government support. The 
most powerful organization in the 1920s was probably the Ku Klux Klan which had 
expanded its scope and marked Catholics as well as Jews for attack. 
Nevertheless, the population started to find ease and comfort in the ethnic and 
racial scene in the 1920s, which was also a significant period in the cultural and po-
litical movement of the Black population, which presented its incomparable talent 
during the Harlem Renaissance. Still, the era of Depression strengthened racist 
voices. World War II, however, revealed the need to improve interracial relations 
and the need for a common ground for understanding between the various groups 
in the US. During these years, "[C]ultural pluralism came into its own as a term 
designating both the actual existence of social diversity and the belief that such di-
versity was good, provided it was not accompanied by ethnocentrism, prejudice, and 
discrimination."' Cultural pluralism was understood as a guiding principle based 
on which national consensus may be achieved. The popularity of this term also 
encouraged various groups living in this supposedly pluralistic society to claim total 
equality. The Civil Rights Movement fought for the realization of the equality of 
races and ethnicities: for the political and legal framework based on which true 
equality may become a reality in every possible way. Headed by the Blacks, it be-
came a movement which brought about advantages not only to other racial and 
ethnic groups, but also to women, gays and lesbians, and other disenfranchised 
minority groups. 
14 	Hansen 1996, 215. 
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5.2 Structural Pluralism 
As of the 1950s, a new generation of social scientists also addressed the issue of 
inequality in American pluralism among the various racial and ethnic groups. They 
argued for the existence of pluralism, but also for the existence of a set of structural 
differences related to the socio-economic position of the ethnicities and their social 
standings, significantly structured and predetermined for decades. This line of think-
ing was in agreement with the claims put forth by the civil rights activists and lead-
ers, who were fighting for true social, economic, and political equality in a society 
which had not yet achieved it. Political pluralism was to be handled by Joseph 
McCarthy, whose named marked a period of efforts toward political homogeni-
zation. American society was pluralistic, but this pluralism was not always allowed 
to express itself nor was it always supported with equal treatment. 
The 1950s also marked a split between the old and the new generation of re-
searchers writing about the American nation. As of the late 1930s, it was primarily 
historians who took it as their responsibility to research immigration history and its 
impact on the American society, in light of which they drew conclusions with regard 
to the nature of the American character and nation. They wrote sagas which praised 
the immigrants and their contribution to American culture. That is, these works 
implied the completion of a classical form of melting pot theory, a process in which 
each ethnic group contributed to the American culture in the course of which the 
immigrants themselves also become Americans. However, the purpose behind these 
sagas was not to argue for one theory or another but rather to give a historical and 
thus objective account of the facts and events. 
Facts and events were equally significant to the new generation; however, they 
were sociologists who relied on findings of their own in contemporary society and 
not those of the distant past. Research focused on racial and ethnic differences, pro-
viding a new understanding of these terms, and the tension between ethnic and ra-
cial groups. This overall paradigm shift resulted in a wealth of literature discussing 
how ethnically and racially divided American society and culture was—and what this 
entailed. The groundbreaking efforts were initiated by Glazer, Moynihan, and Gor-
don. In 1960 and 1961, Glazer and Moynihan conducted extensive research on the 
cultural landscape of New York City. They found that "[E]thnicity and race domi-
nated the city, more than ever seemed possible." 16 Their work mapped various 
aspects of the life of these groups, capturing the most characteristic features as well, 
including family structure, religion, housing, community life, education, political 
participation, economic status, and occupational structure. The authors concluded 
that the various racial and ethnic groups were greatly separated and that they pri-
marily socialized within their groups, within which moderate differences in eco- 
16 	1974, ix. 
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nomic status may have occurred. These authors also maintained that "the specific 
pattern of ethnic differentiation, however, in every generation is created by specific 
events." 17 That is, the meaning of being ethnic in given ways and the implications 
it entailed were not fixed but changed under formative events, most of which were 
part of the American experience. 
There were certain features and tendencies they could observe with regard to the 
various groups. Overall, whites did better than people of color in the City. Blacks 
and Puerto Ricans had the lowest level of self-organization, weakest political voice, 
and least social and economic power, while the Jewish community had performed 
the best in these areas. The level of education, prestige of occupation, and income 
level showed the same difference. Intermingling and intermarriage were not com-
mon between the ethnicities, let alone races, nor was assimilation or upward mobi-
lity, therefore. The findings suggested that racial or ethnic background was the dom-
inant segment in identity and that this identity greatly determined one's life chances 
and success in the socio-economic structure of the city. 
In their long introduction to the second edition entitled "New York City in 
1970," they confirmed that the "long-expected and predicted decline of ethnicity, 
the fuller acculturation and the assimilation of the white ethnic groups, seems once 
again delayed."' They proposed three reasons which underlined the preservation 
of ethnic differences: (1) working-class and other occupational identities had lost 
their status and been replaced by ethnic identification; (2) calm international situa-
tion in which no home country was in danger and thus calling for support—except 
for Israel. As "involvement with and concern for the homelands decline, the sources 
of ethnic identification more and more are to be found in American experiences, in 
American soil." 19; and (3) religion also ceased to be a focus of ethnic identification. 
These points explained the actual transformation of the ethnic experience in the US 
which, in their estimation, primarily took place in the 1960s: the process in the 
course of which ethnic identification increased and was based on a series of new 
events, thus making "being ethnic" an essential feature of the American experience 
and identity. 
In order to capture the meaning and the structure of this new American identity, 
Gordon" proposed a model which consisted of five concentric circles. The self was 
in the focus, carrying the most weight, followed by national origin, meaning 
English, German, Italian, etc, religion, race, and nationality, meaning being Amer-
ican, in this order of significance. This model indicated that identification with one's 
ethnic heritage was an essential feature of Americans' self-identification, more im-
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religion. Moreover, Gordon also accepted Herberg's proposition that one's affili-
ation with ethnicity is not voluntary, but with faith it is, thus it is possible to change 
faith, but not ethnicity. 
This model captured a number of other features of the American society and 
identity. One feature was that it was not one potentially homogeneous society and 
culture but characterized by various kinds of subsocieties, each with its respective 
subculture. Ethnic groups, social classes, rural or urban residence, and regional iden-
tification comprised the four types of subsocieties in the US. Gordon saw the im-
portance of these in being part of self-identification, which, in his understanding, 
is defined as one's locating oneself in a group in order to define oneself as compared 
to others. Although he agreed with Herberg regarding ethnicity as non-voluntary 
in membership, on the theoretical level he allowed for individual choice among 
subcultures—thus, logically, also among ethnicities. He also showed that political and 
economic institutions were typically ethnically mixed, but religion, family, and in 
part education and recreation tended to be ethnically enclosed. If this was indeed the 
case, most of one's life and activities took place within ethnically closed institutional 
forms, indicating that the ethnic component continued to remain core to identity 
in the US. 
Gordon also agreed with Glazer and Moynihan in proposing that there had been 
a transformation of ethnicity and the ethnic experience. He stated that cultural 
pluralism, which he tied to the maintenance of the language, traditions, and habits 
of various ethnic groups, had been replaced by structural pluralism, meaning that 
people seemed to socialize and affiliate primarily with members of their own ethnic 
group. Another common area is the proposition that race is as significant as eth-
nicity if not more so, and the dividing lines between racial groups are more per-
manent than between ethnic communities, resulting from the fact that in the case 
of race, one must consider extrinsic, biologically determined features, considerably 
more prominent than features differentiating ethnic groups within one race. Both 
studies showed that racial differences between whites and Blacks were more accen-
tuated that marked ethnic differences within each of these races. 
Moreover, argued Gordon, ethnic background often determined one's oppor-
tunities and socio-economic success, as the strict social status structure he borrowed 
from Lloyd Warner indicated. According to this, there are six layers in American 
society, which can be characterized not only in terms of people's education, pro-
fession and income category, cultural patterns and behavior but also ethnic back-
ground. Typically, ethnic background determines one's prospects and future posi-
tion within these layers. Naturally, people from one ethnic group may occupy var-
ious socio-economic positions, or classes, as Gordon defined them, thus introducing 
the term 'ethclass' to signify people of the same ethnic origin within the same class. 
He proposed that "the ethnic group is the locus of a sense of historical identifica- 
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tion, while the ethclass is the locus of a sense of participational identification.i 21 He 
saw ethclass membership as a significant component of identity as it provided a firm 
basis for the individual while moving about, it remained with one even if one moved 
to another place to live or work. Gordon, however, hoped that orientation towards 
class may become more significant and saw the possibility of social homogenization 
through structural integration, which could be the possible first step towards full 
integration, in the course of which one's integration into class may override one's 
ethnic identification. 
Some other interesting propositions have grown out of this study. One is that 
integration into class, meaning economic integration, entails other types of assimi-
lation, including social and cultural integration. Two, Gordon also allowed for the 
understanding that ethnicity may be a matter of choice. This is understandable if one 
considers the fact that by the 1960s, some people were of such diverse ethnic back-
grounds that they were given the choice of singling out one possible ethnic heritage 
of the many as "the one" they wished to embrace. Three, if ethnicity had changed 
regarding what it entailed, Barth's proposition that ethnicity should be examined 
with primacy given to the ethnic boundary and focus not so much on the cultural 
features it encloses should be considered. This, along with Glazer and Moynihan's 
conclusion regarding the nature of ethnicity which had been transformed and 
become part of the American experience and Americanness, as well as the ways in 
which it had begun to filter into politics, made everyone realize that the American 
nation was to remain an ethnically heterogeneous community, and the way bound-
aries between these groups would change would be determinant for the future. 
Thus, as Gordon proposes: "Ethnic communality will not disappear in the fore-
seeable future and its legitimacy and rationale should be recognized and respect-
ed." 22 
It has also become apparent from these works that the new understanding of 
ethnicity was also tied to a new pluralism, in a country where race and ethnicity 
came to be referred to as forms of minority status, and parallel with this shift, the 
role and impact of ethnicity and race had also changed. These concepts and groups 
had become players in the political and economic spheres, had become involved in 
power struggles through fights for various rights, and had formed alliances in order 
to move towards the center from the peripheries, which often carried in this def-
inition prejudice, labeling, marginality, and the question of passing. The direction 
which social movements and the discourse on them had taken, show an essential 
transformation in which minority status and ethnicity, but especially race, had been 
transformed into a matter of existence, potential, changes, and fulfillments. This had 
become a driving force and informing agent in the operation of the fragmented self, 
its invention, and politicization. 
21 	Gordon 1964, 53. 
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6. One and Many: 
New Understandings of Social Standings 
The 1970s witnessed an increasing interest in ethnic heritage, which was re-
flected in ethnicity being a central theme for researchers. Although the Civil Rights 
Movement was over, the emerging voices of various minorities—and among them 
of ethnic and racial groups—continued to increase gradually. The American nation 
could not have been further away from unity; people were highly divided on the 
basis of their convictions, political beliefs, and moral standings. They were all in the 
aftermath of the 1960s, in a period which was still filled with public debate. Amer-
icans no longer seemed to share even in the old American values and beliefs, espe-
cially after the highly demoralizing Watergate scandal. People needed new affir-
mations of their place in the world, and a return to their ethnic or racial heritage 
seemed to assist them in their striving for a sense of belonging. 
New understandings of the American nation and identity had to be aware of the 
existence of plurality in society and the increasing power various groups started to 
gain. The possibility for this cultural diversity to exist in the American culture was 
explained by Lawrence Fuchs 1 in his analysis of the American nation and political 
culture. In this assessment, he made use of Almond and Vebla's term, civic culture,' 
in arguing that American culture was originally built on three: principles, also basic 
to republicanism: (1) people can govern themselves through their elected repre-
sentatives, who are accountable to their constituents; (2) everyone is equally eligible 
to participate in public life; and (3) all good citizens are free to differ in various 
areas of their private lives. 
This last principle provided the basis for voluntary pluralism, which allowed for 
a large-scale intellectual and cultural diversity within the American nation—including 
diversity in ethnic cultures as well. This new invention of Americans—voluntary 
pluralism—in which individuals were free to express their ancestral affections and 
sensibilities, to choose to be ethnic, however and whenever they wished or not at 
all by moving across group boundaries easily, was sanctioned and protected by a 
1 Lawrence Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope. Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture (Hanover: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1995). 
2 	This term was first used in 1965 to describe the American political culture in which "there is a 
substantial consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions and the direction and content of public 
policy, a widespread tolerance of a plurality of interests and beliefs in their reconcilability, and a widely 
distributed sense of political competence and mutual trust in the citizenry." Fuchs 1995, 5. 
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unifying civic culture based on the American founding myth, its institutions, heroes, 
rules, and rhetoric.' 
The concept of civic culture not only called for the toleration of ethnic or cultural 
diversity, but also encouraged it, thus making this type of social understanding the 
essential socio-political organizing principle, distinctly characteristic for the Amer-
ican people only. This allowance for diversity resulted in the emergence of new 
ethnicity, which soon led to other emerging concepts, such as multiculturalism, 
symbolic and invented ethnicity, identity politics, and the politics of difference. 
0.1 New Ethnicity and Multiculturalism 
The 1970s witnessed an increasing ethnic revival in US society, which was also 
reflected in a renewed interest in ethnicity and identity among social scientists yet 
again. It became obvious that ethnicity had remained key to the American expe-
rience and had persisted, although in a transformed form. The whole ethnic ex-
perience seemed to appear in new areas, taking new shapes and having new, un-
precedented social and political impacts. This social scientific trend became asso-
ciated with the phrase "new ethnicity," and with Novak's book, The Rise of the Un-
meltable Ethnics as "the major manifesto of the movement.i 4 
In this book Novak presented his findings regarding the ethnic landscape and 
situation in the post-Civil Rights Movement period in some of the biggest American 
cities, such as New York, Chicago, and Baltimore. He claimed that it was the "era 
of ethnic groups" and of a religious boom, the latter closely linked to the former. 
His conclusion was the result of the major concerns he experienced on the side of 
the ethnic population in these cities regarding their self-definition and their per-
ception of their life chances. The most prominent issue preoccupying ethnic Amer-
icans was to find out how to become an American, that is, a full member of society. 
The question, thus, presupposes that the ethnic minorities in the early 1970s did 
not view themselves as proper Americans, that is, in a number of ways they felt 
excluded from the mainstream American culture and milieu, such as in 
opportunities for economic advancement and thus social upward mobility. At the 
same time, it also assumes that these minorities wanted to become Americans, and 
were still in the process of defining what it meant to be an American in practical 
terms and how someone should become one. Considering that Novak's primarily 
target population consisted of third generation immigrants, it must also be noted 
that this problematization also displayed a set of underlying social problems: (1) the 
commonly shared experience and sense that the assimilation process had not been 
3 	Fuchs 1995, 5. 
4 Gleason 1980, 54. 
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taking place; (2) the ethnic and racial minorities were dissatisfied with the realiza-
tion of the concept of cultural pluralism—the main principle guiding domestic policy 
and treatment of ethnicities—since many interpreted it as a policy which stigmatized 
them and presented an obstacle to the actualization of their natural drive to be con-
sidered "just" Americans; and (3) the ethnicities were not in dialogue with policy-
makers regarding their wants, but were subject to theoretical models and policies 
constructed and supported over their heads by outsiders in the power structure. 
Novak, as part of mapping the various ethnic groups, also proposed to classify 
them along shared features, with religion occupying a prominent place among them. 
He contended that being an American equals in fact being a WASP, a White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant. Consequently, any process of assimilation is identical with WASP-
ification, an ideological transformation of any American subject into a WASP. He 
captured this in the following words: "[M] ore like a religion than like a nation, 
America required conversion of the soul."' The first and foremost element of this 
conversion was the acquisition of "the solitariness of Protestant consciousness" 
along with its implications, especially the loneliness of the individual. 
However, a further look at the term is also telling. The second element of WASP 
expresses an ethnic category, which is preceded by a racial category: white. The ad-
dition of this racial category is significant in the American context, as Anglo-Saxons 
were white, and thus the need to explicitly denote their race became key in this 
racially diverse country, where race was a signifier of socio-economic, political, and 
historical standings. Granted that Novak is right in his assessment, the US of the 
1970s must be regarded as a racially differentiated state in which race was still a 
concept—to which exclusionary practices were related—applied to position people in 
an unequal manner. 
As for European white ethnic groups, the old immigrants who arrived from 
Northern and Western countries, were able to live up to the WASP cultural stereo-
type and thus by the 1970s become a part of the core power structure. This was the 
reasoning given to explain why Novak claimed that the American scene had not 
served as a place for the melting of all nations into one—it melted only the old im-
migrants into the center of power, the result of which was captured in his claim of 
the US being "the Nordic jungle". 6 Unlike the old Northern European immigrants 
arriving at the American shores up to the mid-1850s, the new immigrants landing 
after them, and their descendants from Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe had 
remained distinct throughout the years, comprising the group of PIGS, a highly 
derogatory and as such exclusionary acronym made up of the words Poles, Italians, 
Greeks and Slays, referring to the country of origin of these new ethnic arrivals. 
5 Novak 1972, 92. 
6 Novak 1972, 72. The fact that in early British history there had already been a mixture of Nordic 
and Anglo-Saxon peoples, supported this reasoning further. 
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Novak concluded that the existence of various PIGS communities indicated that 
these groups had not assimilated into American society. As he phrased it, "Old 
America taught them `ethnic'," that is, positioned them to be inferior, and marked 
them as the reason for unsuccessful assimilation. And, as Novak said, "the eyes of 
others are mirrors in which we learn our own identity," 7 so these groups had come 
to believe in their own inferiority and to feel guilty for being different, for not 
having been able to do the right thing: to WASPify. Based on his observations, No-
vak concluded that the US was not and had never been democratic as it had failed 
to provide equality and to respect the rights of all its people. He claimed that these 
were slogans from the perspective of WASPs and served the purpose of the rein-
forcement of their culture and power. 
Novak contended that, besides WASP supremacy, the US was also characterized 
by modern industrialism and its values of individualism, competition, rationalism, 
and the pursuit of financial success. All of those who had not been given the option 
of embracing these values, failed to assimilate—that is, all the PIGS and Blacks. 
Therefore, claimed Novak, the renewal of ethnicity for these groups was inevitable, 
as it was this sense of ethnic belonging that was able to integrate the experiences of 
these social groups with their sense of reality in the US. The ethnic experience was 
the primary factor that framed one's identity, and thus ethnic groups remained not 
only unmeltable but gained a renewed impetus for action and overall acknow-
ledgement. Ethnicity came to be the only modality of agency for the members of 
these collectives. 
This ethnicity, however, was new in that the meaning of ethnicity, the manner 
of its constitution and negotiation as well as its inherent potential for empowerment 
had changed. This new ethnicity did not denote a revival but a new phenomenon, 
which was built on the past without bringing it back. This new manner of thinking 
embedded in various intellectual currents resulted in the emergence of a great num-
ber of concepts, including multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism on the one hand, 
and invented ethnicity and identity politics on the other. Moreover, the appearance 
of these concepts and the phenomena they had grown out of also put an end to the 
popular use of the notion of the melting pot: as of the 1970s, no one has really 
considered the melting pot theory and assimilationist approaches appropriate to cap-
ture US social realities. 
In the last three decades of the 20` 1 century, Americans were preoccupied with 
the proper understanding and expression of the multitude of social differences, be 
they ethnic, racial, gender-, class- or age-based, among others. Discourses of iden-
tity, difference, otherness, colonization, and power have transformed the debate by 
making it more sophisticated and considerate, as well as less prescriptive, univer-
salist, and absolutist. Claims and statements have softened into propositions and 
Novak 1972, 49. After Hegel. 
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suggestions, in the spirit of understanding the extremely complex nature of identity, 
both on the level of the individuals and collectives. In this intellectual milieu, how-
ever, it was never claimed that the American people were one in the ethnic or racial 
sense of the word, as proposed earlier by the frontier hypothesis or the melting pot 
theory, but understandings of pluralism underlined the various debates regarding 
other bases of unity among the people residing in the US. 
This firm belief in pluralism was channeled through new histories, such as Ber-
nard A. Weisberger's Many People,.One Nation from 1970 or Leonard Dinnerstein, 
Roger L. Nichols and David M. Reimers's Natives and Strangers from 1979. These 
works emphasized how immigrants of non-Anglo-Saxon origin "also contributed 
ideas, talents, and especially labor to the building of America into the nation she has 
become."' Researchers also started to consider the interaction between the im-
migrants and their descendants as well as the American host society, culture, and 
economy. As a result, social scientific research started capturing immigration and 
the ethnic experience as a two-way process. 9 
These new understandings of plurality resulted in further pursuits of its forms 
and meanings. Fuchs proposed that the Americans of European descent had been 
embracing the notion of civic culture and voluntary pluralism with regard to their 
ethnic heritage. However, he also maintained that throughout US history, there had 
been three other types of pluralism regarding the relationship between non-white 
minorities and the Euro-American 10 host society, often determined by the latter, 
thus being three types of coercive pluralism: (1) tribal or predatory pluralism, which 
characterized the relationship between Euro-Americans and Native Americans, in 
which boundaries between the two groups were clearly marked and reiterated; (2) 
caste pluralism, featuring the relationship between whites and blacks, first in the 
form of slavery and then that of segregation, resulting in irreconcilable differences 
and predetermined socio-economic positions; and (3) sojourner pluralism, "a sys-
tem designed by Euro-Americans for immigrants regarded as temporary residents, 
...applied principally to two groups of non-European immigrants," 11 the Asians 
and Mexicans. He saw sojourner pluralism as the least restrictive of the three, 
allowing the children of immigrants to enter the civic society more readily than 
those of Blacks or Native Americans. He proposed that these forms of pluralism 
were abandoned by the 1980s, as by then civic society had truly come about in the 
Dinnerstein et al. 1979, vii. 
9 See, for example, Colin Greer ed., Divided Society. The Ethnic Experience in America (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974) or Nathan Glazer ed., Clamor at the Gates. The Netv American Immigration (San Fran-
cisco: ICS Press, 1985). 
50 	He focused on differences along racial lines, thus implying that various racial groups were rather 
homogeneous. 
11 	Fuchs 1995, 78. 
8 
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US, having gotten rid of its racially exclusive nature—a claim many scholars would 
not agree with. 
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new concept growing out of the notion 
of new ethnicity: multiculturalism. Kymlicka defined it as "minority groups de-
manding recognition of their identity, and accommodation of their cultural dif-
ferences."' Moreover, Kymlicka proposed that in the US multiculturalism had 
been used not only to equalize ethnic and racial groups, but also to "encompass a 
wide range of non-ethnic social groups which have, for various reasons, been ex-
cluded or marginalized from the mainstream of society ... such as the disabled, gays 
and lesbians, women, the working class, atheists, and Communists." 13 These groups 
fought in the political arena for recognition and for a halt to in-group discrimina-
tion. They were hoping to institutionalize pluralism, which would have meant 
mainstreaming the acceptance of diversity and difference. 
David Hollinger i4 distinguished between two prominent elements in American 
multiculturalism: pluralism and cosmopolitanism. The pluralist element built a-
round Kallen's model of cultural pluralism, which called for an unproblematic, 
peaceful coexistence of various groups in society—without actually affecting each 
other's life trajectory the way melting-pot theorists envisioned coexistence. Cultural 
pluralism was also limited in that it focused strictly on cultural and social distinc-
tions and disregarded other significant factors, such as the economy, which played 
a key role in the positioning of ethnic groups. It also predetermined group mem-
bership, fixing it onto "biological' and "historical' facts, thus fostering an essen-
tialist approach to difference. 
Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, argued for voluntary group associations, 
as opposed to prescribed traditional group membership and thus promoted indivi-
dual choice and conceptualized individual identity as an intersection of multiple 
identities. As such, it also allowed for the notion of flexibility, both in individuals 
and groups, thus enabling and entitling the individual to choose from among var-
ious identities as well as to change them, as no absolute social locations were ac-
cepted as binding with regard to identity. Cosmopolitanism also advocated tolerance 
and openness in embracing other, newly formed cultural communities within the 
American domain. IS 
12 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 10. 
13 	Kymlicka 1995, 14. 
15 	Barát observed that these two elements, in fact, resulted in the major requirement of the "cul- 
tivated citizen"—a term introduced by Ben Robinson—in US society, namely that s/he not "see" the parti-
cular historical conditions that make it possible for him/her to perceive pluralism as a matter of individual 
agentive choice and that of an apparently decentered and fragmented subject. Both in fact are the ideo-
logical precondition for a social subject who is better equipped for a heightened alienation of late ca-
pitalism's globalized divisions of labor. 
14 David A. Hollinger, PostethnicAmerica. BeyondMulticulturalism (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
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Identity and identity politics were key to multicultural efforts. Renewed debates 
on the notion of identity, its constitution, meanings, operation, and manners of af-
firmation became the center of scholarly debates and research projects. A number 
of fields and subdisciplines emerged and gained recognition—such as cultural studies, 
women studies, and ethnic studies—which pursued these issues within specific con-
texts. In the course of their research, criticism of multiculturalism also began to take 
shape. As of the 1990s, various voices critical of the dubious nature of multicul-
turalism started to be heard, dissatisfied groups and individuals made their concerns 
public, and the scholars started to specify the shortcomings of multiculturalism as 
well as to search for new approaches, better equipped to reveal underlying problems 
and to provide solutions for them. 
Hollinger 'summarized the major points of the evolving criticism of multicul-
turalism. He proposed that multiculturalism provided a concept within which group 
struggles could be explained, justified, organized, and carried out—that is, it was a 
frame of reference as well as a frame for the constitution of meaning. The integrity 
of the various groups derived "not from culture but from a history of political and 
economic victimization based on bad biology." 16 If this was indeed the case, despite 
the multiculturalist claims to moving away from centralization and to an embracing 
of diversity, it did suppose homogeneity within the various groups, along with 
shared goals, inspirations, and a unified manner of action. Therefore, ultimately, the 
inflexibility which had characterized the mainstream culture which they hoped to 
reform, re-emerged in the ideology of multiculturalism. 
Mainstream American society and culture, however, was in need of new concep-
tualizations in order to cope in a constructive manner with the increasing number 
of issues bound to race and ethnicity, including various claims regarding the ever-
growing mixed-race population.' Hollinger noted that by the late 1980s, "diversity 
has become too diversified" 18 to be handled by multiculturalism. This, along with 
the increasing frustration and subsequent criticism of cosmopolitanists who claimed 
that "[T]he cult of particularity and difference hinders the development of any large, 
liberating vision that encompasses the stranger," 19 marked the beginning of the fall 
of multiculturalism in its original form. 
As a possible new model, Hollinger put forth his postethnic perspective. This is 
a perspective which did not deny the significance of ethnic or other group affilia-
tions, but instead of seeing identity as something biologically or historically given, 
he considered it as affiliations based on a matter of choice. Hollinger envisioned an 
inclusive mode of thinking, in which affiliations were not prescribed and particu-
larized, but freely chosen, with no classifications which would call for value judg- 
Hollinger 2000, 8. 
Also discussed at length by Kymlicka, 1995. 
Hollinger 2000, 12. 






ments. It was this consent-based respect for affiliations and difference of choices 
which he saw as the possible driving force to unite peoples within the United States. 
As he summed it up, his concept of postethnicity "prefers voluntary to prescribed 
affiliations, appreciates multiple identities, pushes for communities of wide scope, 
recognizes the constructed character of ethno-racial groups, and accepts the forma-
tion of new groups as a part of the normal life of a democratic society."' 
Hollinger's work is, however, a proposition and a theorization, not a model 
actually put in practice. Hollinger seemed to have drawn on some aspects of multi-
culturalism, but his theory approached social life from the perspective of ethnic and 
racial groups only and thus was concerned with a set of problems from that specific 
position. As the name `postethnic' indicates, he envisioned a society the members 
of which had gone beyond concepts like ethnic identity and ethnic hierarchy within 
the American society, and through the act of leaving these behind, they also decen-
tralized them. This model presupposed a utopian state, a uniform development of 
the Americans towards a fairer social system, in a highly prescriptive manner. He 
had nothing to say about the particular social conditions of enacting such consensus, 
leaving agency to be a mere promise and a matter of belief. Hollinger's emphasized 
voluntarism was also challenged by Miri Song who observed that Hollinger's model 
also disregards the fact that "the issue of affiliating with a particular group is 
unlikely to be determined by an individual's desires and choices alone." 21 It is rather 
a matter of intersubjective negotiations whose outcome, i.e., the emerging identity, 
is open to the contestation of the participants. 
6.2 Invented Ethnicity and Identity Politics 
In the second part of the 1980s new ethnicity and multiculturalism gave way to 
the emergence of another line of thinking, claiming that new ethnicity was highly 
symbolic, an invented construct, and represented a key force in new types of po-
litics: identity politics and the politics of difference. These notions were first intro-
duced in the American context by Herbert Gans in his study on symbolic ethnicity 
in 1979. 22 In this Gans, in line with suppositions regarding the emergence of new 
ethnicity in the US, ventured forth to map its constitution, content, purpose, and 
manners of operation. Despite his critical discussion of straight-line assimilationist 
theory, he envisioned new ethnicity as a possible new stage within the processes of 
acculturation and assimilation, and explained this phenomenon with two possible 
20 	Hollinger 2000, 116. 
21 	Miri Song, Choosing Ethnic Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 42. 
22 	Herbert J. Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity. The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," 
in Werner Sollors ed., Theories of Ethnicity. A Classical Reader (London: Macmillan, 1996), 425-59. 
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reasons, "neither of which conflicts with straight line theory: (1) today's ethnics 
have become more visible as a result of upward mobility; and (2) they are adopting 
a new form of ethnic behavior and affiliation I call `symbolic ethnicity'."" 
His argumentation had grown out of Hansen's law which states that the third 
generation wishes to remember its ethnicity and heritage. Regarding new ethnicity 
as a phenomenon which is bound to third and fourth generation immigrants, Gans 
concluded that these generations had reached upward social and economic mobility, 
which is a significant step in assimilation. As a result, "people are less and less in-
terested in their ethnic cultures and organizations... and are instead more concerned 
with maintaining their ethnic identity, ...with finding ways of feeling and expressing 
that identity in suitable ways."24 The third generation ethnics were no more in need 
of ethnic organizations to assist them in their daily lives as they felt part of the 
American system, but still felt the need to remain ethnic and to express this in new 
ways—which were symbolic, and were characterized by a sense of nostalgia, alliance 
with the other members of the ethnic community, love for and pride in their old 
culture, tradition, etc. It was an affiliation which was primarily rooted not in the 
necessity for mere survival but rather satisfied an emotional need. These symbols 
had to be clear, visible, understandable, and highly simplified in meaning. 
New aspects related to this symbolic ethnicity included, according to Gans, 
choice and political participation. Gans contended that ethnicity by the 1970s was 
not firmly embedded in the third-generation ethnic individual, but could change and 
disappear. Also, third-generation ethnics were often of mixed ethnic background or 
one of the parents' ethnicity was not adequately passed over and thus they could 
choose which ethnic background they wished to embrace. Choice was also informed 
by stereotypes and the opinion of the larger society of the given ethnic group. Gans 
also observed that symbolic ethnicity "also takes political forms, through identifi-
cation or involvement with national politicians and international issues which are 
sufficiently remote to become symbols." 25 Thus, symbolic ethnicity is also a possible 
line along which ethnics may be organized for political purposes. As he himself 
noted, even "pan-ethnic coalitions" developed at various times, signifying how eth-
nicity may also provide the basis for various political activities or agency. 
One significant point of departure from this study leads in the direction of view-
ing the emergence of new and symbolic ethnicity not as a step of a natural conti-
nuum towards a possible assimilation—which is regarded as impossible even by Gans 
himself in his epilogue to the 1995 edition of his study—but in the direction of 
conceptualizing ethnicity as a form of invention. 26 Joanne Nagel elaborated on the 
23 Gans 1996, 430. 
24 Gans 1996, 434. 
25 	Gans 1996, 437. 
26 He says: "The notion that ethnicity would someday end in a totally melted American pot is not 
considered possible by anyone in the last decade of the twentieth century." Gans 1996, 454. 
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notion of the "political construction of ethnicity" which, on the one hand, binds 
categories of ethnicity to politics and political struggles, thus establishing a discourse 
in which at least in part this biological category is artificially created. 27  Sollors ar-
gued further and claimed that ethnicity as a whole is an invention, with ethnic cate-
gories being the formal framework, the semantic fields of which are filled in accor-
dance with the changing political contexts and socio-economic positions. This in-
vention and reinvention of practices and their meanings indicate how ethnic groups 
and other social formations are constructed, always in the making. As Hall conclud-
ed, they are also "subject to the continuous play of history, culture and power.i 28 
If identities are invented, the baggage of essentialist categories which had tended 
to bind identities to biological or historical factors, must also be discarded, especially 
in the light of the fact, that contemporary readings of history and the past also 
claimed that history is a narrative, also cultural construction, a form of power which 
enhances further power, as proposed by George Bond and Angela Gilliam, 29 among 
others. In this manner of thinking, therefore, it can be argued that one's ethnicity 
and ethnic identification are not given factors but are matters of personal choice, 
based on individual goals and interests. If this is indeed the case, the factors framing 
the selection of identity and the dynamism of the construction and affirmation of 
identities should be investigated, as proposed by Miri Song. 30 
Song found that internal as well as external factors figure significantly into one's 
ethnic identification and representation. She claimed that the selection, negotiation, 
and affirmation of ethnic identities are much more viable within given racial cate-
gories than between races. 31 With regard to racial categories, she claimed that the 
color line still existed in the US, Afro-Americans being at the bottom of the racial 
hierarchy and whites at the top. As a consequence, multiracial people seemed to 
have the most problems as, based on the one drop of blood principle, racial choice 
was not really available to them, and they belonged to no single race. She contended 
that multiracial people were often marginalized by monoraces, which resulted in the 
appearance of multiracial pan-ethnicity in the 1990s. 
27 Joanne Nagel, "The political construction of ethnicity," in Susan Olzak and Joanne Nagel eds., 
Competitive Ethnic Relations (New York: Academic Press, 1986), 93-112. 
28 	Stuart Hall, "Cultural identity and diaspora," in Jonathan Rutherford ed., Identity, Community, 
Cultural Difference (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 222-37, 225. 
29 George C. Bond and Angela Gilliam eds., Social Construction of the Past. Representation as Power 
(New York: Routledge, 1994), 1. 
30 	2003. 
31 	This is significant as it undermines the general American tendency to theorize about issues and 
to address problems along racial lines, which presupposes a relatively high racial homogeneity when, in 
fact, this was not the case, according to Song. Moreover, educational and class-related differences added 
further to the complicated nature of various issues. 
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Multiracial pan-ethnicity had developed out of the shared experiences and con-
cerns as well as drives of people with multiracial background. Cynthia Nakashima' 
suggested that these desires were threefold: (1) to gain acceptance and legitimacy 
within traditional racial and ethnic groups; (2) to shape the identity and agenda of 
various mixed-race people into a common multiracial community; and (3) to es-
tablish connections in order to bridge differences between various ethnic and racial 
groups in order to form "a community of humanityi 33 and with that, initiate a new 
dialogue, leading to the dismantling of traditional dominant ideologies and their 
positioning of racial and ethnic groups. 
The idea of choosing identities and the existence of mixed race communities 
were also explained in terms of `passing,' a phenomenon which occupied some of 
the more recent scholarship. Linda Schlossberg, for example, maintained that 
"[T]heories of identity and subject formation in the Western culture are largely 
structured around the logic ofvisibility... [where] passing becomes a highly charged 
site for anxieties regarding visibility, invisibility, classification and social demarca-
tion." Various aspects of passing as something or somebody else, thus doing away 
with some undesired feature, which may as well be rooted in ethnic or racial dif-
ferentiation, call attention to the significance of the visible, the body and its opera-
tion as a signifier for a number of socially constructed categories, thus being used 
as a constraining locality as well as an enabling agency in social interaction. 
Gans also proposed that symbolic ethnicity takes political forms, a view that is 
supported by a number of other scholars, including Hall, Nagel, Nakashima, and 
Song. This is connected to the notions of identity politics and the politics of dif-
ference, both appearing in the 1980s and tied to postmodernism and its concep-
tualization of the self and identity as fragmented. Identity politics "is used to refer 
to a commitment to one of the new social movements which emphasizes one ele-
ment in the construction of our identity: gender, sexual orientation, `race', ethnicity, 
or nation.i 3S Hall saw identity politics as part of a "counter-hegemonic war of ma-
neuveri3ó which is aimed at repositioning various marginalized groups. Thus, iden-
tity politics opened up the platform for the self-organization and political struggle 
of various groups who felt they had been disenfranchised, treated as the "Other," 
and wished to leave their assigned positions on the margins. Therefore, the con-
struction or invention of identities, which in postmodern thinking are the outcome 
of an endless series of context-bound imaginary activities—thus always in the making, 
32 	Cynthia Nakashima, "Voices from the movement. Approaches to multiraciality," in M. Root ed., 
The Multiracial Experience (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 79-100. 
33 Nakashima 1996, 81. 
34 Maria Carla Sanches and Linda Schlossberg eds., Passing. Identity and Interpretation in Sexuality, 
Race, and Religion (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 1. 
35 Sarup 1996, 52. 
36 	Chris Rojek, Stuart Hall (Cambridge: Policy Press, 2003), 178. 
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with the possibility of negotiating and changing—may be in line with particular aims 
a given group wanted to achieve in the political realm. As Hall proposed, with new 
ethnicity, the struggle was located in the realm of the politics of representation. 
The logical next step, the acknowledgement of the fact that societies are not ho-
mogeneous entities but are characterized by an "extraordinary diversity of subjective 
positions, social experiences and cultural identities» 37 had led to the construction of 
"politics which works with and through difference, a politics which does not sup-
press the real heterogeneity of interests and identities." 38 One of the main advocates 
of the politics of difference in the US, Iris Young, located the beginning of this type 
of politics in the 1980s, considering it the result of the fact that as of the early 
1970s, various marginalized groups came out in public and asserted their difference 
as a positive experience. One impact this had had was the dominant culture's recog-
nition of its own specificity, that is, the American dominant society's self-definition. 
Interestingly, she captured this specificity not as WASP or Euro-American any 
more, but "as Anglo, European, Christian, masculine, straight." 39 
She argued that the dominant group, through the assertion of positive difference 
by marked groups, was forced to construct values based on which these positive 
experiences could seem deviant, as a result of which exclusion and dominance may 
be practiced, as opposed to understanding, toleration, and appreciation of differ-
ence. In light of this, it can be seen why the politics of difference may also be tied 
to the phenomenon of political correctness, which also aims at discontinuing racist, 
sexist, homophobic, ageist, and other patterns and practices of oppression. Young 
also claimed that the politics of difference was a way to achieve group liberation and 
emancipation. Based on her argumentation, the US can be conceptualized as a so-
ciety of heterogeneous culture, constituted by a variety of groups which are on their 
way to gaining equal recognition and rights—and this is the essence of marked A-
mericanness that Americans may embrace as a common denominator in their com-
mon identity. 
0.3 The Color of Whiteness 
Various social models of American identity and the development of the nation 
considered various European ethnicities as constitutive forces and potential com-
ponents of the newly emerging nation. As has become clear from the previous chap-
ters, up to the 1960s theorists generally disregarded other groups, such as Blacks, 
3' 	Sarup 1996, 61. 
38 	Sarup 1996, 61. 
39 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 166. 
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Native Americans and Asians, in modeling the American nation. 4°  The impact of 
the Civil Rights Movement, which gave voice not only to Black dissatisfaction, but 
to that of all other disenfranchised groups, including Native Americans, women, 
and gays, left its mark on social science as well. As was revealed in the pioneering 
work of Gordon as well as of Glazer and Moynihan, Blacks appeared as a significant 
group in studies of the American social landscape, but Asians and Native Americans 
remained untouched in these studies. 41 This may be explained by their minimal pres-
ence in cities, which was the primary focus of sociological investigation since the 
early 1900s, or by their relatively low number within the American nation, but the 
main reason was that their public voice and representation remained quite marginal. 
Asians have gained more visibility since the 1970s, as the ban on their immigration 
was lifted in the mid-1960s, and they have proved themselves quite willing and able 
to embrace mainstream American values and lifestyles. In fact, by the 1980s Kore-
ans in the US came to be regarded as the single most successful immigrant group 
in terms of their assimilation, upward mobility, level of education, income, and o-
verall achievement. Hispanics were likewise ignored in discussions of American i-
dentity; having immigrated as of the mid-1930s, they only began to gain recogni-
tion in the public and political realms through their efforts in the general upheaval 
of the Civil Rights Movement. 
The groups discussed here as not having been integrated into theorizations on 
the American nation and identity are those which are currently considered non-
white racial groups.42 The phase non -white racialgroup draws attention to an implicit 
Othering of the white race as well as to American understandings of the words white 
and race. The fact that these understandings have changed was already indicated in 
propositions by former theorists, such as Turner, who wrote about the Jewish race 
as well as Italians, Poles, and Slovaks melting into one nation on the frontier, and 
Zangwill, who envisioned that the superior American nation would emerge out of 
40 According to the 2000 US Census, 75.1% of the total US population is White, 12.3% Black, 
0.9% American Indian, 3.6% Asian, 0.1% Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, 5.5% some other 
race, and 2.4% two or more races. 
41 	For contemporary Hungarian studies discussing conceptualizations of race in the US see, for 
example, Eva Federmayer, "Black Woman and the Reconstruction of the Black Family. Jessie Fauset's 
There Is Confusion," Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies 1 (1996) : 93-102; Tibor Frank, 
"`Race as Value. Social Darwinism and U.S. Immigration," in Tibor Frank ed., Values in American Society 
(Budapest: Eötvös Loránd University, 1995), 125-148; Ildikó Hortobágyi, "The Hyphenated Ameri-
can," in Tibor Frank ed., Values in American Society (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd University, 1995), 149—v 
158; and András Tarnócz, "Political Correctness and Multiculturalism," in Tibor Frank ed., Values inA-
merican Society (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd University, 1995), 159-174. 
42 	Since 2000, the minimum categories for race introduced in the US Census have been: (1) Ameri- 
can Indian or Alaska Native; (2) Asian; (3) Black or African American; (4) Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander; (5) White; (6) Some Other Race; (7) Two or more races. It also lists (1) Hispanic or 
Latino and (2) Not Hispanic or Latino as the minimum two ethnic categories, indicating that Hispanics 
may be of any race. 
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the various races, such as Jews, Russians, Hungarians, and Italians. All of these are 
groups which today are considered white ethnicities, but in fact, were viewed in ra-
cial terms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The study of race, that is, of humankind, and the classification of peoples reaches 
back to ancient times. Both Greeks and Romans developed their theories of racial 
superiority which served to explain as well as to justify their power over other peo-
ples in terms of nature. These early theories often focused on differences in physical 
appearance and in character. For example, in his "Politica", Aristotle explained these 
differences by climate, especially the impact of heat and cold on the human body, 
thus being among the first theorists to argue for the centrality of the environment 
in shaping the human body and character. 43 Christianity defined these differences 
in religious terms and offered explanations based on the Bible. 44  Both religious and 
environmentalist argumentations stressed the natural and inevitable quality of these 
differences. But tribal cultures were also captivated by the differences between var-
ious peoples in racial terms. Thomas Gossett, for example, discussed a North Ameri-
can Native legend according to which God created people as if baking bread. He 
baked the first man too long and thus it became a Black person, He took out the 
second too soon and thus created the white man, but finally He mastered His tech-
nique and "was able to produce the properly golden brown Indian." 45 
The relationship between white settlers on the one hand and the Natives and 
Blacks on the other was one of forced separation from early colonial times on. 
Cotton Mather, for instance, viewed the Natives as "devil's minions, damned from 
birth by God and incapable of redemption," thus confirming the belief a century 
later that "at best the Indians were an inferior breed of men and at worst no more 
than savage beasts.' The anti-Indian sentiment and the perceived need to segregate 
the Natives in the colonies found expression, for example, in the Proclamation of 
1763, which physically separated British America and the Indian Country just west 
of the Appalachian Mountains. Later, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 forced the 
removal of Native tribes to the Indian Territory in Oklahoma and reservations else-
where. This was modified by the Dawes Act of 1887, which instituted allotment 
programs, meaning the dissolution of reservation land into small farms of 160 acres 
per Native family. In the mid-1800s, a series of Supreme Court rulings concluded 
that an Indian tribe was a "domestic dependent nation," and it was as recently as 
1924 that Natives born in the US were granted full American citizenship. The pol-
icy of allotment was repealed only in 1934, as a result of the Indian Reorganization 
43 Discussed in Thomas F. Gossett, Race. The History of an Idea in America (New York: Schocken, 
1971), 17. 
44 The legitimation of enslavement was interpreted, for example, by arguing that Blacks are marked 
the way Cain was after God's curse on him (Moses 1, 4:9-14). 
45 Gossett 1971, 7. 
46 	Gossett 1971, 229. 
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Act, which re-established the unity of tribal lands — that is, it continued the physical 
and communal separation ofNatives who wished to live on tribal land. This was one 
significant aspect of the Indian New Deal which attempted to improve overall con-
ditions on reservations. However, newer programs in the early 1950s initiated the 
termination of tribal lands and the relocation of Natives into urban centers, leading 
to the Red Power and American Indian Movements of the 1960s. These struggles 
culminated in the confirmation of the powers of tribal councils and the maintenance 
of tribal lands, granted in the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, which is still 
in effect. Further acts passed later in the 1970s acknowledged tribal pluralism and 
attempted to express respect for the cultural integrity of the Natives by guaranteeing 
them equal rights in terms of welfare, health care, and religious freedom. 
As for the Black population, forced separation from the rest of society was in-
troduced by the institution of slavery. This economic institution was typically jus-
tified either by religious explanation or by theories of natural inferiority. Thomas 
Jefferson, for example, elaborated on how nature positioned Blacks with a lower 
status in his Notes on the State of Virginia, expressing his view that "Negroes" are aes-
thetically, mentally, and morally inferior to whites. Similarly to George Washington 
and James Madison, he could not envision the two races living together in peace as 
equals, and in an 1808 speech in Congress he saw the future solution to the racial 
problem "in the colonization of Blacks in Africa or in some other far place." 47 This 
color-cast social system in the South, which stressed a rigid socio-economic division 
along the color line, ended legally between 1865-69, with the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
Amendments. However, it was actually replaced by a series of Jim Crow laws se-
curing separate status of and discrimination against the Black population, which be-
came the norm through the introduction of the separate-but-equal principle as a 
result of the Supreme Court ruling in the Plessy vs. Ferguson case in 1896. Parallel to 
this, the ideas of social Darwinism and eugenics began to flourish, and by 1900 it 
was widely accepted that both character traits and level of intelligence tend to be 
inherited and differ along racial lines. The medical profession also provided evidence 
through a series of biological findings for the differences between the races as well 
as the genders, contributing to yet another set of non-debatable arguments in sup-
port of maintaining racial differences, and thus social distinctions and barriers. 
An increasing number of Blacks, however, started to voice their concerns and 
disagreement, initiating a fight for Black rights, under the leadership of the first of 
many similar organizations, which was called the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), established in 1909, with leaders such as 
W. E. B. DuBois and Thurgood Marshall. The appreciation of Black art — poetry, 
literature, and music, especially during the Harlem Renaissance era of the 1920s — 
bore witness to the special talents of this group. Still, it was not until 1954 that the 
47 	Fuchs 1995, 89. 
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doctrine of separate-but-equal was reversed by the ruling in the case of Brown vs. 
Board of Education, and legal discrimination was banned only in 1964 by the Civil 
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act the following year, primarily as a result of the 
Blacks' fight for racial equality, led by Martin Luther King and the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference (SCLC). 
However, other forces within the Black community envisioned a different future 
for American Blacks. As early as the 1920s, the first powerful Black nationalist 
movement appeared. This movement envisioned "racial territorial pluralism in 
which Blacks would be given a state or a nation within the US." 48 Its leading figure, 
Marcus Garvey, however, supported repatriation and contended that Blacks must 
return to Africa and establish their union there, in their real homeland. In the 
1960s, the Black Muslim Malcolm X expressed his dissatisfaction with the NAACP 
and the SCLC and propagated the self-separation ofBlacks within American society. 
However, the movement regarded as the most aggressive and separatist of all was 
that of the Black Panthers, spurred on by their conviction that Blacks "form no part 
of the American nation." 49 These examples illustrate well how thoroughly Blacks 
themselves understood the depth of racism in American society and the extent to 
which they were not regarded as an integral part of the American nation. 
This was certainly reflected in the sociological models discussed in the previous 
chapters. Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1944: "White Swedes, Italians, and Jews could 
become Americanized in a generation or two ... Negroes were caught in their'quar-
ters' because of their inescapable social visibility.i50 In 1964, Gordon concluded that 
Blacks are indeed separate from the white population because of "the existence of 
a separate Negro social world with its own institutions and associations." 51 He 
maintained that they represent the only group in the US which forms a separate 
subsociety as well as subculture. One obvious sign of racial separation was the view 
of marriages: in 1964, marriage between Blacks and Whites was still legally pro-
hibited in twenty-two states. Glazer and Moynihan concluded in 1970 that the no-
tion of color blindness in society is "unrealistic" and that "the purpose of 'white' ... 
is not to defend or maintain a 'white' culture or religion but to exclude blacks." 52 
They found that the fear of "the racial other" was the primary source of social con-
flicts as racialization was present in all walks of life. It comes as no real surprise, 
then, that various models of a distinct American nation disregarded Blacks as po-
tential contributors in the emergence of this new nation. In 2003, Song concluded 
that the US is still a biracial country, with a firm dividing line between Blacks and 
	
48 	Fuchs 1995, 107. 
49 Banton, Race Relations (London: Tavistock, 1969), 364. 
So Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: 
Harper,5 	1944), 667. 
Gordon 1964, 163. 
52 Glazer and Moynihan 1970, xxxix. 
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the rest of the population, as there is an overall view that "Asian and Latino Amer-
icans are less different from White people than Black Americans." 53 
This position is clearly reflected in the racial categories listed by the US Census 
Bureau in 2000 in which Latinos are not regarded as a racial category but as an eth-
nic one, members of which may identify with any race — including white. With 
regard to interracial relations, the 2000 Census also revealed that the smallest inter-
racial group is that of Blacks and American Indians with 2.7%, and the second 
smallest is White and Black, with 11.5% of the total mixed race population. This 
seems to indicate that Blacks are the least likely to enter into interracial marriages 
— or that they comprise a significant portion of the category of more than two races. 
This Census also showed that 12.7% of the mixed race population is White and 
Asian. If we bear in mind the small proportion of the Asian population, this is re-
markably high, and may be the outcome of racial perceptions: as Song is quoted as 
saying above, Asians rank higher than Blacks in the racial hierarchy. 
The Asian presence is the result of two separate immigration waves. The early 
Asian immigrants were Chinese, who started entering in the 1840s on the West 
Coast. They worked primarily in mining and on railroad construction, but their 
presence — their physical appearance, culture, language, and faith — was so alien to 
American society that the first ethnic-based exclusionary act was introduced to put 
a halt to their immigration as early as 1882. Japanese immigration followed, but in 
1908 the Gentlemen's Agreement banned the immigration of Japanese males, 
whereas the Ladies' Agreement in 1921 did the same for Japanese females. The ex-
clusion of Asian immigrants signifies not only the course of industrial development 
and the attendant diminished need for cheap labor, but also an extreme anti-Asian 
sentiment. Asians, therefore, were also disregarded in theories on the American 
nation. Asian immigration was stopped completely by the national quota-based im-
migration act in 1924, and the doors were reopened only in 1965. Then immigrants 
seeking political asylum and better economic conditions started to enter the US. 
Due to their relatively late arrival, they were also disregarded in all major studies on 
ethnicity in the US and became a significant group for consideration only in the late 
1970s. 
The reference to Turner's and Zangwill's use of the word race in the second 
paragraph or the changing typification of racial categories by the US Census Bureau 
indicates how racial categories have been subject to ongoing reinterpretation and 
change — although they never challenged the superiority and power position of the 
white race. J. Kincheloe and S. R. Steinberg 54  located the beginning of modern 
Western conceptualizations of race in the late 17`' and early 18`l centuries, finding 
Song 2003, 125. 
54 J. Kincheloe and S. R. Steinberg, "Addressing the Crisis of Whiteness. Reconfiguring White Iden-
tity in a Pedagogy of Whiteness," in J. Kincheloe et al. eds., White Reign. Deploying Whiteness in America 
(New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), 3-30. 
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their roots in the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment. They argued that the 
dominance of whiteness was established by the "privileged construction of the tran-
scendental white male rational subject ... [and] whiteness was naturalized as a uni-
versal entity that operated as more than a mere ethnic positionality." 55 Bhatta-
charyya et al. argued that this emerging rational white subject had the "capacity to 
define and regulate the subjectivity of others and to turn individuals into objects." 56 
Stuart Hall proposed that the examination of racial categorization should focus on 
"the specific conditions which make this form of distinction socially pertinent, his-
torically active."57 The most recent field to deal with the complexity of these factors 
and to map the process of the historical construction of whiteness emerged under 
the name Whiteness Studies in the early 1990s. 58 
Within this field, specific studies focused on the changing racial categorization 
of specific groups who were able to whiten in the course of history. The whitening 
of the Irish, for example, was mapped by Noel Ignatiev 59 and David Roediger, 60 
while Sander Gilman ó1 showed how Jews were regarded as black-skinned and phys-
iologically similar to Blacks from the 17`' to the late 19`" centuries. One racial 
classification from 1910 divided the population as "Slav, English-speaking Euro-
pean, native white, and colored.i ó2 Today White, according to the US Census Bu-
reau, refers to people of European, Middle Eastern and North African origin. These 
are but a few examples of how the color of whiteness has changed throughout the 
last two centuries in the US. 
Jacobson argued that the "contending forces that have fashioned and refashioned 
whiteness in the United States across time ... are capitalism (with its insatiable ap-
petite for cheap labor) and republicanism (with its imperative of responsible 
citizenship) ." 63 In light of this, he contended that the history of whiteness may be 
divided into three periods: (1) 1790-1840, starting with the first naturalization law 
in the US which limited naturalization to "free White persons", which also initiated 
a debate on whether Catholics or Jews should be considered eligible or not; (2) 
Kincheloe and Steinberg 1998, 5. 
56 Gargi Bhattacharyya, John Gabriel and Stephen Small, Race and Power. Global racism in the twenty-
first century (London: Routledge, 2002), 23. 
5' Cited in Peter Childs and Patrick Williams, An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (London: 
Prentice Hall, 1997), 191. 
58 An excellent analysis of the first ten years of the field is provided by Robyn Wiegman, "Whiteness 
Studies and the Paradox of Particularity," Boundary 2: 26.3 (1999): 115-150. 
59 Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
62 Cited in Matthew F. Jacobson, Whiteness ofa Different Color. European Immigrants and the Alchemy 
of Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 5. 
63 	Jacobson 1998, 13. 
55 
60 David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness. Race and the Making oftheAmerican Working Class (Lon-
don: Verso, 1991). 
61 	Sander Gilman, The Jew's Body (London: Routledge, 1991) . 
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1840-1924, an era marked by large-scale immigration, commencing with the mass 
appearance of the Irish in the 1840s, followed by other Europeans from Central, 
Eastern and Southern Europe, systematically regulated by the restrictive, nation-
based legislation of 1924, which was based on "a fracturing of whiteness into a hier-
archy of plural and scientifically determined white races;i ó4 and (3) the post-1924 
era, up to the 1960s, which witnessed "a dramatic decline in the perceived diffe-
rences among these white Others,i ó5 and thus whiteness was "reconsolidated" and 
interest in a changing "dominant racial configuration" connected to African-Amer-
ican internal migration, among other things, became focal. The result of this, argued 
Jacobson, is the contemporary perception of American society as basically biracial: 
Black and White. What is more, the concluding statement in the Kerner Commis-
sion's report from 1968 that the United States consisted of"two societies-one white, 
one black, separate and unequal" 66  still holds true. 
64 	Jacobson 1998, 7. 
65 	Jacobson 1998, 14. 
66 	Cited in Jacobson 1998, 96. 
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CONCLUSION: 
A NATION OF CONSENT 
The previous chapters provided a discussion of various theories and models re-
garding American identity. This identity was always conceptualized as a form of na-
tional identity, and often revolved around the definition of the American people: 
who is an American? What makes one an American? How is one constituted as an 
American? What values, traditions, practices characterize an American? In what 
ways is being American a unique position? Answers to these questions revealed that 
these conceptualizations were primarily the result of their contemporary socio-
economic realities. Depending on these, some theories were prescriptive, others 
descriptive; some worked with homogeneous categories, others emphasized multi-
plicity; some captured uniformity in processes, others diversity; some argued for 
descent, others for consent. 
The War of Independence and the documents which established the US as an 
independent country were acts of consent, which were followed by theorizations 
which could couple it with descent—a natural consequence of mindsets which drew 
on the European nation-states and their ideologies. Up to the 1940s, an underlying 
scheme of the various theories regarded the possibility of the emergence of a homo-
geneous white American nation, united by essentialist categories, such as common 
ancestry—just as ethnic groups claim to be. The emerging Civil Rights Movement 
in the mid-1950s marked the beginning of an era which admitted to pluralism and 
differences, and aimed at theorizations which could grasp these, yet also united them 
within one common framework. The realization of how extremely diverse and mul-
tifaceted the American ethnic and racial landscape was shifted the focus to concepts, 
values, and ideologies which may keep this multiethnic, multicolored, and multi-
cultural nation in one. Based on Sollors' proposition, the American nation was yet 
again conceptualized as a people held together by consent. 
As for the core the consent is constructed around, which is political ideology in 
Greenfeld's interpretation, it has changed throughout the years, always being con-
text-dependent and power-related. It drew on some features and values inherited 
from the Puritans and the Enlightenment of the founding fathers. It supposedly 
remained religious, tolerant, and independent. However, all these can be measured 
through difference; thus these features may call for the establishment of categories 
for their Other. The present era is one in which people in many of these collective 
categories wish not to be the Other, the marginalized, and are willing to fight to 
belong. However, their struggle will probably result in a rearrangement of social 
groups, but not the disappearance of difference based on marginalization and ex- 
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clusion—these differences will just probably shift in some direction, allowing for a 
more tolerant redrawing of the center/margin distinction. This is just as the models 
and theories do, which not only try to describe these processes, but also try to con-
tribute to a heightened presence of social flexibility, since "the requirements of na-
tional economies, polities and ideologies influence the struggles between theories, 
including empirically-grounded ones"' as well. 
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The first study is devoted to the theory of 
structuration by contemporary British so-
ciologist Anthony Giddens. "The author 
offers a precise and circumspect analysis 
in the first chapter, which explores the 
theoretical background of Giddens' mod-
el and its major points of contact with 
other contemporary models as well as 
with other works by Giddens. The sec-
ond chapter does not simply discuss the 
text to establish the grand theory in great 
detail. Indeed, Annus undertakes a much 
greater task: she translates the Giddens-
ian model into an interpretative scheme 
which assists the reader in attaining a far-
reaching understanding. Finally, the third 
chapter logically carries on the strategy of 
contextualization. As an indispensable 
condition of a critical reception so crucial 
pedagogically, she examines the reception 
of Giddens's model among academics, 
potential modes of application, and ... 
shortcomings. ... A meticulous work, 
the study teaches an intelligent reading 
and a critical approach." 
Erzsébet Barát, (University of Szeged; 
Central European University, Budapest) 
In the second study, the author "under-
takes to discuss the various 20`h-century 
theorizations on US national identity. ... 
The work is characterized by a lucidly ar-
ranged structure, fine style and profes-
sional standard.... The author discusses 
the theories she has selected in depth and 
with compelling expertise." 
Zoltán Vajda, (University of Szeged) 
   
    
